What should we reward? Should our society's incentives
be set up to reward those who seek to privatize the
economic value our land and other natural resources for
their own benefit, or for their own children or
great-great grandchildren, or should the incentives be
arranged to encourage the treatment of the land and
natural resources as our common treasure?
Should the great-grandchildren of the landed start
life with more than the great-grandchildren of those who
had no land? Georgists seek to create a level playing
field on which both groups have equal access to all
natural opportunities, and all have the incentives to
excel.
To the extent that foresight consists of being able to
envision a city where a town is now, and having enough
money to buy land there, foresight does not create
anything useful for society. We shouldn't be rewarding
land speculation. Rather, we should be rewarding those
who create jobs, those who create housing, those who
create from our natural resources, not making it possible
for those with "foresight" to get there first and be
permitted to charge those creators for access to the
land!
Charles T. Root — Not a Single Tax! (1925)
... But before this time the reader, unless he has
given previous attention to the subject, is full of
objections to the above doctrine: "How about the law?" he
is asking. "Hasn't a man the right to buy a piece of land
as cheaply as he can, to do what he pleases with it, and
hold on to it till he gets ready to sell?" The answer is
that at present he certainly has this statutory right,
which has been so long and so universally recognized that
most people suppose it to be not only a legal, but a real
or equitable right. A shrewd man, foreseeing the
direction of growth of population in a city, for example,
can buy a well-located block at a moderate figure from
some less far-seeing owner, can let it grow up to weeds,
fence it off against all comers and give it no further
attention except to pay the very small tax usually
imposed upon vacant land.
Meantime the increasing community builds up all around
it with homes, banks, stores, churches, schools, paving
and lighting the streets, giving police and fire
protection, etc., and at last comes to need this block so
urgently that the owner is fairly begged to sell it, at
three or ten or fifty times what it cost him. Quite often
the purchaser at this enormous advance is the very
community which has through its presence and the
expenditure of its taxes created practically the whole
value of the land in question!
It was said above that an individual has a statutory
right to pursue this very common course. That was an
error. The statement should have been that he has a
statutory wrong; for no disinterested person can follow
the course of land speculation as almost universally
practiced, without feeling its rank injustice. ...
read the whole
article
Upton Sinclair: The
Consequences of Land Speculation are Tenantry and Debt on
the Farms, and Slums and Luxury in the Cities
I know of a woman — I have never had the
pleasure of making her acquaintance, because she lives in
a lunatic asylum, which does not happen to be on my
visiting list. This woman has been mentally incompetent
from birth. She is well taken care of, because her father
left her when he died the income of a large farm on the
outskirts of a city. The city has since grown and the
land is now worth, at conservative estimate, about twenty
million dollars. It is covered with office buildings, and
the greater part of the income, which cannot be spent by
the woman, is piling up at compound interest. The woman
enjoys good health, so she may be worth a hundred million
dollars before she dies.
I choose this case because it is one about which there
can be no disputing; this woman has never been able to do
anything to earn that twenty million dollars. And if a
visitor from Mars should come down to study the
situation, which would he think was most insane, the
unfortunate woman, or the society which compels thousands
of people to wear themselves to death in order to pay her
the income of twenty million dollars?
The fact that this woman is insane makes it easy to
see that she is not entitled to the "unearned increment"
of the land she owns. But how about all the other people
who have bought up and are holding for speculation the
most desirable land? The value of this land increases,
not because of anything these owners do — not
because of any useful service they render to the
community — but purely because the community as a
whole is crowding into that neighborhood and must have
use of the land.
The speculator who bought this land thinks that he
deserves the increase, because he guessed the fact that
the city was going to grow that way. But it seems clear
enough that his skill in guessing which way the community
was going to grow, however useful that skill may be to
himself, is not in any way useful to the community. The
man may have planted trees, or built roads, and put in
sidewalks and sewers; all that is useful work, and for
that he should be paid. But should he be paid for
guessing what the rest of us were going to need?
Before you answer, consider the consequences of this
guessing game. The consequences of land speculation are
tenantry and debt on the farms, and slums and luxury in
the cities. A great part of the necessary land is held
out of use, and so the value of all land continually
increases, until the poor man can no longer own a home.
The value of farm land also increases; so year by year
more independent farmers are dispossessed, because they
cannot pay interest on their mortgages. So the land
becomes a place of serfdom, that land described by the
poet, "where wealth accumulates and men decay." The great
cities fill up with festering slums, and a small class of
idle parasites are provided with enormous fortunes, which
they do not have to earn, and which they cannot
intelligently spend. ... read the whole
article
Henry George: The Condition of Labor
— An Open Letter to Pope Leo XIII in response to
Rerum Novarum (1891)
... Your use, in so many passages of your Encyclical,
of the inclusive term “property” or
“private” property, of which in morals
nothing can be either affirmed or denied, makes your
meaning, if we take isolated sentences, in many places
ambiguous. But reading it as a whole, there can be no
doubt of your intention that private property in land
shall be understood when you speak merely of private
property. With this interpretation, I find that the
reasons you urge for private property in land are eight.
