Public Expenditure
One of the beauties of forming communities is that
through our common spending, we can together create
amenities and provide services that benefit large number
of people, which individuals would have great difficulty
in providing or could only provide very
inefficiently.
Most public spending creates more value than what it
costs. Spend money on a bridge, and land values rise at
an accelerating rate on both sides of the bridge. Build a
subway system, and land values within a significant
radius around the stations go sky high. Improve the
schools, and land values will rise. Provide trash pickup,
and land values will rise.
Judging a public spending project on the basis of
whether it will produce an increase in land values equal
to the cost of the project makes a lot of sense. For
example, there was the famous proposal to build a bridge
to an island in Alaska. One guess at the land value of
that island placed the island's value at about $450
million, and the cost of the bridge was to be about $223
million. So if building the bridge results in a 50%
increase in land values, the cost of building the bridge
would be covered! (And if building the bridge
wouldn't produce a 50% increase in land values,
did the project make sense?)
Now we need to consider who it is that should
pay for that bridge, and why the current owners of the
60,000 or so acres of land on that island should receive
a windfall. If we believe that the federal taxpayer
should pay for it, should it be paid for via a tax on
wages and other income, or should it be through a federal
tax on land values?
Something to think about.
Henry George: The
Common Sense of Taxation (1881 article)
The true purposes of government are well stated in the
preamble to the Constitution of the United States, as
they are in the Declaration of Independence. To insure
the general peace, to promote the general welfare, to
secure to each individual the inalienable rights to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness — these are
the proper ends of government, and are therefore the ends
which in every scheme of taxation should be kept in
mind.
As to amount of taxation, there is no principle which
imposes any arbitrary limit. Heavy taxation is better for
any community than light taxation, if the increased
revenue be used in doing by public agencies things which
could not be done, or could not be as well and
economically done, by private agencies. Taxes
could be lightened in the city of New York by dispensing
with street-lamps and disbanding the police force. But
would a reduction in taxation gained in this way be for
the benefit of the people of New York and make New York a
more desirable place to live in? Or if it should be found
that heat and light could be conducted through the
streets at public expense and supplied to each house at
but a small fraction of the cost of supplying them by
individual effort, or that the city railroads could be
run at public expense so as to give every one
transportation at very much less than it now costs the
average resident, the increased taxation necessary for
these purposes would not be increased burden, and in
spite of the larger taxation required, New York would
become a more desirable place to live in. It is a mistake
to condemn taxation as bad merely because it is high; it
is a mistake to impose by constitutional provision, as in
many of our States has been advocated, and in some of our
States has been done, any restriction upon the amount of
taxation. A restriction upon the incurring of public
indebtedness is another matter. In nothing is the
far-reaching statesmanship of Jefferson more clearly
shown than in his proposition that all public obligations
should be deemed void after a certain brief term —
a proposition which he grounds upon the self-evident
truth that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living,
and that the dead have no control over it, and can give
no title to any part of it. But restriction upon public
debts is a very different thing from restriction upon the
power of taxation, and reasons which urge the one do not
apply to the other. Nor is increased taxation
necessarily proof of governmental extravagance. Increase
in taxation is in the order of social development, for
the reason that social development tends to the doing of
things collectively that in a ruder state are done
individually, to the giving to government of new
functions and the imposing of new duties. Our public
schools and libraries and parks, our signal service and
fish commissions and agricultural bureaus and grasshopper
investigations, are evidences of this.
But while no limit can be properly fixed for the
amount of taxation, the method of taxation is of supreme
importance. A horse may be anchored by fastening to his
bridle a weight which he will not feel when carried in a
buggy behind him. The best ship may be made utterly
unseaworthy by the bad stowage of a cargo which properly
placed would make her the stiffer and more weatherly. So
enterprise may be palsied, industry crushed, accumulation
prevented, and a prosperous country turned into a desert,
by taxation which rightly levied would hardly be felt.
...
So long as we consider that community most prosperous
which increases most rapidly in wealth, so long is it the
height of absurdity for us to tax wealth in any of its
beneficial forms. We should tax what we want to repress,
not what we want to encourage. We should tax that which
results from the general prosperity, not that which
conduces to it. It is the increase of population, the
extension of cultivation, the manufacture of goods, the
building of houses and ships and railroads, the
accumulation of capital, and the growth of commerce that
add to the value of land — not the increase in the
value of land that induces the increase of population and
increase of wealth. It is not that the land of Manhattan
Island is now worth hundreds of millions where, in the
time of the early Dutch settlers, it was only worth
dollars, that there are on it now so many more people,
and so much more wealth. It is because of the increase of
population and the increase of wealth that the value of
the land has so much increased. Increase of land values
tends of itself to repel population and prevent
improvement. And thus the taxation of land values, unlike
taxation of other property, does not tend to prevent the
increase of wealth, but rather to stimulate it. It is the
taking of the golden egg, not the choking of the goose
that lays it.
Every consideration of policy and ethics squares with
this conclusion. The tax upon land values is the most
economically perfect of all taxes. It does not raise
prices; it maybe collected at least cost, and with the
utmost ease and certainty; it leaves in full strength all
the springs of production; and, above all, it consorts
with the truest equality and the highest justice. For, to
take for the common purposes of the community that value
which results from the growth of the community, and to
free industry and enterprise and thrift from burden and
restraint, is to leave to each that which he fairly
earns, and to assert the first and most comprehensive of
equal rights — the equal right of all to the land
on which, and from which, all must live.
Thus it is that the scheme of taxation which conduces
to the greatest production is also that which conduces to
the fairest distribution, and that in the proper
adjustment of taxation lies not merely the possibility of
enormously increasing the general wealth, but the
solution of these pressing social and political problems
which spring from unnatural inequality in the
distribution of wealth. ... read the whole
article
Henry George: The Condition of Labor
— An Open Letter to Pope Leo XIII in response to
Rerum Novarum (1891)
God’s laws do not change. Though their
applications may alter with altering conditions, the same
principles of right and wrong that hold when men are few
and industry is rude also hold amid teeming populations
and complex industries. In our cities of millions and our
states of scores of millions, in a civilization where the
division of labor has gone so far that large numbers are
hardly conscious that they are land-users, it still
remains true that we are all land animals and can live
only on land, and that land is God’s bounty to all,
of which no one can be deprived without being murdered,
and for which no one can be compelled to pay another
without being robbed. But even in a state of society
where the elaboration of industry and the increase of
permanent improvements have made the need for private
possession of land wide-spread, there is no difficulty in
conforming individual possession with the equal right to
land. For as soon as any piece of land will yield to the
possessor a larger return than is had by similar labor on
other land a value attaches to it which is shown when it
is sold or rented. Thus, the value of the land itself,
irrespective of the value of any improvements in or on
it, always indicates the precise value of the benefit to
which all are entitled in its use, as distinguished from
the value which, as producer or successor of a producer,
belongs to the possessor in individual right.
To combine the advantages of private possession with
the justice of common ownership it is only necessary
therefore to take for common uses what value attaches to
land irrespective of any exertion of labor on it. The
principle is the same as in the case referred to, where a
human father leaves equally to his children things not
susceptible of specific division or common use. In that
case such things would be sold or rented and the value
equally applied.
It is on this common-sense principle that we, who term
ourselves single-tax men, would have the community
act.
We do not propose to assert equal rights to land by
keeping land common, letting any one use any part of it
at any time. We do not propose the task, impossible in
the present state of society, of dividing land in equal
shares; still less the yet more impossible task of
keeping it so divided.
We propose — leaving land in the private
possession of individuals, with full liberty on their
part to give, sell or bequeath it — simply to levy
on it for public uses a tax that shall equal the annual
value of the land itself, irrespective of the use made of
it or the improvements on it. And since this
would provide amply for the need of public revenues, we
would accompany this tax on land values with the repeal
of all taxes now levied on the products and processes of
industry — which taxes, since they take from the
earnings of labor, we hold to be infringements of the
right of property.
This we propose, not as a cunning device of human
ingenuity, but as a conforming of human regulations to
the will of God.
God cannot contradict himself nor impose on his
creatures laws that clash.
If it be God’s command to men that they should
not steal — that is to say, that they should
respect the right of property which each one has in the
fruits of his labor;
And if he be also the Father of all men, who in his
common bounty has intended all to have equal
opportunities for sharing;
Then, in any possible stage of civilization, however
elaborate, there must be some way in which the exclusive
right to the products of industry may be reconciled with
the equal right to land.
If the Almighty be consistent with himself, it cannot
be, as say those socialists referred to by you, that in
order to secure the equal participation of men in the
opportunities of life and labor we must ignore the right
of private property. Nor yet can it be, as you yourself
in the Encyclical seem to argue, that to secure the right
of private property we must ignore the equality of right
in the opportunities of life and labor. To say the one
thing or the other is equally to deny the harmony of
God’s laws.
But, the private possession of land, subject to the
payment to the community of the value of any special
advantage thus given to the individual, satisfies both
laws, securing to all equal participation in the bounty
of the Creator and to each the full ownership of the
products of his labor. ...
Nor do we hesitate to say that this way of securing
the equal right to the bounty of the Creator and the
exclusive right to the products of labor is the way
intended by God for raising public revenues. For we are
not atheists, who deny God; nor semi-atheists, who deny
that he has any concern in politics and legislation.
