Alaska and the Alaska Permanent
Fund
As we think about what America is trying to do in
Iraq, it is worth thinking about who it is that is going
to reap the benefits of the oil under Iraqi sand. Should
it be a few Iraqis? Should it be a few American
corporations and their shareholders? Should it be all the
people who live in the districts where the oil is pumped?
Should it be all the people of Iraq? Who should
decide?
Similarly, when America invests in rebuilding Iraq's
infrastructure, who benefits? Is it accurate to say that
everyone who lives in the areas served benefits, or is
there another, more precise, answer to that question?
Does the answer to that question depend on whether the
homeownership rate is 10%, 50% or 90%? Does the answer to
that question depend on whether 10% of businesses are
conducted on properties owned by those who operate them,
50% or 90%?
In America, urban land is a very valuable resource,
often more valuable than land that can be mined for its
natural resources. Who should benefit from increases in
its value? Who should be able to privatize the rent on
urban land, be it Iraq's or America's? Is is acceptable
for individuals to pocket the land value if they are
local residents? Is it acceptable for individuals to
pocket the land value if they are foreigners? Is it
acceptable for corporations to pocket the land value?
Does it matter whether those corporations' shareholders
are locals or foreigners?
Is there a handy alternative to the value of land or
natural resources being privatized? Absolutely! Shift
taxes off work, off trade (sales), and off buildings, and
instead place the tax burden on land and on natural
resources. We won't use any less of either one, but
instead of a few individuals pocketing something they
didn't create, all of us will benefit — equally.
And we'll all benefit from a healthier economy.
Alaska's approach, to invest a portion of the oil
proceeds for the future for the people of Alaska, is a
sound one. Alaska already has low taxes, because much of
the cost of state government is coming from oil revenues.
And with powerful representatives in the Senate who see
that Federal money is spent in ways that benefit Alaska's
property owners, Alaskans tend to be in a good
situation.
Alanna Hartzok: Earth Rights Democracy:
Public Finance based on Early Christian Teachings
... This equitable and successful public
finance approach was eventually undermined by private
banking institutions. Now taxpayers nationwide subsidize
the irrigation needs of agribusiness. Self-financing
development projects reduce the necessity for debt
finance, so do not contribute to the profits of
rent-seeking institutions. These exploitative
institutions which concentrate wealth in the hands of the
few will continue to sabotage this policy approach until
sufficient numbers of people have a better understanding
of the land ethic of koinonia and
this fundamental approach to securing the human right to
the earth.
One of the best examples of the beneficial
results of an ethic of koinonia in natural resources is
to be found in the state of Alaska
where an "earth rights" constitution gives ownership of
the oil and other natural resources of the state to the
citizens of Alaska on an equal basis. The Alaska
Permanent Fund invests the state's oil resource rents,
the interest from which funds cash dividend payments
directly to all adults and children resident in the state
at least one year.
The Permanent Fund ended fiscal year 2004 on June
30 with a 14.1 percent return and a total value of more
than $27.4 billion, according to currently available
Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation figures. More than
$24,000 per person have been distributed to citizens of
Alaska since 1982. Note that Alaska is the only state in
the US wherein the wealth gap has decreased during recent
decades.[33]
The Alaska Permanent Fund is an innovative and
important model of resource rents for citizen dividends,
but with worldwide oil production nearing peak, it is the
opinion of this writer that oil resource rents had best
be directed to the development of renewable energy
technologies. The electromagnetic spectrum, geo-orbital
zones, and surface land values would be a more
appropriate source of rent distribution as citizen
dividend payments.
Had the land problem been addressed in the south
after the Civil War, a more equitable distribution of
wealth and overall prosperity would have been the likely
result. It can be instructive to review this earlier
effort to secure land rights in America. read the whole
article
Alanna Hartzok: CITIZEN DIVIDENDS AND
OIL RESOURCE RENTS
Abstract: Citizens of Alaska have been
receiving individual dividend checks from an oil rent
trust fund since 1982. Norway¹s citizens receive
substantial social services and invest oil rents in a
permanent fund for the future. Nigeria has yet to
establish a similar fund for its oil revenue stream. This
paper explores the oil rent institutions of Alaska,
Norway and Nigeria with a focus on these
questions:
- Are citizen dividends from oil rent funds
currently or potentially a source of substantial basic
income?
