"Windfall" sounds extremely benign, and
even noble: apples that have been blown to the ground,
and are available for some industrious soul to pick up
for free. It almost has a "Horatio Alger" feel about
it.
But many windfalls for the "lucky" (privileged) come at
the expense of those who work hard? How much of our
extremely tilted playing field, our wildly distorted
distributions of income and wealth come from so-called
"windfalls" like the privilege of collecting -- and
keeping -- the rent on land value? How many windfalls
are actually organized, legalized theft? What are the
effects on the rest of us?
But before this time the reader, unless
he has given previous attention to the subject, is full
of objections to the above doctrine: "How about the
law?" he is asking. "Hasn't a man the right to buy a
piece of land as cheaply as he can, to do what he
pleases with it, and hold on to it till he gets ready
to sell?" The answer is that at present he certainly
has this statutory right, which has been so long and so
universally recognized that most people suppose it to
be not only a legal, but a real or equitable right. A
shrewd man, foreseeing the direction of growth of
population in a city, for example, can buy a
well-located block at a moderate figure from some less
far-seeing owner, can let it grow up to weeds, fence it
off against all comers and give it no further attention
except to pay the very small tax usually imposed upon
vacant land.
Meantime the increasing community builds
up all around it with homes, banks, stores, churches,
schools, paving and lighting the streets, giving police
and fire protection, etc., and at last comes to need
this block so urgently that the owner is fairly begged
to sell it, at three or ten or fifty times what it cost
him. Quite often the purchaser at this enormous advance
is the very community which has through its presence
and the expenditure of its taxes created practically
the whole value of the land in question!
It was said above that an individual has
a statutory right to pursue this very common course.
That was an error. The statement should have been that
he has a statutory wrong; for no disinterested person
can follow the course of land speculation as almost
universally practiced, without feeling its rank
injustice.
How did so evident a wrong become so
firmly established? ...
Being the high financiers of their days
and generations, they managed to contrive taxes which
could be plausibly and gradually imposed upon the
landless, until within a few generations they had
succeeded in shifting most of the cost of government on
to the plebeians without giving up a foot of land or
any considerable part of the income therefrom. The
"common people" were deftly loaded with the heavy end
of the beam, which they have been carrying ever since;
while the arbitrarily created landlords and their
successors, down to the present day, have kept their
tight hold on the community's natural income.
The landlords, being also the lawmakers,
have seen to it that their tenure of this easy money
should not be disturbed, but on the contrary have so
buttressed it with centuries of legislation,
precedents, and judicial decisions, that any
proposition to hark back to the terms of the original
bargain, whereby the owners of the land agreed to pay
the expenses of the government, is now denounced as
anarchy and sacrilege.
Lapse of time, however, never can
transform wrong into right, nor can a buyer acquire any
better title than the seller possessed. The economic
rent belongs to the community, which can and will begin
to reclaim it as soon as the voters thoroughly awake to
the facts and the right and wrong of the matter, which
are not hard to grasp when the subject is presented in
its simplest form.
An illustration has already been given of
the case of a piece of farm land. Let us take an
example in a large city. Let us take a corner lot
centrally located in New York City, the title to which
lot is held by, say, Mr. John William Rhinelastor. This
lot was a part of an old Dutch farm, and is an
heirloom. It did not cost the present owner anything,
nor his father nor his grandfather. There is a little
old building on it, which has always been rented at a
figure ten times as large as the taxes imposed, so that
the owner has been handsomely subsidized each year for
storing his title-deeds during a period of the city's
growth in which the increase in population and the
expenditure of public money in that neighborhood have
raised the value of this corner location to, say, two
hundred times its early value.
About now, Mr. Rhinelastor decides that
he will go abroad to live, and can't be bothered with
this piece of property. But knowing that the pressure
of population is sure to increase and that the
expenditure of public money to the benefit of this land
must continue, he will not sell it. So he gives a
twenty-one year lease to the corner for, say, $20,000 a
year net, with a privilege to the lessee of renewals at
advancing figures. The lessee agrees to pay all
taxes.
Now what is this net $20,000 a year,
which will be regularly remitted to Mr. Rhinelastor, in
Europe or wherever he may be, given in payment for? Not
for the old building — the first thing the lessee
does is to pull it down. Not for the land itself
— it is all rock, which has got to be blasted out
as part of its improvement.
Clearly it is paid for a location or site
value, which the community, and the community only, has
built up and paid for. In other words, the present
$20,000 rental, and the larger one which that location
will command in later years, is strictly a community
product, and as such belongs to the community and not
to Mr. Rhinelastor.