It is true as you say — a salutary truth too
often forgotten — that “man is older than the
state, and he holds the right of providing for the life
of his body prior to the formation of any state.”
Yet, as you too perceive, it is also true that the state
is in the divinely appointed order. For He who foresaw
all things and provided for all things, foresaw and
provided that with the increase of population and the
development of industry the organization of human society
into states or governments would become both expedient
and necessary.
No sooner does the state arise than, as we all
know, it needs revenues. This need for revenues is small
at first, while population is sparse, industry rude and
the functions of the state few and simple. But with
growth of population and advance of civilization the
functions of the state increase and larger and larger
revenues are needed.
Now, He that made the world and placed man in it, He
that pre-ordained civilization as the means whereby man
might rise to higher powers and become more and more
conscious of the works of his Creator, must have foreseen
this increasing need for state revenues and have made
provision for it. That is to say: The
increasing need for public revenues with social advance,
being a natural, God-ordained need, there must be a right
way of raising them — some way that we can truly
say is the way intended by God. It is clear that this
right way of raising public revenues must accord with the
moral law.
Hence:
- It must not take from individuals what rightfully
belongs to individuals.
- It must not give some an advantage over others, as by
increasing the prices of what some have to sell and
others must buy.
- It must not lead men into temptation, by requiring
trivial oaths, by making it profitable to lie, to swear
falsely, to bribe or to take bribes.
- It must not confuse the distinctions of right and
wrong, and weaken the sanctions of religion and the state
by creating crimes that are not sins, and punishing men
for doing what in itself they have an undoubted right to
do.
- It must not repress industry. It must not check
commerce. It must not punish thrift. It must offer no
impediment to the largest production and the fairest
division of wealth.
Let me ask your Holiness to consider the taxes on the
processes and products of industry by which through the
civilized world public revenues are collected — the
octroi duties that surround Italian cities with barriers;
the monstrous customs duties that hamper intercourse
between so-called Christian states; the taxes on
occupations, on earnings, on investments, on the building
of houses, on the cultivation of fields, on industry and
thrift in all forms. Can these be the ways God has
intended that governments should raise the means they
need? Have any of them the characteristics indispensable
in any plan we can deem a right one?
All these taxes violate the moral law. They take by
force what belongs to the individual alone; they give to
the unscrupulous an advantage over the scrupulous; they
have the effect, nay are largely intended, to increase
the price of what some have to sell and others must buy;
they corrupt government; they make oaths a mockery; they
shackle commerce; they fine industry and thrift; they
lessen the wealth that men might enjoy, and enrich some
by impoverishing others.
Yet what most strikingly shows how opposed to
Christianity is this system of raising public revenues is
its influence on thought.
Christianity teaches us that all men are brethren;
that their true interests are harmonious, not
antagonistic. It gives us, as the golden rule of life,
that we should do to others as we would have others do to
us. But out of the system of taxing the products and
processes of labor, and out of its effects in increasing
the price of what some have to sell and others must buy,
has grown the theory of “protection,” which
denies this gospel, which holds Christ ignorant of
political economy and proclaims laws of national
well-being utterly at variance with his teaching. This
theory sanctifies national hatreds; it inculcates a
universal war of hostile tariffs; it teaches peoples that
their prosperity lies in imposing on the productions of
other peoples restrictions they do not wish imposed on
their own; and instead of the Christian doctrine of
man’s brotherhood it makes injury of foreigners a
civic virtue.
“By their fruits ye shall know them.” Can
anything more clearly show that to tax the products and
processes of industry is not the way God intended public
revenues to be raised?
But to consider what we propose — the raising of
public revenues by a single tax on the value of land
irrespective of improvements — is to see that in
all respects this does conform to the moral law.
Let me ask your Holiness to keep in mind that the
value we propose to tax, the value of land irrespective
of improvements, does not come from any exertion of labor
or investment of capital on or in it — the values
produced in this way being values of improvement which we
would exempt. The value of land irrespective of
improvement is the value that attaches to land by reason
of increasing population and social progress. This is a
value that always goes to the owner as owner, and never
does and never can go to the user; for if the user be a
different person from the owner he must always pay the
owner for it in rent or in purchase-money; while if the
user be also the owner, it is as owner, not as user, that
he receives it, and by selling or renting the land he
can, as owner, continue to receive it after he ceases to
be a user.
Thus, taxes on land irrespective of improvement cannot
lessen the rewards of industry, nor add to prices,* nor
in any way take from the individual what belongs to the
individual. They can take only the value that attaches to
land by the growth of the community, and which therefore
belongs to the community as a whole.
* As to this point it may be well to add
that all economists are agreed that taxes on land
values irrespective of improvement or use — or
what in the terminology of political economy is styled
rent, a term distinguished from the ordinary use of the
word rent by being applied solely to payments for the
use of land itself — must be paid by the owner
and cannot be shifted by him on the user. To explain in
another way the reason given in the text: Price is not
determined by the will of the seller or the will of the
buyer, but by the equation of demand and supply, and
therefore as to things constantly demanded and
constantly produced rests at a point determined by the
cost of production — whatever tends to increase
the cost of bringing fresh quantities of such articles
to the consumer increasing price by checking supply,
and whatever tends to reduce such cost decreasing price
by increasing supply. Thus taxes on wheat or tobacco or
cloth add to the price that the consumer must pay, and
thus the cheapening in the cost of producing steel
which improved processes have made in recent years has
greatly reduced the price of steel. But land has no
cost of production, since it is created by God, not
produced by man. Its price therefore is fixed
—
1 (monopoly rent), where land is held
in close monopoly, by what the owners can extract
from the users under penalty of deprivation and
consequently of starvation, and amounts to all that
common labor can earn on it beyond what is necessary
to life;
2 (economic rent proper), where there is no special
monopoly, by what the particular land will yield to
common labor over and above what may be had by like
expenditure and exertion on land having no special
advantage and for which no rent is paid; and,
3 (speculative rent, which is a species of monopoly
rent, telling particularly in selling price), by the
expectation of future increase of value from social
growth and improvement, which expectation causing
landowners to withhold land at present prices has the
same effect as combination.
Taxes on land values or economic rent
can therefore never be shifted by the landowner to the
land-user, since they in no wise increase the demand
for land or enable landowners to check supply by
withholding land from use. Where rent depends on mere
monopolization, a case I mention because rent may in
this way be demanded for the use of land even before
economic or natural rent arises, the taking by taxation
of what the landowners were able to extort from labor
could not enable them to extort any more, since
laborers, if not left enough to live on, will die. So,
in the case of economic rent proper, to take from the
landowners the premiums they receive, would in no way
increase the superiority of their land and the demand
for it. While, so far as price is affected by
speculative rent, to compel the landowners to pay taxes
on the value of land whether they were getting any
income from it or not, would make it more difficult for
them to withhold land from use; and to tax the full
value would not merely destroy the power but the desire
to do so.
To take land values for the state, abolishing all
taxes on the products of labor, would therefore leave to
the laborer the full produce of labor; to the individual
all that rightfully belongs to the individual. It would
impose no burden on industry, no check on commerce, no
punishment on thrift; it would secure the largest
production and the fairest distribution of wealth, by
leaving men free to produce and to exchange as they
please, without any artificial enhancement of prices; and
by taking for public purposes a value that cannot be
carried off, that cannot be hidden, that of all values is
most easily ascertained and most certainly and cheaply
collected, it would enormously lessen the number of
officials, dispense with oaths, do away with temptations
to bribery and evasion, and abolish man-made crimes in
themselves innocent.
But, further: That God has intended the state to
obtain the revenues it needs by the taxation of land
values is shown by the same order and degree of evidence
that shows that God has intended the milk of the mother
for the nourishment of the babe.
See how close is the analogy. In that primitive
condition ere the need for the state arises there are no
land values. The products of labor have value, but in the
sparsity of population no value as yet attaches to land
itself. But as increasing density of population and
increasing elaboration of industry necessitate the
organization of the state, with its need for revenues,
value begins to attach to land. As population still
increases and industry grows more elaborate, so the needs
for public revenues increase. And at the same time and
from the same causes land values increase. The connection
is invariable. The value of things produced by labor
tends to decline with social development, since the
larger scale of production and the improvement of
processes tend steadily to reduce their cost. But the
value of land on which population centers goes up and up.
Take Rome or Paris or London or New York or Melbourne.
Consider the enormous value of land in such cities as
compared with the value of land in sparsely settled parts
of the same countries. To what is this due?
Is it not due to the density and activity of the
populations of those cities — to the very causes
that require great public expenditure for streets,
drains, public buildings, and all the many things needed
for the health, convenience and safety of such great
cities? See how with the growth of such cities the one
thing that steadily increases in value is land; how the
opening of roads, the building of railways, the making of
any public improvement, adds to the value of
land. Is it not clear that here is a
natural law — that is to say a tendency willed by
the Creator? Can it mean anything else than that He who
ordained the state with its needs has in the values which
attach to land provided the means to meet those
needs?
That it does mean this and nothing else is confirmed
if we look deeper still, and inquire not merely as to the
intent, but as to the purpose of the intent. If we do so
we may see in this natural law by which land values
increase with the growth of society not only such a
perfectly adapted provision for the needs of society as
gratifies our intellectual perceptions by showing us the
wisdom of the Creator, but a purpose with regard to the
individual that gratifies our moral perceptions by
opening to us a glimpse of his beneficence.