- Are oil rent funds the best source for citizen
dividends or should CDs be based on other types of
resource rents?
The paper recommends full use of information and
communication technologies for transparency in extractive
resource industries, that resource rent from
non-renewable resources should be invested in socially
and environmentally responsible ways and primarily in the
needed transition to renewable energy based economies,
and that oil and other non-renewable resource rent funds
should transition towards capturing substantial resource
rents from surface land site values (ground rent) and
other permanent and sustainable sources of rent for
possible distribution of citizen dividends. read the whole
article
Mason Gaffney: Cannan's Law
Some successes entail barriers to immigration.
Alaska early on set out to limit its social
dividend to citizens with five years prior residence in
Alaska. It immediately lost out to the ghost of Madison.
In Zobel v. Williams (1982) the U.S.S.C. called this
provision a barrier to interstate migration, and struck
it down. Alaska's annual oil dividend survived, but were
it not for Zobel might be much higher than today.
Meantime, Alaskan landowners pay no property taxes. Land
cannot immigrate, but there goes the dividend, and
Anchorage is the most sprawled city in North America. ...
read the whole article
Nic Tideman:
Improving Efficiency and Preventing Exploitation in Taxing
and Spending Decisions
The efficiency of the competitive equilibrium requires
that the sharing of the pre-development rental value of
land (that part of the rental value of land that is not
accounted for by local public goods) and the value of
other natural opportunities be unaffected by migration or
political competition. If the distribution of the returns
to natural opportunities depends on where people live or
on political competition, then efficiency will fall
because of inefficient location decisions and rent
seeking losses. For example, if the returns to oil in
Alaska are divided among the people who live in Alaska,
then people will move to Alaska inefficiently to share in
the bounty. If the distribution of the returns to natural
opportunities depends on political competition, then
there will be rent-seeking losses from such competition.
A non-exploitive and reasonably efficient local public
sector is thus possible through competition among
communities. ...
read the whole article
James Kiefer: James Huntington and the
ideas of Henry George
Henry George, author of Progress and Poverty, argued
that, while some forms of wealth are produced by human
activity, and are rightly the property of the producers
(or those who have obtained them from the previous owners
by voluntary gift or exchange), land and natural
resources are bestowed by God on the human race, and that
every one of the N inhabitants of the earth has a claim
to 1/Nth of the coal beds, 1/Nth of the oil wells, 1/Nth
of the mines, and 1/Nth of the fertile soil. God wills a
society where everyone may sit in peace under his own
vine and his own fig tree.
The Law of Moses undertook to implement this by making
the ownership of land hereditary, with a man's land
divided among his sons (or, in the absence of sons, his
daughters), and prohibiting the permanent sale of land.
(See Leviticus 25:13-17,23.) The most a man might do with
his land is sell the use of it until the next Jubilee
year, an amnesty declared once every fifty years, when
all debts were cancelled and all land returned to its
hereditary owner.
Henry George's proposed implementation is to tax all
land at about 99.99% of its rental value, leaving the
owner of record enough to cover his bookkeeping expenses.
The resulting revenues would be divided equally among the
natural owners of the land, viz. the people of the
country, with everyone receiving a dividend check
regularly for the use of his share of the earth (here I
am anticipating what I think George would have suggested
if he had written in the 1990's rather than the
1870's).
This procedure would have the effect of making the
sale price of a piece of land, not including the price of
buildings and other improvements on it, practically zero.
The cost of being a landholder would be, not the original
sale price, but the tax, equivalent to rent. A man who
chose to hold his "fair share," or 1/Nth of all the land,
would pay a land tax about equal to his dividend check,
and so would break even. By 1/Nth of the land is meant
land with a value equal to 1/Nth of the value of all the
land in the country.
Naturally, an acre in the business district of a great
city would be worth as much as many square miles in the
open country. Some would prefer to hold more than one
N'th of the land and pay for the privilege. Some would
prefer to hold less land, or no land at all, and get a
small annual check representing the dividend on their
inheritance from their father Adam.