That the latter has no good right to it
is at once evident when we remember that "When one man
gets something for nothing somebody else has got to
give something for nothing." Here are $20,000 that some
men and women have got to work to earn every year to
hand over to a man who does not render, and does not
feel any obligation to render, one dollar's worth of
public or private service in return. Such is the wild
travesty of justice which we call law. It is not
comical only because it is frankly tragic in its social
results. ... read the
whole article
Bill Batt: Painless Taxation
Abstract Real tax reform
could do away with those taxes that are resented by
the large proportion of our population. We could
replace all taxes on wages and on interest by
instead taxing economic rent. Rent is windfall
income; it is income that arises not from the
efforts of any person or corporation; it comes
about as a surplus gain from common social
enterprise. There is ample moral warrant for
society to lay claim to that which it has created,
as well as to that which no individual or party has
earned. Analysis increasingly makes clear that
economic rent in all its forms is far larger than
official government figures indicate; in fact it is
likely sufficient to supplant all current taxes on
labor and capital (wages and interest) which are
acknowledged to have so many negative effects.
Recovering economic rent in all its manifestations
by taxing its various bases actually can foster
economic performance and yield other benefits that
make it the natural source of revenue for
governments. Such a tax is essentially
painless.
Introduction
Under current tax regimes, some people get hit
with onerous bills while others get windfall
gains.[1] If taxes
only on windfalls were collected, we could
eliminate those burdens that fall unfairly upon
people who have rightfully earned their income and
wealth, and the total would likely remain revenue
neutral. This is my thesis here, one which should
compel the attention of those who would redesign
our tax system.
1. A windfall, usually defined, is
"an unexpected financial gain, or a stroke of
luck." But, as one exhaustive study makes clear,
it is typically the consequence of some public
policy decision. ...
... Any tax on capital has its downside effects,
so that taxing savings causes people to save less,
taxing consumption causes people to buy less, and
taxing buildings causes people to build less. The
result is that economists as well as businessmen
usually frown upon taxing capital. Another
alternative is to tax labor, but it is even more
widely understood that taxing labor normally
discourages people from working as much as they
would in the absence of a tax. From this comes
sentiment against taxing labor, even though for
want of any alternative, people have today commonly
come to accept it as a necessity. But electing to
tax labor, just as for taxing capital, forecloses a
discussion of the virtues of taxing land —
not necessarily land as earth, but rather land as
location. Yet land rent is the most
attractive tax base of all, as rent is not earned;
it is windfall income, entirely the result of being
well situated in any market of scarce natural
resources and where community demand (rather than
one's own efforts) leads to an appreciation of that
land's price. To be sure many people have learned
to position themselves in situations where a land's
market value is likely to rise — indeed these
people come to think of themselves as astute
investors. But the fact is that that market gain is
not of their own doing at all; it is the result of
common enterprise creating a surplus that comes to
settle on land sites. An investment in land, in any
form it might take, is speculation in greater or
lesser degree. ...
To be sure, by replacing taxes on labor and
capital with taxes on land rent, people will enjoy
greater returns for their enterprise and will be
able to keep what they have earned. But people will
also cease, at least those few who have been so
lucky, to be able to rely on windfall unearned
gains that they have in many cases come to regard
as their entitlements. The greatest forfeiture of
such windfall gains will be homeowners who have
come to see their title to a home as an investment,
and not a place to live. But whereas some
residential locations have seen enormous increases
in market prices — as much as 20 percent
yearly on occasion — others have enjoyed no
such fortune. People may come to understand that
houses depreciate just like cars, refrigerators and
computers. They may also see that it is only land
value that increases, and realize that any gain
which their land has is due to the general vitality
of their community and region. It may help them to
realize that they are linked to and dependent upon
the society as a whole, and that their fortune is
not in this dimension of their own making.
Well over a century ago, John Stuart Mill
recognized that
landlords grow richer in their sleep without
working, risking or economizing. The increase in
the value of land, arising as it does from the
efforts of an entire community, should belong to
the community and not to the individual who might
hold title.[17]
... read the whole
article
Frank Stilwell and Kirrily Jordan:
The Political
Economy of Land: Putting Henry George in His
Place
Indeed, one could say that the term
‘tax’ is a misnomer because what is
really involved is value created by the community
being retained by the community rather than being
appropriated by private landholders. For example,
under current arrangements landowners receive
‘windfall’ gains when the market value
of their land rises as a result of publicly
provided infrastructure being built nearby, or when
local government zoning decisions reclassify their
land as appropriate for further development. In
this way, individual landowners stand to reap huge
benefits at the expense of community-generated
processes. Such arrangements create an odd
incentive: allowing landholders to appropriate the
unearned wealth generated by rising land values,
thereby rewarding this unproductive activity, while
taxing productive endeavour. The Georgist land tax
‘remedy’, by contrast, would eliminate
such perverse incentives and thereby more
effectively align private and public interests in
the use of society’s resources. ...