Consider: Here is a natural law by which as
society advances the one thing that increases in value is
land — a natural law by virtue of which all growth
of population, all advance of the arts, all general
improvements of whatever kind, add to a fund that both
the commands of justice and the dictates of expediency
prompt us to take for the common uses of
society. Now, since increase in the fund
available for the common uses of society is increase in
the gain that goes equally to each member of society, is
it not clear that the law by which land values increase
with social advance while the value of the products of
labor does not increase, tends with the advance of
civilization to make the share that goes equally to each
member of society more and more important as compared
with what goes to him from his individual earnings, and
thus to make the advance of civilization lessen
relatively the differences that in a ruder social state
must exist between the strong and the weak, the fortunate
and the unfortunate? Does it not show the purpose of the
Creator to be that the advance of man in civilization
should be an advance not merely to larger powers but to a
greater and greater equality, instead of what we, by our
ignoring of his intent, are making it, an advance toward
a more and more monstrous inequality? ... read the whole
letter
Henry George: Thou
Shalt Not Steal (1887 speech)
There is no need for poverty in this world, and in
our civilization. There is a provision made by the laws
of the Creator which would secure to the helpless all
that they require, which would give enough and more than
enough for all social purposes. These little children
that are dying in our crowded districts for want of room
and fresh air, they are the disinherited heirs of a great
estate.
Did you ever consider the full
meaning of the significant fact that as progress goes on,
as population increases and civilization develops, the one
thing that ever increases in value is land? Speculators
all over the country appreciate that fact. Wherever there
is a chance for population coming; wherever railroads meet
or a great city seems destined to grow; wherever some new
evidence of the bounty of the Creator is discovered, in a
rich coal or iron mine, or an oil well, or a gas deposit,
there the speculator jumps in, land rises in value, and a
great boom takes place, and people find themselves
enormously rich without ever having done a single thing to
produce wealth.
Now, it is by virtue of a natural law
that land steadily increases in value; that population adds
to it; that invention adds to it; that the discovery of
every fresh evidence of the Creator’s goodness in the
stores that He has implanted in the earth for our use adds
to the value of land, not to the value of anything else.
This natural fact is by virtue of a natural law, a law that
is as much a law of the Creator as is the law of
gravitation.
What is the intent of this natural
law of increasing land values? Is there not in it a
provision for social needs? That land values grow greater
and greater as the community grows and common needs
increase: is there not built into this law
a manifest provision for social needs — a fund
belonging to society as a whole, with which we may take
care of those who fall by the wayside — with which we
may meet public expenses, and do all the things that an
advancing civilization makes more and more necessary for
society to do on behalf of its members?
Today the value of land in New York
city is over a hundred million annually. Who has created that value? Is it
because a few landowners are here that that land is worth a
hundred million a year? Is it not because the whole
population of New York is here? Is it not because this
great city is the center of exchanges for a large portion
of the continent? Does not every child that is born, every
one that comes to settle in New York, does it not add to
the value of this land? Ought it not, therefore, get some
portion of the benefit? And is it not wronged when, instead
of being used for that purpose, certain favored individuals
are allowed to appropriate the fund of land
values?
We might take this
vast fund for common needs; we might with it make a city
here such as the world has never seen before — a city
spacious, clean, wholesome, beautiful — a city that
should be full of parks; a city without tenement
houses; and we could do this, not merely without
imposing any tax upon production, without interfering with
the just rights of property, but while at the same time
securing far better than they are now the rights of
property, and abolishing the taxes that now weigh on
production. ... read the whole
article Henry George: The Wages of Labor
Take Rome, or Paris, or London, or New York, or
Melbourne. Consider the enormous value of land in such
cities as compared with the value of land in sparsely
settled parts of the same countries. To what is this due?
Is it not due to the density and activity of the
populations of those cities – to the very causes
that require great public expenditure for streets,
drains, public buildings, and all the many things needed
for the health, convenience, and safety of such great
cities? See how with the growth of such cities the one
thing that steadily increases in value is land; how the
opening of roads, the building of railways, the making of
any public improvement, adds to the value of land.
... read
the whole article
Louis Post: Outlines
of Louis F. Post's Lectures, with Illustrative Notes and
Charts (1894) — Appendix: FAQ
Q2. Would the single tax yield revenue sufficient
for all kinds of government?
A. Thomas G. Shearman, Esq., of New York, estimates that
sixty-five per cent of the rent that the land in the
United States now yields actually and potentially to its
owners, would be sufficient. But whether it would or not
is as yet an unimportant question. If all
revenues ought to be raised from land values, then no
revenues should be drawn from other sources while any
land value remains in private possession. Until
land values are exhausted the taxation of labor cannot be
excused.
Q4. What disposition would you make of the
revenues that exceeded the needs of
government?
A. The people who ask this question ought to settle it
with those who want to know whether the single tax would
yield revenue enough. I do not believe that public
revenues under the single tax would exceed the just needs
of economical government; in better highways, better
sidewalks, better wharves, better schools, better public
service of various kinds, we should find sufficient
demand for all our revenues. But the question of
deficiency or surplus is one to be met and disposed of
when it arises. The present question is the wisdom and
the justice of applying land values to common use, as far
as they will go or as much of them as may be needed as
the case may prove to be.
Q5. If the full rental value were taken would it
not produce too much revenue and encourage official
extravagance? If only what was needed for an economical
administration of government, would not land still have a
speculative value?
A. In the first part of your question you are thinking of
a vast centralized government as administering public
revenues. With the revenues raised locally, each locality
being assessed for its contribution to the state and the
nation, there would be no such danger. The possibility of
this danger would be still further reduced by the fact
that private business would then offer greater pecuniary
prizes than would public office, wherefore public office
would be sought for purer purposes than as money-making
opportunities. As to the second part of your question,
the speculative value of land would be wiped out as soon
as the tax on land values was high enough and that on
improvement values low enough to make production more
profitable than speculation. And this point would be
reached long before the whole rental value was absorbed
in taxation.
Q55. Our city raises $20,000 for fire protection.
Is it fair to tax land, which doesn't get that
protection, and let houses go free though they do get
it?
A. Is not the land worth more with your fire protection
than it would be without it? Which would be better for
the owners of land in your city, to pay the $20,000, or
to have no fire protection? Read notes 14 and 18. ...
read the book
Charles B. Fillebrown: A Catechism of Natural
Taxation, from Principles of Natural Taxation
(1917)
Q2. What is meant by the single tax?
A. The payment of all public expenses from economic rent,
the normal revenue, thus eventually abolishing all
taxes.
Q3. What is meant by economic rent?
A. Gross ground rent -- the annual site value of land --
what land, including any quality or content of the land
itself, is worth annually for use -- what the land does
or would command for use per annum if offered in open
market -- the annual value of the exclusive use in
control of a given area of land, involving the enjoyment
of those "rights and privileges thereto pertaining" which
are stipulated in every title deed, and which, enumerated
specifically, are as follows: right and ease of access
to
* water, and
* health inspection,
* sewerage,
* fire protection,
* police,
* schools,
* libraries,
* museums,
* parks,
* playgrounds,
* steam and electric railway service,
* gas and electric lighting,
* telegraph and telephone service,
* subways,
* ferries,
* churches,
* public schools,
* private schools,
* colleges,
* universities,
* public buildings --
utilities which depend for their efficiency and
economy on the character of the government; which
collectively constitute the economic and social
advantages of the land which are due to the presence and
activity of population, and are inseparable therefrom,
including the benefit of proximity to, and command of,
facilities for commerce and communication with the world
-- an artificial value created primarily through public
expenditure of taxes. For the sake of brevity, the
substance of this definition may be conveniently
expressed as the value of "proximity." It is ordinarily
measured by interest on investment plus taxes.
Q57. Would the single tax yield sufficient revenue
for all government purposes, local, state, and
national?
A. Careful estimates by Mr. Thomas G. Shearman indicate
that all present taxes amount to not much more than one
half of the annual site value of the land. But he
said:
The honest needs of public government grow faster
than population and fully as fast as wealth itself.
Local taxation will increase rapidly; and it ought to
do so..... This does not imply that ground rent will
not be sufficient to supply many, possibly all, of
those additions to human happiness which Henry George
has pictured in such glowing words. But such extensions
of the sphere of government must take place gradually;
or they will be ruinous failures, simply because the
state cannot at once furnish the necessary machinery
for their successful operation. ... read the whole
article
Arthur J. Ogilvy: A Colonist's Plea for
Land Nationalization (about 1890)
The increase of value in my land has arisen from the
execution of public works and increase of population,
causing an increased demand for the land; in other words,
it has arisen from the national progress; and I, so far
from aiding in this progress have actually hindered it,
by keeping my property locked up and so forcing on
intending producers to inferior or less accessible lands;
and by holding so much land back have helped to make land
so much scarcer, and, therefore, so much dearer, and so
have helped to increase the tribute which industry has to
pay to monopoly for the mere privilege of exerting
itself. ...
The value of land, as of everything else, will
oscillate within certain limits, and even in some
exceptional cases, as in the sudden diversion of traffic,
fall for an indefinitely prolonged period; but these
occasional or exceptional perturbations are but as the
advance and recession of the waves in a flowing tide. The
tide still comes in.
In every country which has any enterprise and progress,
land values must rise. The movement may be fast or slow,
continuous or interrupted, but it is up not down.