Note that, at least for the able-bodied, this solves
the problem of poverty at a stroke. If the total land and
total labor of the world are enough to feed and clothe
the existing population, then 1/Nth of the land and 1/Nth
of the labor are enough to feed and clothe 1/Nth of the
population. A family of 4 occupying 4/Nths of the land
(which is what their dividend checks will enable them to
pay the tax on) will find that their labor applied to
that land is enough to enable them to feed and clothe
themselves. Of course, they may prefer to apply their
labor elsewhere more profitably, but the situation from
which we start is one in which everyone has his own plot
of ground from which to wrest a living by the strength of
his own back, and any deviation from this is the result
of voluntary exchanges agreed to by the parties directly
involved, who judge themselves to be better off as the
result of the exchanges.
Some readers may think this a very radical proposal.
In fact, it is extremely conservative, in the sense of
being in agreement with historic ideas about land
ownership as opposed to ownership of, say, tools or
vehicles or gold or domestic animals or other movables.
The laws of English-speaking countries uniformly
distinguish between real property (land) and personal
property (everything else). In this context, "real" is
not the opposite of "imaginary." It is a form of the word
"royal," and means that the ultimate owner of the land is
the king, as symbol of the people. Note that
English-derived law does not recognize "landowners." The
term is "landholders." The concept of eminent domain is
that the landholder may be forced to surrender his
landholdings to the government for a public purpose.
Historically, eminent domain does not apply to property
other than land, although complications arise when there
are buildings on the land that is being seized.
I will mention in passing that the proposals of Henry
George have attracted support from persons as diverse as
Felix Morley, Aldous
Huxley, Woodrow Wilson, Helen Keller, Winston Churchill, Leo Tolstoy, William F Buckley Jr, and Sun
Yat-sen. To the Five Nobel Prizes authorized by Alfred
Nobel himself there has been added a sixth, in Economics,
and the Henry George Foundation claims eight of the Economics
Laureates as supporters, in whole or in part, of the
proposals of Henry George (Paul Samuelson, 1970; Milton Friedman, 1976; Herbert A
Simon, 1978; James Tobin, 1981; Franco Modigliani, 1985;
James M Buchanan, 1986; Robert M Solow, 1987; William S Vickrey, 1996).
The immediate concrete proposal favored by most
Georgists today is that cities shall tax land within
their boundaries at a higher rate than they tax buildings
and other improvements on the land. (In case anyone is
about to ask, "How can we possibly distinguish between
the value of the land and the value of the buildings on
it?" let me assure you that real estate assessors do it
all the time. It is standard practice to make the two
assessments separately, and a parcel of land in the
business district of a large city very often has a
different owner from the building on it.) Many cities
have moved to a system of taxing land more heavily than
improvements, and most have been pleased with the
results, finding that landholders are more likely to use
their land productively -- to their own benefit and that
of the public -- if their taxes do not automatically go
up when they improve their land by constructing or
maintaining buildings on it.
An advantage of this proposal in the eyes of many is
that it is a Fabian proposal, "evolution, not
revolution," that it is incremental and reversible. If a
city or other jurisdiction does not like the results of a
two-level tax system, it can repeal the arrangement or
reduce the difference in levels with no great upheaval.
It is not like some other proposals of the form,
"Distribute all wealth justly, and make me absolute
dictator of the world so that I can supervise the
distribution, and if it doesn't work, I promise to
resign." The problem is that absolute dictators seldom
resign. ... read
the whole article
Peter Barnes:
Capitalism 3.0 — Chapter 3: The Limits of Government
(pages 33-48)
Limits of Public Ownership
Because of historical circumstances, America has a
long tradition of public land ownership. When Europeans
first arrived, North America was held in common by an
assortment of tribes. As these tribes were dispossessed,
the federal government acquired their territories. Some
of the federal holdings were given to states as they
entered the union. Though most of what the federal and
state governments owned was then sold cheaply, much was
retained. Today, nearly a third of the land in the United
States is government-owned.
To say that land — or any asset — is
“government-owned,” however, isn’t to
say it’s managed on behalf of future generations,
nonhuman species, or ordinary citizens. Consider what the
federal and state governments have done with the lands
they own.
Outside of Alaska, about 5 percent of government-owned
lands have been designated as wilderness. In such areas,
humans may enter on foot but not use motorized vehicles.