Georgist analysis strongly emphasises
landownership as a principal source of inequality.
Because land is a strictly limited resource, its
private ownership necessarily excludes large
sections of the community from its benefits. A
landowning class thereby gains political economic
power. In George’s own time the social
identity and power of this landowning class was
distinctive. Those who could not afford to buy land
were forced to pay rent to the wealthier few who
could. By taxing the value of land, George posited
that publicly created wealth could be recouped from
the private landowners and redistributed throughout
the community more equitably in order to address
social goals.
Are George’s arguments about land
ownership and wealth inequality relevant today?
Australia provides an interesting example, because
land is the single largest item in national wealth.
Laurie Aarons outlines the concentration of farming
land in particular in the hands of a few very
wealthy corporations and individuals – what
he refers to as ‘corporate
squattocracy’ (Aarons, 1999: 23). The
relentless increase in urban land values in recent
years has also produced dramatic redistributions of
wealth. In the State of New South Wales, for
example, land values increased by about $361
billion over the period 1993 – 2003. The
existing land-based taxes clawed back only $44
billion in government revenues, comprising only
about 12% of the land-related economic surplus. So
88% was retained as ‘unearned income’
by landowners (Stilwell and Jordan, forthcoming). A
higher rate of land tax with fewer exemptions could
have substantially reduced this private wealth
appropriation. This is not necessarily to posit the
desirability of recouping 100% through land tax,
because that would certainly raise major problems
of people’s ability to pay, given that much
of the increased wealth resulting from land price
inflation has not been realised as current income.
But it is indicative of the current imbalance
between private and public appropriations of the
surplus arising from increases in land-based
wealth. ... read the whole
article
Bill Batt: The Compatibility of Georgist
Economics and Ecological Economics
Rent becomes critically important in Georgist
economics, because rent is the increment of market gain
that accrues to choice land parcels. This insight arose
originally in the context of agricultural societies,
where differential qualities of land were recognized by
varied payment in rent. An individual’s return on
investment was represented by his labor — that
was his and his alone to keep. So also were whatever
capital goods he acquired through the efforts of his
past labor. On the other hand, whenever land offered a
higher yield separate from whatever the
individual’s labor investment might represent,
this constituted a windfall gain above
and beyond what might be minimally expected.
This is land rent, and it exists even if it isn’t
collected. Today, as earlier noted, the greatest land
rents derive from their location, grown out of nearby
social investment. ...
The Georgist main agenda, as earlier noted, is
economic justice. If one searches the term
“economic justice” online, the first site
that will appear is the Georgist website, progress.org. The
starting point is that people are entitled to what they
earn, but only to what they earn. The fruits of the
commons generated in rent might also be distributed to
citizens equally if not used to finance the general
services of government. In practice this means the
abolition of those taxes that represent an unjust
capture of one’s personal property — taxes
such as income, sales, and other nuisance taxes. It
accepts, to be sure, the need to collect user fees,
Pigouvian taxes, and perhaps sumptuary (sin) taxes. It
argues aggressively for the collection of economic rent
in support of government and, for any remaining
surplus, its distribution as a citizens’
dividend. The justification for the collection of
rent has several grounds:
-
the first is to preclude the entitlement of
windfall gains to those who have unfairly captured
monopoly control of parts of what are rightfully
the public commons.
-
A second reason is to enhance the efficiency
of economic productivity which the failure to
collect rent prevents. It is not just that monopoly
control of commons sites drives less attractive and
less valuable land into production because the
primary choices are unavailable; it is also that
the use of alternative taxes leads to a deadweight
loss in the economy which reduces the wealth of
every citizen except the monopoly titleholder.The
proper collection of land rent leads to increases
in economic efficiency in a way that wages are not
artificially depressed and more opportunities arise
in the labor market.
The result of these factors leads to a greater
equality in the income of each person.
...