There is not a single factor in a nation's progress that
does not add to the value of land. Every road improved
and railway laid down; every machine invented and process
perfected; every opening of new markets; every
improvement in fiscal policy, in order and good
Government, in the knowledge and skill, in the morals,
manners, and even numbers of the people, every
conceivable element, in short that adds to the
productiveness of industry, adds to the value of land,
and increases the tribute which monopoly can wring from
industry; which the man who merely owns the land can
exact from him who uses it for the mere permission to use
it.
This is why the gradual rise of land value or rent
(ground rent only, remember), is called the unearned
increment. ...
Rent devours wages.
Suppose the labourer to ask for a rise and the farmer to
refuse, on the ground that he cannot afford it.
But presently something happens. A railway is made or a
mine opened in the neighbourhood, or some improved
process enables a greater yield to be obtained at the
same cost, and there is now an appreciable surplus. The
labourer comes forward again and says, "You can afford it
now."
"Unfortunately, no," replies his employer. "I might have
done so, but my lease is nearly up, and these advantages
you refer to having made the land more valuable, my
landlord has notified that he means to raise the rent;
and as there certainly is a greater surplus available for
rent than there was, I must give it, for if I don't
someone else will; and so, as far as I am concerned, the
surplus you calculate upon has vanished."
In short, whenever there is an increase in the
productiveness of industry creating an additional
surplus, and the labourer stretches forth his hand for a
share of it, the landlord pushes him aside, and takes it
all himself; but as he keeps well out of sight in doing
so, using the employer as his instrument, his action is
not perceived. And as it is in the present so it has been
in the past. Inventions and discoveries have within the
last century doubled the productiveness of industry over
and over again, but the labourer has no more benefited by
them than the employer has. The increase has been
enormous, but, in the primary industries at any rate, the
landlord has taken it all.
But some will say, "The labourer's exertion is a fixed
quantity. The increased productiveness of his industry is
in no degree due to himself, but to the improved
appliances he works with, and, that being so, the person
who supplies these appliances that is, the employer has a
right to the increase.
There is enough prima facie appearance of reason in this
to have made it worth discussing if the employer really
got it, but he does not. He gets interest, no doubt, on
the additional expense he has incurred in procuring the
appliance, but he gets none of the increase of wealth due
to the increased efficiency of labour when aided by the
appliance, (once the appliance has come into general
use); that, as we have seen, goes to increase the value
of land and raise rents, and while the employer does not
gain, the labourer in most cases actually loses; for the
usual result of labour-saving inventions, in the primary
industries at any rate, is not that the employer retains
the same hands to do more work, but that he discharges
some of his men and does the old amount of work with
fewer hands.
It is the landlord, who has neither invented, nor
supplied, nor put to use the appliances, who gets the
whole benefit of them. ... read the whole
paper.
note: the Canal which Churchill
describes was built by a corporation, not a government
entity, but the story is instructive
nonetheless:
Winston Churchill: The
People's Land
Fancy comparing these healthy processes with the
enrichment which comes to the landlord who happens to own
a plot of land on the outskirts or at the centre of one
of our great cities, who watches the busy population
around him making the city larger, richer, more
convenient, more famous every day, and all the while sits
still and does nothing. Roads are made,
streets are made, railway services are improved, electric
light turns night into day, electric trams glide swiftly
to and fro, water is brought from reservoirs a hundred
miles off in the mountains -- and all the while the
landlord sits still. Every one of those improvements is
effected by the labour and at the cost of other
people. Many of the most
important are effected at the cost of the municipality
and of the ratepayers. To not
one of those improvements does the land monopolist as a
land monopolist contribute, and yet by every one of them
the value of his land is sensibly enhanced. He
renders no service to the community, he contributes
nothing to the general welfare; he contributes nothing
even to the process from which his own enrichment is
derived. If the land were occupied by shops or by
dwellings, the municipality at least would secure the
rates upon them in aid of the general fund, but the land
may be unoccupied, undeveloped, it may be what is called
'ripening' — ripening at
the expense of the whole city, of the whole country, for
the unearned increment of its owner. Roads perhaps may
have to be diverted to avoid this forbidden area. The
merchant going to his office, the artisan going to his
work, have to make a detour or pay a tram fare to avoid
it. The citizens are losing their chance of developing
the land, the city is losing its rates, the State is
losing its taxes which would have accrued if the natural
development had taken place; and that share has to be
replaced at the expense of the other ratepayers and
taxpayers, and the nation as a whole is losing in the
competition of the world -- the hard and growing
competition of the world -- both in time and money. And
all the while the land monopolist has only to sit still
and watch complacently his property multiplying in value,
sometimes manifold, without either effort or contribution
on his part; and that is justice!
Unearned increment reaped in
exact proportion to the disservice done. But let
us follow the process a little further. The population of
the city grows and grows still larger year by year, the
congestion in the poorer quarters becomes acute, rents
and rates rise hand in hand, and thousands of families
are crowded into one-roomed tenements. There are 120,000
persons living in one-roomed tenements in Glasgow alone
at the present time. At last the land becomes ripe for
sale — that means that the price is too tempting to
be resisted any longer — and then, and not till
then, it is sold by the yard or by the inch at ten times,
or twenty times, or even fifty times, its agricultural
value, on which alone hitherto it has been rated for the
public service. The greater the population around the
land, the greater the injury which they have sustained by
its protracted denial, the more inconvenience which has
been caused to everybody, the more serious the loss in
economic strength and activity, the larger will be the
profit of the landlord when the sale is finally
accomplished. In fact, you may say that the unearned
increment on the land is on all fours with the profit
gathered by one of those American speculators who
engineer a corner in corn, or meat, or cotton, or some
other vital commodity, and that the unearned increment in
land is reaped by the land monopolist in exact
proportion, not to the service but to the disservice
done.
The drag on
enterprise It is monopoly which is the keynote, and where
monopoly prevails, the greater the injury to society the
greater the reward of the monopolist will be. See how all
this evil process strikes at every form of industrial
activity.
- The municipality, wishing for
broader streets, better houses, more healthy, decent,
scientifically planned towns, is made to pay, and is made
to pay in exact proportion, or to a very great extent in
proportion, as it has exerted itself in the past to make
improvements. The more it has improved the town, the more
it has increased the land value, and the more it will
have to pay for any land it may wish to
acquire.
- The manufacturer proposing to start a new
industry, proposing to erect a great factory offering
employment to thousands of hands, is made to pay such a
price for his land that the purchase price hangs round
the neck of his whole business, hampering his competitive
power in every market, clogging him far more than any
foreign tariff in his export competition, and the land
values strike down through the profits of the
manufacturer on to the wages of the workman.
- The railway company wishing to build a new
line finds that the price of land which yesterday was
only rated at agricultural value has risen to a
prohibitive figure the moment it was known that the new
line was projected, and either the railway is not built
or, if it is, is built only on terms which largely
transfer to the landowner the profits which are due to
the shareholders and the advantages which should have
accrued to the traveling public.
Now let the Manchester Ship Canal tell its tale
about the land. It has a story to tell which is just as
simple and just as pregnant as its story about Free
Trade. When it was resolved to build the Canal, the first
thing that had to be done was to buy the land. Before the
resolution to build the Canal was taken, the land on
which the Canal flows — or perhaps I should say
'stands' — was, in the main, agricultural land,
paying rates on an assessment from 30s. to L2 an acre. I
am told that 4,495 acres of land purchased fell within
that description out of something under 5,000 purchased
altogether. Immediately after the decision, the 4,495
acres were sold for L777,000 sterling — or an
average of L172 an acre — that is to say, five or
six times the agricultural value of the land and the
value on which it had been rated for public
purposes.
Now what had the landowner done
for the community; what enterprise had he shown; what
service had he rendered; what capital had he risked in
order that he should gain this enormous multiplication of
the value of his property! I will tell you in one word
what he had done. Can you guess it!
Nothing.
But it was not only the owners of the land that
was needed for making the Canal, who were automatically
enriched. All the surrounding land either having a
frontage on the Canal or access to it rose and rose
rapidly, and splendidly, in value. By the stroke of a
fairy wand, without toil, without risk, without even a
half-hour's thought many landowners in Salford, Eccles,
Stretford, Irlam, Warrington Runcorn, etc., found
themselves in possession of property which had trebled,
quadrupled, quintupled in value.
Apart from the high prices which were paid, there
was a heavy bill for compensation, severance,
disturbance, and injurious affection where no land was
taken -- injurious affection, namely, raising the land
not taken many times in value -- all this was added to
the dead-weight cost of construction. All this was a
burden on those whose labour skill, and capital created
this great public work. Much of this land today is still
rated at ordinary agricultural value, and in order to
make sure that no injustice is done, in order to make
quite certain that these landowners are not injured by
our system of government, half their rates are, under the
Agricultural Rates Act, paid back to them. The balance is
made up by you. The land is still rising in value, and
with every day's work that every man in this
neighbourhood does and with every addition to the
prosperity of Manchester and improvement of this great
city, the land is further enhanced in value. ... Read the
whole piece
Clarence Darrow: How to Abolish Unfair
Taxation (1913)
Fundamentally, all law recognizes the right to eminent
domain, to take the portion of any human being for the
welfare of the public — that no man's claim to any
portion of the earth shall stand in the way of the common
good. This is a common law, but in practice it only
applies where a rich railroad wants to get the land of
some poor widow.