Mining, logging, and hunting are also prohibited. On the
other 95 percent of government-owned land, private and
commercial use is regulated by various agencies. National
forests are managed by the U.S. Forest Service, grazing
and mineral lands by the Bureau of Land Management,
hunting and fishing by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service.
As a general rule, politics — not fiduciary duty
— determines what uses are permitted and what
prices are charged. A classic example is the Mining Act
of 1872, under which private companies can stake claims
to mineral-bearing lands for $5 an acre, and pay no
royalties on the minerals they extract. Every attempt to
reform this antiquated law has failed because of the
mining companies’ political clout.
In the same vein, the U.S. Forest Service has for
decades been selling trees to timber companies for
below-market prices. On top of that, it spends billions
of tax dollars building roads in virgin forests so timber
firms can harvest the people’s trees. This is, of
course, economically irrational and a huge subsidy to
private corporations. It also addicts Americans to cheap
forest products and destructive logging methods. These
practices occur because the Forest Service is not a trust
committed to ecosystem preservation, but a politically
influenced agency dedicated to “multiple use”
of government-owned forests.
There are exceptions to this dismal pattern. One
involves trust lands given by the federal government to
states. Such gifts began with the Land Ordinance of 1785,
which reserved one square mile per township for the
support of public schools. Later, the Morrill Land Grant
College Act of 1862 gave more land to states to support
colleges of agriculture and mechanics. And in 1954,
Congress gave Texas title to oil-rich coastal lands,
providing that all revenue from them be placed in an
endowment, or permanent fund, that generates income for
public schools forever.
Today, twenty-two states hold about 155 million acres
in trust for public schools and colleges — which is
to say, for future generations. Like the federal
government, the state trusts lease much of their land for
oil drilling, timber cutting, and cattle grazing. The
trusts’ duty is to preserve not the land itself but
the income streams it generates. This creates
beneficiaries (educators, students, parents) who monitor
the land managers closely. One result, according to
University of California professor Sally Fairfax, is that
state trust lands are better managed than federally owned
lands. Whereas the U.S. Forest Service “has been
hiding the ball on cash flows and returns to investments
for most of this century . . . the state trust land
managers know how to keep books and make them
public.” Further, even though the state trusts
aren’t bound to protect ecosystems per se, they
tend to do so because they have a long-term calculus.
An interesting variant of the typical state land trust
is the Alaska Permanent Fund, created in
1976 to absorb some of the windfall from leasing state
land to oil companies. The aim was to create an endowment
that would benefit Alaskans even after the oil is gone.
To this end, the Permanent Fund invests in stocks, bonds,
and similar assets, and off the earnings pays yearly
dividends to every resident. Originally, the dividends
were to be allocated in proportion to the
recipients’ length of residence in Alaska, with
old-timers getting more than newcomers. But the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that, because of the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Alaska couldn’t
discriminate against newcomers that way. The dividend
formula was then changed to one person, one share.
THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND
Under Alaska’s constitution, the state’s
natural resources belong to its people. Jay Hammond,
Republican governor of Alaska in the 1970s, took this
provision seriously.When oil began flowing from the North
Slope, he pushed for royalties to be shared among
Alaska’s citizens. Many battles later, the
legislature agreed to a deal: 75 percent of the
state’s oil revenue would go to the government as a
replacement for taxes.The remaining 25 percent would flow
into the Alaska Permanent Fund, and would be invested on
behalf of all Alaskans equally.
Since 1982, the Fund has grown to over $30 billion and
paid equal yearly dividends to all Alaskans, including
children (see figure 3.1). In effect, it is a giant
mutual fund managed on behalf of all Alaskan citizens,
present and future. Even after the oil runs dry, it will
continue to benefit everyone. Economist Vernon Smith, a
Nobel laureate and libertarian scholar at the Cato
Institute, has called it “a model [that]
governments all over the world would be well-advised to
copy.” ...
read the whole chapter
Peter Barnes:
Capitalism 3.0 — Chapter 5: Reinventing the Commons
(pages 65-78)
There’s nothing about property rights, however,
that requires them to be concentrated in
profit-maximizing hands. You could, for example, set up a
trust to own a forest, or certain forest rights, on
behalf of future generations. These property rights would
talk as loudly as shares of Pacific Lumber stock, but
their purpose would be very different: to preserve the
forest rather than to exploit it. If the Lorax had owned
some of these rights, Dr. Seuss’s tale (and Pacific
Lumber’s) would have ended more happily.