Pricing resources of nature at their marginal
rates is a clearly understood economic principle. To do
otherwise fosters extravagant and wasteful use of such,
or leads to inefficient use of their locations. Hence
both a moral reason — the unjust
windfall gain that otherwise befalls such monopoly
titles — and an economic reason —
efficiency — call for such practices. It is the
compelling impetus of politics and not economic
rationality that frustrates the implementation of such
designs. With the advent of greater and more accurate
data, as well as the increased power of computer
analysis, there is every reason to argue for and
anticipate the collection of economic rent from every
source where it arises. ... read the whole
article
Bill Batt: Stemming
Sprawl: The Fiscal Approach
Stemming Sprawl: Pricing Measures for
Transportation
From the foregoing, it is clear that insofar as the
causes of sprawl development are economic, the solution
needs to be economic as well. The equilibrium of forces
can be restored in two ways:
1) by charging the true marginal costs of motor
vehicle transportation to users and
2) by recovering the economic rent from urban site
owners that is really the socially created value.
It is easy to distinguish five elements of
transportation service cost: capital investment,
maintenance costs, regulation costs, environmental
externalities, and congestion costs. Each of these
calls for a different treatment with respect to revenue
design. Capital costs are best recovered by
recapturing the land rent proximate to the highway
corridors. This is socially created value, which is
better used to honor debt service of infrastructure
investment than allowing it to be retained as windfall
gains by titleholders to property close by.
User fees, most aptly linked to the purchase of motor
fuel and tire wear, serve as a proxy for the use of the
roads and can be designed to be commensurate with use.
As the wear and tear of roads as well as police patrol,
snow and ice control, and signaling all involve
operating and maintenance costs, such charges are
easily linked with benefits received. In the future,
still more accurate systems of service charges are
likely to appear: Singapore, Hong Kong, and New Zealand
are already reliant on electronic devices that record
road use by time, place, and vehicle weight.
Ensuring the safety of drivers and vehicles through
licenses, registrations, and inspections is most
appropriately financed by fees commensurate with the
costs of their administration. This way, if a vehicle
is used but seldom, it is charged on the basis of its
identification rather than assuming any projected level
of use. Environmental externalities such as pollution
costs can be linked to the polluting source, such as
diesel fuel and gasoline consumption, to the full
extent necessary to equilibrate air quality and other
environmental ambiences. Congestion costs, the last of
the major components of a pricing design for highway
use, are partially paid for by the time loss of those
caught in traffic. The costs of time lost due to
highway congestion are enormous: In 2000, the average
driver spent 62 hours sitting in traffic at a
nationwide cost of $68 billion in gas and time lost In
Los Angeles, the average driver spent 136 hours stalled
in traffic at an average cost of $2,510.[33] Commuting
times were also 20 percent longer than they were a
decade ago, about 22 minutes one way nationally on
average but as high as 32 minutes on average in New
York.[34] But not all
people's time is valued equally, and people themselves
value their time differently at different times, and it
is unfair to require people to impose their congestion
on others. Therefore, congestion pricing, being
explored in several urban regions, provides a rationing
of limited highway space. In a sense, that payment for
space usage, in time or money, is a form of land rent.
... read the whole
article
Charles B. Fillebrown: A Catechism of Natural
Taxation, from Principles of Natural
Taxation (1917)
Q22. What is privilege?
A. Strictly defined, privilege is, according to the
Century Dictionary, "a special and exclusive power
conferred by law on particular persons or classes of
persons and ordinarily in derogation of the common
right."
Q23. What is today the popular conception of
privilege?
A. That it is the law-given power of one man to profit
at another man's expense.
Q24. What are the principal forms of
privilege?
A. The appropriation by individuals, or by public
service corporations, of the net rent of land created
by the growth and activity of the community without
payment for the same. Also, the less important
privileges connected with patents, tariff, and the
currency.
Q25. Where in does privilege differ from
capital?
A. Capital is a material thing, a product of labor,
stored-up wages; an instrument of production paid for
in human labor, and destined to wear out. Capital is
the natural ally of labor, and is harmless except as
allied to privilege. Privilege is none of these, but is
an intangible statutory power, an unpaid-for and
perpetual lien upon the future labor of this and
succeeding generations. Capital is paid for and
ephemeral. Privilege is unpaid for and eternal. A man
accumulated in his profession $5,000 capital, which he
invested in land in Canada. Ten years later he sold the
same land for $200,000. Here is an instance of $5,000
capital allied with $195,000 privilege. This
illustrates that privilege and not capital is the real
enemy of labor.
Q26. How may franchises be treated?
A. Franchise privileges may be abated, or gradually
abolished by lower rates, or by taxation, or by both,
in the interest of the community.