Let us consider them in order of presentation. You
urge:
1. That what is bought with rightful property is
rightful property. (RN, paragraph 5) ...
2. That private property in land proceeds from
man’s gift of reason. (RN, paragraphs 6-7.)
...
3. That private property in land deprives no one of the
use of land. (RN, paragraph 8.) ...
4. That Industry expended on land gives ownership in
the land itself. (RN, paragraphs 9-10.) ...
5. That private property in land has the support of the
common opinion of mankind, and has conduced to peace
and tranquillity, and that it is sanctioned by Divine
Law. (RN, paragraph 11.) ...
6. That fathers should provide for their children and
that private property in land is necessary to enable
them to do so. (RN, paragraphs 14-17.) ...
7. That the private ownership of land stimulates
industry, increases wealth, and attaches men to the
soil and to their country. (RN, paragraph 51.)
...
8. That the right to possess private property in land
is from nature, not from man; that the state has no
right to abolish it, and that to take the value of
landownership in taxation would be unjust and cruel to
the private owner. (RN, paragraph 51.) ...
2. That private property in land proceeds from
man’s gift of reason. (6-7.)
In the second place your Holiness argues that man
possessing reason and forethought may
not only acquire ownership of the fruits of the earth,
but also of the earth itself, so that out of its products
he may make provision for the future.
Reason, with its attendant forethought, is indeed the
distinguishing attribute of man; that which raises him
above the brute, and shows, as the Scriptures declare,
that he is created in the likeness of God. And this gift
of reason does, as your Holiness points out, involve the
need and right of private property in whatever is
produced by the exertion of reason and its attendant
forethought, as well as in what is produced by physical
labor. In truth, these elements of man’s production
are inseparable, and labor involves the use of reason. It
is by his reason that man differs from the animals in
being a producer, and in this sense a maker. Of
themselves his physical powers are slight, forming as it
were but the connection by which the mind takes hold of
material things, so as to utilize to its will the matter
and forces of nature. It is mind, the intelligent reason,
that is the prime mover in labor, the essential agent in
production.
The right of private ownership does therefore
indisputably attach to things provided by man’s
reason and forethought. But it cannot attach to things
provided by the reason and forethought of
God!
To illustrate: Let us suppose a company traveling
through the desert as the Israelites traveled from Egypt.
Such of them as had the forethought to provide themselves
with vessels of water would acquire a just right of
property in the water so carried, and in the thirst of
the waterless desert those who had neglected to provide
themselves, though they might ask water from the
provident in charity, could not demand it in right. For
while water itself is of the providence of God, the
presence of this water in such vessels, at such place,
results from the providence of the men who carried it.
Thus they have to it an exclusive right.
But suppose others use their forethought in pushing
ahead and appropriating the springs, refusing when their
fellows come up to let them drink of the water save as
they buy it of them. Would such forethought give any
right?
Your Holiness, it is not the forethought of carrying
water where it is needed, but the forethought of seizing
springs, that you seek to defend in defending the private
ownership of land!
Let me show this more fully, since it may be worth
while to meet those who say that if private property in
land be not just, then private property in the products
of labor is not just, as the material of these products
is taken from land. It will be seen on consideration that
all of man’s production is analogous to such
transportation of water as we have supposed. In growing
grain, or smelting metals, or building houses, or weaving
cloth, or doing any of the things that constitute
producing, all that man does is to change in place or
form preexisting matter. As a producer man is merely a
changer, not a creator; God alone creates. And since the
changes in which man’s production consists inhere
in matter so long as they persist, the right of private
ownership attaches the accident to the essence, and gives
the right of ownership in that natural material in which
the labor of production is embodied. Thus water, which in
its original form and place is the common gift of God to
all men, when drawn from its natural reservoir and
brought into the desert, passes rightfully into the
ownership of the individual who by changing its place has
produced it there.
But such right of ownership is in reality a mere right
of temporary possession. For though man may take material
from the storehouse of nature and change it in place or
form to suit his desires, yet from the moment he takes
it, it tends back to that storehouse again. Wood decays,
iron rusts, stone disintegrates and is displaced, while
of more perishable products, some will last for only a
few months, others for only a few days, and some
disappear immediately on use. Though, so far as we can
see, matter is eternal and force forever persists; though
we can neither annihilate nor create the tiniest mote
that floats in a sunbeam or the faintest impulse that
stirs a leaf, yet in the ceaseless flux of nature,
man’s work of moving and combining constantly
passes away. Thus the recognition of the ownership of
what natural material is embodied in the products of man
never constitutes more than temporary possession —
never interferes with the reservoir provided for all. As
taking water from one place and carrying it to another
place by no means lessens the store of water, since
whether it is drunk or spilled or left to evaporate, it
must return again to the natural reservoirs — so is
it with all things on which man in production can lay the
impress of his labor.