Everybody who works is poor; nobody would work if they
were not poor, and nobody can get rich working. I never
tried it, but I have seen others try it. The land
boomer comes along and gets good car service to this poor
man's home, and then charges him ten dollars per month
instead of five. A lot of reformers are trying
to get parks laid out in the slums, which only make the
poor move, for they cannot pay the increased rent. The
greater the population, the less the worker gets.
As the land becomes valuable, more and more goes
to rent. The bigger the city, the deeper the
poverty; the bigger the city the more degradation, there
are the almshouses and gaols filled to overflowing.
It is better for the men who own the earth to
have big cities — but for no one else.
Every man, woman, and child adds to the wealth of the
land owner; the others must secure land upon which to
live, and they must bid with each other for the right to
live.
... The single tax theory is that the public should
take all the value of land, as it was made by the public.
Land value goes up because of population, and not because
of the owner of the title deed, and the value should be
taken by the community, and thus create a natural fund
from which to make improvements for the comfort of all,
and thus make life easier. It would abolish poverty, that
crime of the century, which has always come with
civilization; inequality of wealth, which comes as the
world grows older, and which we have never been able to
cure, because man wants to hold what he cannot use, and
pass on to future generations what they will not use.
The personal property tax always was a delusion, a
humbug, and a snare; it never could be administered
justly. The conscientious man, the widow and the orphans
(whose fund is in trust) pay in full while the rich get
off. It is unscientific, it is bad as a fiscal measure.
What we are after is the earth, and it can be had in an
easy, simple, direct way.
Every right-of-way of every railroad should be owned
by the people; all public franchises, every mine and
every forest, all should belong to the community itself.
Then we would not need the repressive laws we have
today.
Men love peace, and if not antagonized, they will
behave, and until justice is done in that good time to
come, all the gaols on earth cannot make them behave. It
never did, and it never will.
The "single tax" is so simple, so fundamental, and so
easy to carry into effect that I have no doubt it will be
about the last reform the world will ever get. People in
this world are not often logical; in fact, there is never
any considerable number of them that are logical. I am
pretty sure the people will never get started in the
right direction; they will go a long way around. ...
read the
whole speech
Charles T. Root — Not a Single Tax! (1925)
... let us lay down and briefly defend the proposition
that —
Taxation as a means of meeting the proper
expenses of government is oppressive, unjust,
inexpedient and unnecessary.
This proposition will strike a good many readers as
absurd, but all must at least recognize the timeliness of
the topic and the importance of any contribution to the
discussion of a subject which is agitating the whole
civilized world, for the methods, subjects and amounts of
taxation are among the pressing problems of every
country.
The most obvious question which arises in the mind of
anyone who reads for the first time the proposition above
laid down is this:
"If taxation is unnecessary, what is to take its
place? Government and its functions are increasingly
expensive. They require a lot of money. Where is it to
come from?" The answer may be placed in the form of a
second proposition:
Every community, whatever its political name and
extent — village, city, state or province or nation
— has its own normal, unfailing income, growing
with the growth of the community and always adequate to
meet necessary governmental expenditure.
To explain: Every community has an indefeasible
original right to the land on which it exists, and to all
the natural, unmodified properties and advantages of that
particular area of the earth's surface. To this land in
its natural state, undrained, unfenced, unfertilized,
unplanted and unoccupied, including its waters, its
contents and its location, every individual in the
community (which may consist of any political unit
selected) has an equal right, while all the individuals
together have a joint right to the value for use which
society has conferred upon these natural advantages.
This value for use is known as "Land Value," or by the
not particularly descriptive but generally adopted name
of "Economic Rent."
Briefly defined the land value or economic rent of any
piece of ground is the largest annual amount voluntarily
offered for the exclusive use of that ground, or of an
equivalent parcel, independent of improvements thereon.
Every holder or user of land pays economic rent, but he
now pays most of it to the wrong party. The aggregate
economic rent of the territory occupied by any political
unit is, as has been stated above, always sufficient,
usually more than sufficient, for the legitimate expenses
of the government of that unit. As also stated above, the
economic rent belongs to the community, and not to
individual landowners. ...
But before this time the reader, unless he has given
previous attention to the subject, is full of objections
to the above doctrine: "How about the law?" he is asking.
"Hasn't a man the right to buy a piece of land as cheaply
as he can, to do what he pleases with it, and hold on to
it till he gets ready to sell?" The answer is that at
present he certainly has this statutory right, which has
been so long and so universally recognized that most
people suppose it to be not only a legal, but a real or
equitable right. A shrewd man, foreseeing the direction
of growth of population in a city, for example, can buy a
well-located block at a moderate figure from some less
far-seeing owner, can let it grow up to weeds, fence it
off against all comers and give it no further attention
except to pay the very small tax usually imposed upon
vacant land.
Meantime the increasing community builds up all around
it with homes, banks, stores, churches, schools, paving
and lighting the streets, giving police and fire
protection, etc., and at last comes to need this block so
urgently that the owner is fairly begged to sell it, at
three or ten or fifty times what it cost him. Quite often
the purchaser at this enormous advance is the very
community which has through its presence and the
expenditure of its taxes created practically the whole
value of the land in question!
It was said above that an individual has a statutory
right to pursue this very common course. That was an
error. The statement should have been that he has a
statutory wrong; for no disinterested person can follow
the course of land speculation as almost universally
practiced, without feeling its rank injustice.
...
An illustration has already been given of the case of
a piece of farm land. Let us take an example in a large
city. Let us take a corner lot centrally located in New
York City, the title to which lot is held by, say, Mr.
John William Rhinelastor. This lot was a part of an old
Dutch farm, and is an heirloom. It did not cost the
present owner anything, nor his father nor his
grandfather. There is a little old building on it, which
has always been rented at a figure ten times as large as
the taxes imposed, so that the owner has been handsomely
subsidized each year for storing his title-deeds during a
period of the city's growth in which the increase in
population and the expenditure of public money in that
neighborhood have raised the value of this corner
location to, say, two hundred times its early value.
About now, Mr. Rhinelastor decides that he will go
abroad to live, and can't be bothered with this piece of
property. But knowing that the pressure of population is
sure to increase and that the expenditure of public money
to the benefit of this land must continue, he will not
sell it. So he gives a twenty-one year lease to the
corner for, say, $20,000 a year net, with a privilege to
the lessee of renewals at advancing figures. The lessee
agrees to pay all taxes.
Now what is this net $20,000 a year, which will be
regularly remitted to Mr. Rhinelastor, in Europe or
wherever he may be, given in payment for? Not for the old
building — the first thing the lessee does is to
pull it down. Not for the land itself — it is all
rock, which has got to be blasted out as part of its
improvement.
Clearly it is paid for a location or site value, which
the community, and the community only, has built up and
paid for. In other words, the present $20,000 rental, and
the larger one which that location will command in later
years, is strictly a community product, and as such
belongs to the community and not to Mr. Rhinelastor.
That the latter has no good right to it is at once
evident when we remember that "When one man gets
something for nothing somebody else has got to give
something for nothing." Here are $20,000 that some men
and women have got to work to earn every year to hand
over to a man who does not render, and does not feel any
obligation to render, one dollar's worth of public or
private service in return. Such is the wild travesty of
justice which we call law. It is not comical only because
it is frankly tragic in its social results.
Now suppose this $20,000 and all the rest of this same
community product — i.e., the site or location rent
of its ground — were paid every year to its
rightful owner, the treasurer of New York City, what
would become of taxation, with its inseparable retinue,
Fraud, Evasion, Perjury, Inequality, and an all-pervading
public sense of injustice? ... read the whole article
Frank Stilwell and Kirrily Jordan: The Political Economy of Land:
Putting Henry George in His Place
Indeed, one could say that the term ‘tax’
is a misnomer because what is really involved is value
created by the community being retained by the community
rather than being appropriated by private landholders.
For example, under current arrangements
landowners receive ‘windfall’ gains when the
market value of their land rises as a result of publicly
provided infrastructure being built nearby, or
when local government zoning decisions reclassify their
land as appropriate for further development. In this way,
individual landowners stand to reap huge benefits
at the expense of community-generated processes.
Such arrangements create an odd incentive: allowing
landholders to appropriate the unearned wealth generated
by rising land values, thereby rewarding this
unproductive activity, while taxing productive endeavour.
The Georgist land tax ‘remedy’, by contrast,
would eliminate such perverse incentives and thereby more
effectively align private and public interests in the use
of society’s resources. ...
Georgist analysis strongly emphasises landownership as
a principal source of inequality. Because land is a
strictly limited resource, its private ownership
necessarily excludes large sections of the community from
its benefits. A landowning class thereby gains political
economic power. In George’s own time the social
identity and power of this landowning class was
distinctive. Those who could not afford to buy land were
forced to pay rent to the wealthier few who could. By
taxing the value of land, George posited that publicly
created wealth could be recouped from the private
landowners and redistributed throughout the community
more equitably in order to address social goals.