Imagine a whole set of property rights like this.
Let’s call them, generically, common
property rights. If such property rights
didn’t exist, there’d be a strong case for
inventing them. Fortunately, they do exist in a variety
of forms — for example, land or easements held in
perpetual trust, as by the Nature Conservancy, and
corporate assets managed on behalf of a broad community,
as by the Alaska Permanent Fund.
Some forms of common property include individual
shares — again, the Alaska Permanent
Fund is an example. These individual shares,
however, differ from shares in private corporations.
They’re not securities you can trade in a market;
rather, they depend on your membership in the community.
If you emigrate or die, you lose your share. Conversely,
when you’re born into the community, your share is
a birthright.
I recognize that, for some, turning common wealth into
any kind of property is a sacrilege. As Chief Seattle of
the Suquamish tribe put it, “How can you buy or
sell the sky, the warmth of the land?” I empathize
deeply with this sentiment. However, I’ve come to
believe that it’s more disrespectful of the sky to
pollute it without limit or payment than to turn it into
common property held in trust for future generations.
Hence, I favor propertization, but not
privatization. ...
read the whole chapter
Peter Barnes:
Capitalism 3.0 — Chapter 7: Universal Birthrights
(pages 101-116)
Dividends from Common Assets
A cushion of reliable income is a wonderful thing. It
can be saved for rainy days or used to pursue happiness
on sunny days. It can encourage people to take risks,
care for friends and relatives, or volunteer for
community service. For low-income families, it can pay
for basic necessities.
Conversely, the absence of reliable income is a
terrible thing. It heightens anxiety and fear. It
diminishes our ability to cope with crises and
transitions. It traps many families on the knife’s
edge of poverty, and makes it harder for the poor to
rise.
So why don’t we, as Monopoly does, pay
everyone some regular income — not through
redistribution of income, but through predistribution of
common property? One state — Alaska — already
does this. As noted earlier, the Alaska Permanent Fund
uses revenue from state oil leases to invest in stocks,
bonds, and similar assets, and from those investments
pays yearly dividends to every resident. Alaska’s
model can be extended to any state or nation, whether or
not they have oil. We could, for instance, have an
American Permanent Fund that pays equal dividends to
long-term residents of all 50 states. The reason is, we
jointly own many valuable assets.
Recall our discussion about common property trusts.
These trusts could crank down pollution and earn money
from selling ever-scarcer pollution permits. The scarcer
the permits get, the higher their prices would go. Less
pollution would equal more revenue. Over time, trillions
of dollars could flow into an American Permanent
Fund.
What could we do with that common income? In Alaska
the deal with oil revenue is 75 percent to government and
25 percent to citizens. For an American Permanent Fund,
I’d favor a 50/50 split, because paying dividends
to citizens is so important. Also, when scarce ecosystems
are priced above zero, the cost of living will go up and
people will need compensation; this wasn’t, and
isn’t, the case in Alaska. I’d also favor
earmarking the government’s dollars for specific
public goods, rather than tossing them into the general
treasury. This not only ensures identifiable public
benefits; it also creates constituencies who’ll
defend the revenue sharing system.
Waste absorption isn’t the only common resource
an American Permanent Fund could tap. Consider also, the
substantial contribution society makes to stock market
values. As noted earlier, private corporations can
inflate their value dramatically by selling shares on a
regulated stock exchange. The extra value derives from
the enlarged market of investors who can now buy the
corporation’s shares. Given a total stock market
valuation of about $15 trillion, this socially created
liquidity premium is worth roughly $5 trillion.
At the moment, this $5 trillion gift flows mostly to
the 5 percent of the population that own more than half
the private wealth. But if we wanted to, we could spread
it around. We could do that by charging corporations for
using the public trading system, just as investment
bankers do. (For those of you who haven’t been
involved in a public stock offering, investment bankers
are like fancy doormen to a free palace. While the public
charges almost nothing to use the capital markets,
investment bankers exact hefty fees.)