Hence, when you say that man’s reason puts it
within his right to have in stable and permanent
possession not only things that perish in the using, but
also those that remain for use in the future, you are
right in so far as you may include such things as
buildings, which with repair will last for generations,
with such things as food or fire-wood, which are
destroyed in the use. But when you infer that man can
have private ownership in those permanent things of
nature that are the reservoirs from which all must draw,
you are clearly wrong. Man may indeed hold in private
ownership the fruits of the earth produced by his labor,
since they lose in time the impress of that labor, and
pass again into the natural reservoirs from which they
were taken, and thus the ownership of them by one works
no injury to others. But he cannot so own the earth
itself, for that is the reservoir from which must
constantly be drawn not only the material with which
alone men can produce, but even their very bodies.
The conclusive reason why man cannot claim ownership
in the earth itself as he can in the fruits that he by
labor brings forth from it, is in the facts stated by you
in the very next paragraph (7), when you truly say:
Man’s needs do not die out, but recur; satisfied
today, they demand new supplies tomorrow. Nature,
therefore, owes to man a storehouse that shall never
fail, the daily supply of his daily wants. And this he
finds only in the inexhaustible fertility of the
earth.
By man you mean all men. Can what nature owes to all
men be made the private property of some men, from which
they may debar all other men?
Let me dwell on the words of your Holiness,
“Nature, therefore, owes to man a storehouse that
shall never fail.” By Nature you mean God. Thus
your thought, that in creating us, God himself has
incurred an obligation to provide us with a storehouse
that shall never fail, is the same as is thus expressed
and carried to its irresistible conclusion by the Bishop
of Meath:
God was perfectly free in the act by which He
created us; but having created us he bound himself by
that act to provide us with the means necessary for our
subsistence. The land is the only source of this kind
now known to us. The land, therefore, of every country
is the common property of the people of that country,
because its real owner, the Creator who made it, has
transferred it as a voluntary gift to them.
“Terram autem dedit filiis
hominum.” Now, as every individual in that
country is a creature and child of God, and as all his
creatures are equal in his sight, any settlement of the
land of a country that would exclude the humblest man
in that country from his share of the common
inheritance would be not only an injustice and a wrong
to that man, but, moreover, be AN IMPIOUS RESISTANCE TO
THE BENEVOLENT INTENTIONS OF HIS CREATOR.
... read
the whole letter
Bill Batt: The
Compatibility of Georgist Economics and Ecological
Economics
Any failure to pay back that increment to society,
or of government to recapture it in the form of taxes,
constituted not only an injustice to the poor but a
distortion of economic equilibrium. He witnessed first
hand the perverted configurations of land use that today
we know as sprawl
development— even in his time it was apparent that
urban, high value land parcels were being held off the
market for speculative gain by meretricious interests. He
witnessed also the boom and bust cycles of the land
markets on account of such speculation, effects which
spread far wider than just land prices. These inevitable
cycles would dislocate labor and capital supply, giving
impetus to the impoverishment and suffering which he
himself had experienced. He understood that holding the
most strategically valuable landsites out of circulation
constituted a burden on the economy. He understood that
financial resources spent to pay exorbitant land prices
had a depressing effect on capital and labor. And because
government was taxing labor and capital instead of
recovering land rent, it was further restricting the job
market and the growth of capital. He realized that people
who captured monopoly control of strategically valuable
landsites could do so because they were privy to
information prior to its public release. It was not by
any means his insight alone; it was captured also by
George Washington Plunkett writing at the same
time:
There’s an honest graft,
and I’m an example of how it works. I might sum up
the whole thing by sayin’: “I seen my
opportunities and I took ‘em.”
Just let me
explain by examples. My party’s in power in the
city, and it’s goin’ to undertake a lot of
public improvements. Well, I’m tipped off, say,
that they’re going to lay out a new park in a
certain place.
I see my opportunity and I take it. I go to that place
and I buy up all the land I can in the neighborhood. Then
the board of this or that makes its plan public, and
there is a rush to get my land, which nobody cared
particularly for before.
Ain’t it perfectly honest to
charge a good price and make a profit on my investment
and foresight? Of course, it is. Well, that’s
honest graft. 32
32William L. Riordan, Plunkett of Tammany
Hall. New York: Dutton, 1963, p. 3.
All society needed to do was to collect the
economic rent from landholders as its rightful due, a
solution that became part of the subtitle of his book,
“the remedy.” Taxing the land (or,
alternatively, collecting the economic rent) was
something common citizens could
understand.... read the whole
article
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