Are George’s arguments about land ownership and
wealth inequality relevant today? Australia provides an
interesting example, because land is the single largest
item in national wealth. Laurie Aarons outlines the
concentration of farming land in particular in the hands
of a few very wealthy corporations and individuals
– what he refers to as ‘corporate
squattocracy’ (Aarons, 1999: 23). The relentless
increase in urban land values in recent years has also
produced dramatic redistributions of wealth. In the State
of New South Wales, for example, land values increased by
about $361 billion over the period 1993 – 2003. The
existing land-based taxes clawed back only $44 billion in
government revenues, comprising only about 12% of the
land-related economic surplus. So 88% was retained as
‘unearned income’ by landowners (Stilwell and
Jordan, forthcoming). A higher rate of land tax with
fewer exemptions could have substantially reduced this
private wealth appropriation. This is not necessarily to
posit the desirability of recouping 100% through land
tax, because that would certainly raise major problems of
people’s ability to pay, given that much of the
increased wealth resulting from land price inflation has
not been realised as current income. But it is indicative
of the current imbalance between private and public
appropriations of the surplus arising from increases in
land-based wealth. ... read the whole
article
Joseph Fels: True
Christianity and My Own Religious Beliefs
Do you question the relationship between taxation
and righteousness? Let us see. If government is a natural
growth, then surely God's natural law provides food and
sustenance for government as that food is needed; for
where in Nature do we find a creature coming into the
world without timely provision of natural food for it? It
is in our system of taxation that we find the most
emphatic denial of the Fatherhood of God and the
Brotherhood of Man, because,
- first, in order to meet our common needs, we
take from individuals what does not belong to us in
common;
- second, we permit individuals to take for
themselves what does belong to us in common;
- thus, third, under the pretext of taxation for
public purposes, we have established a system that
permits some men to tax other men for private
profit.
Does not that violate the natural, the divine law?
Does it not surely beget wolfish greed on the one hand,
and gaunt poverty on the other? Does it not surely breed
millionaires on one end of the social scale and tramps on
the other end? Has it not brought into civilization a
hell, of which the savage can have no conception?
Could any better system be devised for
convincing men that God is the father of a few and the
stepfather of the many? Is not that destructive of
the sentiment of brotherhood? With such a condition, how
is it possible for men in masses to obey the new
commandment, "that ye love one another"? What could more
surely thrust men apart? What could more
surely divide them into warring classes?...
read the
whole letter
Joseph Stiglitz: October, 2002,
interview
Q: Your academic work led you to formulate what you
called "The Henry George Theorem." This demonstrated that
public spending — where this was efficient —
generated additional rental value that surfaced in the
land market. Other distinguished scholars, such as the
late Nobel prize winner, William Vickrey, confirmed your
findings. You also noted in one of your books, co-written
with Anthony Atkinson, that the Henry George Theorem was
attractive both because it was the revenue-raiser that
did not distort private incentives and because "it is the
'single tax' required to finance the public good."
[Anthony B. Atkinson & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lectures
on Public Economics, London: McGraw-Hill, 1980, p. 525]
Now, public investment, unless of the wasteful kind
designed to serve the privileged interests of rent
seekers (the classic type being a land speculator),
should be viewed as working in partnership with the
private sector and not a drain on the community. How can
the reputation of publicly provided services and
investments be rescued?
JES: That's a very good question. What we did when I
was at the Council of Economic Advisors was some studies
to try to show what the social returns would be to public
investment in R&D, etc. And we became convinced that
the rates of return of those investments are very high.
So you ask the question, "what can we do to restore
confidence in public investment?" We need to realize how
much we depend on them. I keep telling people, "The
Internet." That's one example. It was publicly funded.
It's now a public-private partnership. The government did
the basic research, and the private sector ran off with
it. But, arguably, we would never have had the Internet
if it were not for government expenditure. So I think a
major industry in the United States — biotech
— is based on NIH (National Institutes of Health).
NIH does all the basic research.
Q: From the conference on "mondialization," I saw a
major difference in attitude among the French with regard
to public investment. The French believe strongly in
public funds for public works, whereas Americans believe
they shouldn't be taxed more in order to support public
projects. Which view do you agree with?
JES: There's been a lot of so-called "bad rhetoric" in
this whole area. The real point is that we need to
recognize that there are some things in the area of "the
public sphere." We're not having investment in basic
research; we need to have the government do it. And
that's what I've consistently been arguing; you don't
want the government building steel factories. But you do
want the government doing certain research, and the
relative size of that depends on the society. Right now,
we should be spending far more on basic research. So what
is the message. I think how much we depend on the
government. And the new economy, we take it for granted,
but it is the public sector. I think you're right that we
have the wrong view. But I keep saying, "The Internet."
How much as it changed our lives? And it's [the result
of] the government. ... read the entire
interview
Mason Gaffney: Neo-classical Economics
as a Stratagem Against Henry George
A state, provincial, or local government can
finance generous public services without driving away
business or population. The formula is simple: tax land,
which cannot migrate, instead of capital and people,
which can. By eliminating the destructive "Wedge Effect,"
the land tax lets us support schools and parks and
libraries and water purification and police and fire
protection, etc., as generously as you please, without
suppressing or distorting useful work, and without taxing
investors in real capital. ... read
the whole essay
Lindy Davies: The Cat
in New York
When I taught at the Henry George School
in New York, our Director, George Collins, used to
give a stirring graduation speech to students. He told
them they would find that the gift of insight they'd been
given, in studying Georgist political economy, was also a
kind of curse: they would never look upon their city with
the same eyes. The land question and its ramifications,
the malignant absurdities of today's economic systems and
the sheer obviousness of the remedy, would shout at them
in every day's news.
I was reminded of that when I recently visited New
York. ...
Economists note in this budget
crunch, as in others the city has faced, a curious
disconnect between the fiscal crisis and the overall
economy. Tax receipts are way down and the budget outlook
is indeed scary, even while the underlying economy actually
lurches toward recovery. If it weren't for the large
declines in the (admittedly, very important) financial and
tourism sectors, the city's economy would not be performing
badly at all. How unfortunate, then, that
New York will see no other alternative than to choke off
economic recovery by raising income and sales taxes while
cutting back on public services. But what can they do? The
tax base is declining.
Or is it? It turns out that land
values in New York, while modestly down in some areas, have
not taken anywhere near the beating that the Stock Market
has, or the small business community, or public services.
No, the real estate market in New York City remains, all in
all, quite bullish. There are few bargains to be had.
Residential rents, of course, having been held artificially
low by rent stabilization, provide no relief even in a weak
market.
So, no -- despite the dire warnings,
New York City need not endure a fiscal crisis. Its tax base
-- properly defined -- is robustly capable of providing for
public needs, while actually bringing business into the
city. They have just been taxing the wrong
things, all along. Tourists, bulls and bears come and go,
but New York City's land values -- like its citizens -- are
quite resilient. ...
Read the
whole article
William F. Buckley, Jr.: Home Dear
Home
The real estate boom is a familiar phenomenon. Most
people are predicting that it will, if not burst, at
least wilt. But the basic components aren't going to
change, not unless we have a catastrophe of sorts,
something economists don't feel obliged to integrate into
their speculations.
The components are:
- a relatively wealthy community;
- the hard desire to own one's own house, along with
the ambition to make it more and more comfortable and
pleasing;
- the dependence of building sites on immediate
amenities (sewage, power); and
- strategic sources of nourishment (jobs).
The convenience of infinitely available land faded as
urbanization brought on heavy dependence on elements that
weren't always available to homes on the range. Schools
and hospitals are not only useful for educating children
and curing the infirm. They are necessary to attract
affluent home buyers. ... read the
whole column
Weld Carter: A
Clarion Call to Sanity, to Honesty, to Justice
...Thus, the benefits of a tax-supported
public work accrued once more not to the benefit of the
public at large, but to that of a very limited and
narrowly defined class, those who were rich enough to own
land in that location.
There are undoubtedly many other problems to be
resolved before the ills of our society are cured; but
what many do not recognize and understand is the primacy
of the adoption of land value taxation over all these
other corrections. The reason for that can be very simply
stated: If any of these other measures already adopted
have no merit and have only added to the burden of our
problems, then they are disqualified at the outset. On
the other hand, if they are of themselves beneficial, any
benefit from them will be immediately capitalized into
land values and will therefore exacerbate the very
problems which otherwise might be helped toward a
cure. Thus it is that our first step toward any
possible remedy for the awesome plight into which we have
been led increasingly over the recent years must be the
adoption of land value taxation. ... read the whole
essay
Ted Gwartney: A Free Market Strategy to
Reduce Sprawl
- Unused land is far more abundant than we
realize.
- End the Public Subsidy of Land Speculation and
Sprawl
- Counterproductive growth limitations and
regulations should be abolished.
- A Strategy for Urban Renewal
- A Strategy for Economic
Development
- Public Finance by Self-Financing
It was estimated that the BART transportation
system in San Francisco produced two times more land
value than it cost to build. The public recaptured only a
small part of the cost from benefits provided by land
taxes and user fees. Most of the cost came from external
sources, unrelated sales and income taxes. Most of the
profits went into only a few pockets.
Thus, the claim that a community is
short of capital is misleading. In fact, a community could
become self-sufficient in the supply of capital from
internal sources. But a precondition for this is the
reduction of taxes on productive capital and labor.
Examine, for example, what would happen as a result of the
elimination of taxation of buildings. This decision, not to
penalize people who invest their savings in new buildings,
leads to the stimulation of a higher level of national
income, higher saving, and the creation of new capital.
According to the study made by Tideman and Plassmann (1998,
The Losses of Nations, Fred Harrison, editor, Orthila
Press), shifting taxes off buildings, production and
distribution, and onto land and natural resources, could
increase the gross national product by 25%, or one
trillion 1998 dollars
($1,000,000,000,000).