The public’s fee could be in cash or stock.
Let’s say we required publicly traded companies to
deposit 1 percent of their shares each year in the
American Permanent Fund for ten years — reaching a
total of 10 percent of their shares. This would be our
price not just for using a regulated stock exchange, but
also for all the other privileges (limited liability,
perpetual life, copyrights and patents, and so on) that
we currently bestow on private corporations for free.
In due time, the American Permanent Fund would have a
diversified portfolio worth several trillion dollars.
Like its Alaskan counterpart, it would pay equal yearly
dividends to everyone. As the stock market rose and fell,
so would everyone’s dividend checks. A rising tide
would lift all boats. America would truly be an
“ownership society.” ...
read the whole chapter
Peter Barnes:
Capitalism 3.0 — Chapter 10: What You Can Do (pages
155-166)
To build Capitalism 3.0, we each have unique roles to
play. I therefore address the final pages of this book to
a variety of people whose participation is critical.
...
POLITICIANS
Everyone wants your attention. Channel 5 is on line 3
and a powerful lobbyist is at your door. It’s hard
for you to see the forest for the trees. What can I
possibly tell you?
What I want to tell you is, there’s a fork in
the road. On one side lies capitalism as we know it; on
the other, an upgrade. You must decide which branch to
take. Your choice has vast ramifications. Very possibly,
the fate of the planet is in your hands. Trillions of
dollars are also at stake. I want you to be courageous. I
want you to choose the upgrade.
But that isn’t what one says to a politician.
What one says is, we need to reduce our dependence on
foreign oil, create jobs in America, and protect the
environment. All those things cost money, and government
doesn’t have enough. But here’s what
government can do.
- First, delegate to an independent authority —
something like the Fed — the power to cap U.S.
carbon consumption. That way, when energy prices go up
(which they inevitably will), you won’t get blamed.
Also, make sure the carbon authority pays dividends, like
the Alaska Permanent Fund. Then, when checks are mailed
to your constituents, you can take credit.
- Second, talk about jobs and energy independence in
your speeches. And push for an American Permanent Fund
financed by sales of pollution permits. Within a few
years, thousands of people in your district will be
installing new energy systems and cashing dividend
checks. You’ll be a hero.
- Finally, tell your donors not to worry. You’re
a low-tax, small-government, pay-as-we-go kind of person.
You think the environment should be protected through
market mechanisms. You favor an ownership society in
which every American has a tax-deferred savings account
and no child is left behind. ...
What’s particularly nice about Capitalism 3.0 is
that we can install it one piece at a time. We
needn’t shut the machine down, or delete the old
operating system, before installing the new one. Indeed,
we’re not even replacing most of the old operating
system, which is fine as it is. Rather, we’re
attaching add-ons, or plug-ins, that allow for a gradual
and safe transition. A formula for describing this
is:
Corporations + Commons = Capitalism
3.0
Like the governor of James Watt’s steam engine,
these add-ons will curb our current engine’s
unchecked excesses. When illth of one sort gets too
great, the new bits of code will turn the illth valve
down, or give authority to trustworthy humans to do so.
If money circulates too unequally, the new code will
alter the circulation, not by re distributing income but
by pre distributing property. It will make similar
adjustments when there’s too much corporate
distortion of culture, communities, or democracy
itself.
What’s also nice about the new operating system
is that, once installed, it can’t be easily
removed. That’s because it relies on property
rights rather than government programs that are subject
to political ebb and flow. If you have any doubt about
this, consider the staying power of Social Security and
the Alaska Permanent Fund, both of which distribute
periodic payments that have attained the status of
property rights. Social Security is over seventy years
old and has never been cut once; in 2005, it survived a
privatization campaign led by President Bush. Similarly,
the Alaska Permanent Fund, now more than twenty-five
years old, repelled an attempt in 1999 to divert part of
its income to the state treasury. ...
And, for businesspeople, here’s the best part:
Capitalism 3.0 will preserve the driving force of
American capitalism, the profit-maximizing algorithm. It
will do this not only by leaving the algorithm alone, but
also by giving all Americans, via the American Permanent
Fund, a financial stake in its success. All Americans
will benefit both from nature’s health and from the
health of corporations. ...
read the whole chapter
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