Q27. Why should privilege be especially
taxed?
A. Because such payment is fairly due from grantee to
the grantor of privilege and also because a tax upon
privilege can never be a burden upon industry or
commerce, nor can it ever operate to reduce the wages
of labor or increase prices to the consumer.
Q28. How are landlords privileged?
A. Because, in so far as their land tax is an "old"
tax, it is a burdenless tax, and because their
buildings' tax is shifted upon their tenants; most
landlords who let land and also the tenement houses and
business blocks thereon avoid all share in the tax
burden.
Q29. How does privilege affect the distribution
of wealth?
A. Wealth as produced is now distributed substantially
in but two channels, privilege and wages. The abolition
of privilege would leave but the one proper channel,
viz., wages of capital, hand, and brain.
... read
the whole article
Karl Williams: Land Value Taxation: The
Overlooked But Vital Eco-Tax
I. Historical overview
II. The problem of sprawl
III. Affordable and efficient public
transport
IV. Agricultural benefits
V. Financial concerns
VI. Conclusion: A greater
perspective
Appendix: "Natural Capitalism" -- A Case Study
in Blindness to Land Value Taxation
While all landholders will be encouraged to put
their land to its optimal use, land speculators will be
particularly affected by LVT. The former head of the
Town Planning Department of the University of
Queensland, Philip Day, characterises the current lure
of windfall increases in land
value operating as a standing invitation to "develop"
land by seeking approval for a change of use,
irrespective of its environmental significance and
regardless of how such rezoning repeatedly leads to the
environmentally destructive process of urban
sprawl.
While, at first sight, the
prospect of sprawling cities with lots of open space
and possible greenery might be appealing from an
environmental perspective, a closer examination should
lead to a different conclusion. The inducement
to collect windfall profits (resulting from the failure
of society to apply LVT) encourages some landholders to
withhold vacant land from the market and forces new
development to "leapfrog" this land and move further
out. Hence there is an unnecessary outlay in roads,
pipelines, power supplies and other infrastructure
which must service a greater area. Commuting journeys,
similarly, must now consume greater resources.
Financially inducing land to be put to its optimal use
is not "flogging" the land, but is rather ensuring land
is carefully used and that we only exploit as much as
we properly need. ...
A simple model will serve to illustrate.
Presently, rail/metro infrastructure is almost
prohibitively expensive because the windfall benefits
are effectively handed over to landowners. To partially
recoup the outlay, authorities are forced to set fares
so high as to act as a disincentive to potential
low-impact commuters. ... read the entire
article
Karl Williams: Landlording It Over
Us
But the rewards of land go far beyond status,
evidenced by how, over the centuries, the land-owning
elite has pulled the levers of power in society,
politics and the world of commerce. The Earl of
Derby’s 1881 candid analysis of the benefits of
owning land perhaps says it best,
- “One, political
influence;
- two, social importance;
- three, power exercised over
tenantry;
- four, residential enjoyment including what
is called sport;
- five, the money return – the
rent.”
Since then, the reform of the House of Lords has
dented the political influence that was previously
wielded by the landowning class (titles and land were
once synonymous). But who needs status? –
let’s get crass and just go for the cash. The
great windfall profits which are dropped into
landowners’ laps (which rightly belongs to the
community) occurs with rezoning and the growth in
residential/industrial values. In the UK between 1991
and 2001, the total return by this measure (including
capital growth and rental income) averaged a healthy
12.6% per year.
The gross injustice of handing over
community-created values to landowners is revealed by
cold, hard figures. According to Yolande Barnes, head
of research at FPD Savills, the
average UK building plot – at £709,650 for a
greenfield acre – is worth around 403 times the
equivalent agricultural land. Nationwide,
through this form of rezoning, around £5bn.
windfall profit is handed over to UK landowners each
year.
Barnes explains further, “In many parts of
the South and Southeast, it is certainly true that
prices are paid for agricultural land that
wouldn’t be justified by its agricultural
value.” She said further that it is impossible to
know how much of this differential is accounted for by
a "hope" factor – a speculative play on future
change of use – and how much represents the
premium for land’s amenity value when it is in
such short supply. But she adds: “There has
certainly been a deal of strategic holding and buying
on city and town fringes by agricultural owners and
farmers. New development land is usually designated in
“fill-ins” and close to existing
developments.” She added further that
farmers buy around towns because they
can’t lose. They’ll farm the land anyway,
and if permission is given to build, they’ve won
the lottery.
A great way to run a casino,
but what sort of way to run an economy and a
society? Read the whole
article
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