The Land Value Tax Shift from labor
and capital is not only a key to reversing suburban sprawl
and protecting rural environments -- it is a key to
realizing the dream and fulfilling promises of a truly free
market -- with liberty, prosperity, and justice for
all. ... Read
the whole article Weld Carter: A Clarion Call
to Sanity, to Honesty, to Justice
(1982)
Back in the early days of this
century, Winston Churchill saw and recorded an example of
this. There had been a ferry fare over the river Thames for
the common laborers who lived on the wrong side of the
river to pay in order to get to work. A spirit of nobility
prompted the absorption of this fare by the City, and
almost immediately rents in the working class area were
increased by the same amount as the fare had been. When
this thing was done, the guys who got the benefit were not
the poor working class people, but the owners of the homes
in which they lived, or, more accurately and more
critically, the owners of the land on which those homes
stood. The laborers were thus charged a higher rent, and
that rent diverted the benefit from the seemingly intended
beneficiary (i.e., the public) to landowners in the
affected area.
This occurs every day in this
country. A new road is built, or a superhighway is
constructed, which makes access to a particular site much
easier. We tell ourselves that we justify this as an
expenditure of public funds by the benefits that accrue to
the traveling public; but the benefits go, in the form of
higher land prices and rents, to the owners of the sites
that are served by this new road. If you doubt this,
consider the jockeying for the insider information or for
influence over the selection.
Robert Caro, in his biography of
Robert Moses, recalls the time in the early 1920s that
Moses suggested to the authorities the building of a
causeway from the Long Island mainland over to Jones
Island. This proposal was rejected outright by the Long
Island Park Commission. Some months later, Moses presented
them with a drawing showing precisely where this causeway
would run, and, after a suitable period of during which
these public employees could buy up the land along the
proposed highway, he resubmitted his proposal. This time,
they officially approved the suggested
construction.
In the town of Antioch, Illinois,
there were two developments underway almost simultaneously.
In the one, roads were provided, together with water and
sewer lines, but no sidewalks; in the other, just across a
main road from the first, the mayor of the city had storm
sewers, curbs and sidewalks installed at public expense,
for which of course, any prospective buyer or tenant would
gladly pay for use of that land the higher price these
added benefits provided. Any reader will recognize this
chain of events and set of economic relationships as being
the course of everyday life and business at the local,
state and national level. The cynic would say that a
primary motivation for entering local or even national
politics would be the opportunity for personal gain offered
daily by publicly financed improvements.
Another example relates to a piece of
farmland in central Pennsylvania. In the early 1940's, an
18-acre farm complete with a two-story house with five
bedrooms, a large barn that would among other things hang 3
½ acres of tobacco and store hay, straw and corn on
the upper level, with stalls for 6 milking cows and a half
dozen steers, housing for 100 laying hens and for fattening
a few hogs plus a shed for equipment – all in all,
not a large farm by local standards at the time –
sold for $7,500. Twenty years later, with about $12,000 in
residential improvements, that land and its buildings were
sold for approximately $20,000. In those twenty years, the
neighborhood and the general economy in the county had not
changed a great deal. Within the next year, a decision was
pending on the exact location and routing of a new
superhighway. The decision, which was announced some time
later, carried the route of the highway via a bridge across
the local road on which that farm was situated and a
cloverleaf access was built nearby. Soon, the value of that
piece of land jumped to $10,000 per acre, which, ignoring
the value of any improvements to the original piece of
land, was an increase of 800%. That increase, from $20,000
to $180,000, benefitted the most recent purchaser of the
land. However, the increase resulted from the effects of
public (i.e., taxpayers') spending, and, in a more just
society, would have been returned to the taxpayers, rather
than accruing to the private benefit of an individual who
either made a good guess, had some private information, or
even perhaps lobbied for that particular routing of that
publicly financed highway.
Thus, the benefits of a
tax-supported public work accrued once more not to the
benefit of the public at large, but to that of a very
limited and narrowly defined class, those who were rich
enough to own land in that location.
There are undoubtedly many other
problems to be resolved before the ills of our society are
cured; but what many do not recognize and understand is the
primacy of the adoption of land value taxation over all
these other corrections. The reason for that can be very
simply stated: If any of these other measures already
adopted have no merit and have only added to the burden of
our problems, then they are disqualified at the outset. On
the other hand, if they are of themselves beneficial, any
benefit from them will be immediately capitalized into land
values and will therefore exacerbate the very problems
which otherwise might be helped toward a cure. Thus it
is that our first step toward any possible remedy for the
awesome plight into which we have been led increasingly
over the recent years must be the adoption of land value
taxation. ... read the
whole essay Mason Gaffney: How to Revive a Dying
City
"French Equity" (Equity in
Kind)
Under the Code Napoleon, a French
testator must divide real estate equally among all
children. Money cannot substitute for land; the Code
requires equity in kind. The resulting fine subdivision is
called morcellement, and the Code
demands it without regard for efficiency.
Each heir, in fact, must get an equal
share of land of each quality: meadow, woodland,
etc.
Today we approach French Equity
indirectly, and expensively. We distribute land
haphazardly, but seek to make every parcel equally good by
extending utilities and roads to all parcels on the same
terms, regardless of cost or location.
Economists call such schemes "postage
stamp pricing," because postal rates do not vary with
delivery costs. Manhattan has 64,000 residents per square
mile; Montana has 5.4. It costs a lot more to collect or
deliver mail in Montana. The reason postal rates rise is
that the U.S. urban population is spreading out more like
Montana and less like Manhattan (which once had over
100,000 per square mile). Here are five other
examples:
- The British Columbia Ferry
Service. This socialized system has two urban lines
that make money, but the whole system hardly breaks even,
because lesser lines serve remote areas. The worst costs
$12 for every dollar of revenue.
- British Columbia Hydro.
This socialized power system charges uniform rates
throughout the Province. Users living in high-density
Vancouver are cheap to serve. A few live on the Yukon
border, where (I surmise) it costs hundreds of dollars to
earn a dollar of revenue.
- Water and sewer service in
Milwaukee County, Wisconsin. City investments have
been captured, controlled, and milked by suburban land
development interests, helped by state
legislators.
- State university campuses.
The legislative ethic demands a prize, such as a
university campus, in every electoral district. Most of
the eight UC campuses have excess land; some have excess
floor space. Sacramento solves rising enrollment not with
more intensive use of existing campuses, but with the
costly creation of new ones, each to enrich influential
land speculators.
- Water supply in California.
The high real cost of serving new settlements is passed
on to older settled areas through an accounting device
called "melding," stirring all the accounts in the same
pot. Melding passes through several levels: a state
wholesaler serves the metropolitan district, which serves
local districts, which serve cities. At the end of the
line, in Riverside, it costs society $1800 to serve the
marginal acre-foot (a unit of water) selling for $20.
This subsidy is worth fortunes to developers; the cost is
spread so others won't notice.
Problems with French
Equity
There are two problems with these subsidies as an
approach to equity: they are not equitable, and they are
wasteful.
- Equity achieved by regional
cross-subsidy is not interpersonal, but interregional. It
is like U.S. "foreign aid" programs, which tax the poor
in rich countries to aid the rich in poor
countries. Some who hold speculative land and
enjoy subsidies are among the world's richest people and
cor-porations. Equity is not served by milking
middle-class neighborhoods to further enrich wealthy
owners. "Public works for private gain" is bad enough,
but worse when profiteers are already rich.
- How about waste? Subsidy
creates waste in the amount of the subsidy, almost by
definition. The New York Regional Plan Association
estimates the social cost of creating a new lot on the
urban fringe at four times the lot's price (probably an
underestimate). Why develop a lot worth only one quarter
of its cost? Because other people pay the other three
quarters. This process transfers ground rent from areas
of overcharge to areas of undercharge, but it destroys
much of the ground rent. To spread the surplus, we lose
much of it.
Has French Equity any merit? It
passed for a way to create jobs when Keynes actually urged
waste as a route to full employment. Those ideas are now
dormant, but we still do not understand the problem. If we
had to fire teachers or policemen each time a city extended
utilities to a campaign donor's raw acres, we would better
sense the true cost of public works for private
profit. ... read the whole
article Ed Clarke: Geoisim and the Practice of
Public Economics
The Nation has long needed more effective
decision-making mechanisms for intergovernmental
coordination of expenditures and regulations. Efficient
coordination can be achieved in an incentive-compatible
way where the effects of spending by any one subunit on
another subunit can be more effectively taken into
account as compared with current decision-making
procedures.
Effective coordination also relates to an
important national economic policy concern which is
efficient and equitable spending and deficit management.
The need for better coordination is evidenced by
fractious Congressional debate (ie.,. the Congressional
debate over welfare reform) over how to implement
acceptable reductions in intergovernmental transfers,
accompanied by reductions in Federally mandated spending
requirements.
Given the existence of decision-making mechanisms
(ie., demand revealing) that would motivate
decision-makers to accurately reveal the positive and
negative effects of spending and regulatory decisions on
one another, why not use these mechanisms to achieve more
effective coordination? The Federal Government can
establish an initial level of entitlements (called a
distributional status quo) and then, with appropriate
provisions for agenda-control, let the political subunits
decide what levels of actual spending, including
Federally mandated spending, is required. In effect,
Congress determines the initial distribution but allows
more implementation flexibility to the subunits,
adjusting the financial flows to reflect external
effects.
To illustrate, I will assume we are applying the
process to a subset of Federal discretionary programs
(about $500 billion annually, and including National
defense expenditures). Consider a subset of these
programs consisting of about $55 billion in programs
(transportation, communications and the environment)
financed by Federal excise taxes. Assume first that, we
take the President's budget and allow a "citizen's
advisory committee" to propose substitutes or
eliminations designed to "maximize the likelihood of
minimizing harm" (a criterion elaborated by Bailey,
1997). Subject to oversight by a "Commission", it will
allocate cost shares among political subunits (in this
case Congressional districts) so as to try to equalize
per capita (or household) net benefits among the
jurisdictions (for example, by trying to make the cost
shares proportional to estimated benefits -- see Clarke,
1980, Chapter V).
Suppose that the allocation of beneficiary
tax-shares resulted in pressures for spending changes
that were nonuniform among the districts. For example,
spending may be cut about 10% (from $550 per household on
average to $500. Lower spending districts with lower cost
shares might end up with an average of $450 while higher
spending districts remained close to the original $550
average. Under the system, compensating transfers in the
form of interest on expenditures of $50 plus a credit on
the $50 principal would be made in the form of an
accounting transfer from the higher to the lower spending
districts. If the advisory committee recommended prudent
changes that also generated large net benefits and the
compensating transfers were designed to achieve equal or
proportional per capita net benefit increases for each
district (that, say also averaged $500 per household),
then the proposed package of changes would be accepted
unanimously. (The result is that, relative to the
original status quo, the lower spending districts would
be loaning $50 per household to the higher spending
districts and sharing in the social surplus created by
more productive investments).
Perhaps such transfers may seem fairly
insignificant in each household's budget. But what of the
potential benefits to residents in any district if they
carefully scrutinize the entire $500 or so in
entitlements spent in or outside the district and can
begin to effect self sustaining projects that are, say,
financed through land rent increments and the appropriate
marginal cost (user) charges? A resident that in no way
benefits may be saving $500 per year with accumulating
interest balances, accompanied by a significant incentive
to make his/her preferences known.
In the SEA paper referred to above, I explore the
potential for various "federalist" arrangements to govern
district and National spending decisions. They range
between close approximations of Bailey's "constitution"
or "financial laws" to very simple, if less effective
means of constraining rent seeking, means of determining
interest rates to reflect disproportionate uses of Trust
funds relative to initial entitlements (see appendix).
The strongest incentive system, based on Bailey's work,
is a use of the pivotal mechanism for agenda setting and
combined use of the pivotal mechanism and the Thompson
"preference revealing" approach in making final budget
and regulatory decisions in a manner that will achieve
efficiency while minimizing redistributive harm. (To
illustrate the power of the Thompson incentive if
budgetary conflicts reached a referendum stage, the
citizen would have a strong incentive to reveal the $500
he is paying for a project with no benefit to him and
would receive up to one half that amount in compensation
if his less preferred option was chosen).
I'm also suggesting a very simple moral to the
story. No one is going to seriously move forward on LVT
when people think they can get what they want largely for
free. We need to live with that realization. However, we
often have episodic periods of reform when broad, if
discrete, administrative measures might be undertaken in
conjunction with an eye towards instituting what amounts
to benefit taxation. Imagine an alternative to a "Truth
in Budgeting" bill that can take Trust Funds off budget
(which failed by one vote in the last Congress) passing
with the appropriate incentive-compatible allocation
features). One might find those with a strong bent
towards benefit taxation (like Dupont) working in tandem
with those who have no strong ideological bent towards
the benefit tax idea (like Turgot).
One can always imagine the results of one's
conversations with an overly agitated Finance Minister
(who despite their calm exteriors are often extremely
agitated). Whether I've worked with one or more in a
functioning democracy here at home, in an autocracy
(Morocco) or in anarchy (Haiti), I often feel like a
player in Waiting for Godot. The mood is captured late in
Act I when Estrogen (the assistant) turns to Vladimir
(the Finance Minister) and says: "Be Happy". Later (after
considerable reflection), Vladimir replies: Now That We
Are Happy, What Shall We Do? Later, Estrogen then says
(not in the play): Let's Write That Memoir".
... ...
Read the
whole article
Mason Gaffney:
Rent, Taxation, Dissipation and
Federalism
1. Public works. These enhance the value of
specific private lands and so attract support from
specific benefited landowners. At the same time they link
new lands with old markets and, in the aggregate,
increase the amount of land that is usable in more
intensive forms, e.g. for urban housing, and thus have
some redistributive effect in favor of non-owners. This
makes for a wide constituency.
Because they are durable capital they appear to
represent real assets. However many are heavily
subsidized or cross-subsidized and cost far more than
their benefits to anyone. In the aggregate they freeze up
too much of the nation's limited capital stock.
Services are not inherently wasteful, and capital is
not inherently economical. Economy is the key in either
case. (When debt-financed, however, there should be
capital resulting.)
Capital is the more wasteful when we consider it is
taken from the margins of alternative uses where it may
be very scarce today. Labor, on the other hand, is in
surplus.
Anti-growth movements burgeoning today manifest
growing disbelief in the benefits of subeconomic
extensions of infrastructure. A small but growing element
is increasing awareness of the high degree of absentee
and alien ownership, highly concentrated, of the
benefited lands.
Squandering the Alaska surplus is a splendid case in
point. A social dividend would have been efficient, and
respectful of consumer sovereignty. James Madison's dead
hand stopped it (in part). (Zobel v. Williams.)
2. Subsidized public works in tandem with
exclusionary zoning.
Through revenue-sharing with categorical grants, many
localities have built expensive public works, e.g. sewer
plants, designed to accommodate higher populations. Then
they turn around and impose exclusionary zoning, to limit
the benefits to a few.
In the B.C. Ferry Service the main lines make a little
money and the branch lines to small islands are heavily
cross-subsidized, some making $1 of revenues for $12 of
costs. Residents of those islands, having sought and
secured the service, are now alarmed at the influx of
population and are zoning it out.
Here we have public works turned into pure giveaways
to a few landowners, with no tokens for any wider
constituency.
3. Hocking the revenues
Borrowing to spend worsens the public works problems.
Worse yet is borrowing to pay for current services, with
some admixture of graft, as the NYC bankruptcy
illustrated, and much 3d-world borrowing illustrates
today on a wider canvas. ...
Read the whole article
Frank Stilwell and Kirrily Jordan: The Political Economy of Land:
Putting Henry George in His Place
George saw land as a community resource provided by
nature, to which every human being had an equal right. He
argued that, since land was fixed in supply, the system
of private land ownership allowed the wealthy few to
enjoy exclusive rights to land and its benefits, while
alienating the poorer majority from land ownership and
forcing them to pay rent to landowners in order to access
this necessary resource. Moreover, the collection of
rents by landowners allowed them to increase their wealth
without contributing to the productive efforts of
society. As the population grew, so too did the demand
for land, forcing rents and land values ever higher. In
addition, increases in land value resulting from
publicly-funded developments, such as roads and public
transport systems, unduly benefited landowners at the
expense of the community. Such unearned gains from
landownership encouraged speculation in land, pushing
prices even higher, while exposing the economy to the
risks of speculative ‘booms’ and
‘busts’. ... read the whole
article
Bill Batt: Comment on Parts of the
NYS Legislative Tax Study Commission's 1985 study
“Who Pays New York Taxes?”
The market price of a location depends not only on
ground rent and taxes, effectively its present value, but
also upon the “discount rate,” or interest
rate, that prevails in the market used to calculate its
returns and costs. When interest rates go up, the market
prices of sites fall, just as for any other economic
encumbrances placed on locational sites.
The market prices of sites also fall if taxes go up
and nothing else changes. However, an increase in taxes
is often accompanied by improvements in any obligations
linked to parcel locations. These too are sometimes
easily “commodified,”26 and may vary
according to time period, changed neighborhood
expectations, emergency conditions, government
regulations, and so on.27 These contingent links often
constitute services that raise the market prices of sites
more than the taxes depress them. Still another way of
understanding the value of locations is to see them as
capitalized transportation costs.28 Savings in
transportation are likely to be expressed in the market
price of sites. One way or another people are willing to
pay for access to exchange markets: either in the form of
site proximity or in the form of travel expenses. It is
the reason why urban cores have higher site rents than
peripheral areas and hinterlands. Hence the differential
value of locations, dependent, not on anything
titleholders do, but rather on the quality of
community amenities. These all have a
price.
The prices for services that raise land
rents, like the services themselves, should be
regarded as flows rather than as stocks. But, ironically,
our payments for such services are not understood as
flows affecting site values at all, but are seen rather
as related to stock prices. The values of our property
parcels are viewed solely as stocks, and therefore our
taxes are seen as stock taxes. ... read the whole
commentary
Further reading:
Rick Rybeck: Using Value Capture to
Finance Infrastructure and Encourage Compact
Development, at http://www.edrgroup.com/ted2006/T3_Rybeck_Rick.pdf.
Fred Harrison: Wheels of Fortune:
Self-funding Infrastructure and the Free Market Case for
a Land Tax at
http://www.iea.org.uk/files/upld-publication307pdf?.pdf.
|
To share this page with a friend:
right click, choose "send," and add your
comments.
|
|
Red links have not been
visited; .
Green links are pages you've seen
|
Essential Documents pertinent
to this theme:
|
|