Postage Stamp Pricing
Mason Gaffney: Economics in Support of
Environmentalism
Sprawl is not the product of free
choice
A favorite fallacy is that sprawl results from
free individual choice. In fact, sprawl
results mainly from subsidies to sprawl, enforced through
taxation and/or utility rate regulation. Thus it is
imposed, not freely chosen. The classic case,
which exemplifies the whole genus, is postal service. It
costs you 29¢ to send a letter across the street
downtown, or from rural Idaho to rural Florida. The
generic name for such subsidies to sprawl is
"postage-stamp pricing" (a
species of spatial cross-subsidy), which gives you the
idea.
In British Columbia, people move
around a good deal by car-ferry, because of the terrain.
The Provincial Government ("The Crown Provincial") runs the
system. There are many lovely little islands in the Straits
of Georgia, between Vancouver Island and the mainland,
favored by the wealthy, the exclusive and reclusive. Being
more sybaritic than Henry D. Thoreau, and politically
puissant, they have demanded and received car-ferry
service. This service costs about $10 for every $1 in
revenue. The resulting deficit is covered by raising rates
on the main plebeian line, Victoria-Vancouver. Naturally,
these cheap ferries attract new visitors to the islands,
and new demand for land there. ...
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Mason
Gaffney: How to
Revive a Dying City
"French Equity" (Equity in Kind)
Under the Code Napoleon, a French testator must divide
real estate equally among all children. Money cannot
substitute for land; the Code requires equity in kind.
The resulting fine subdivision is called morcellement, and the Code demands it
without regard for efficiency.
Each heir, in fact, must get an equal share of land of
each quality: meadow, woodland, etc.
Today we approach French Equity indirectly, and
expensively. We distribute land haphazardly, but seek to
make every parcel equally good by extending utilities and
roads to all parcels on the same terms, regardless of
cost or location.
Economists call such schemes "postage stamp pricing,"
because postal rates do not vary with delivery costs.
Manhattan has 64,000 residents per square mile; Montana
has 5.4. It costs a lot more to collect or deliver mail
in Montana. The reason postal rates rise is that the U.S.
urban population is spreading out more like Montana and
less like Manhattan (which once had over 100,000 per
square mile). Here are five other examples:
- The British Columbia Ferry
Service. This socialized system has two urban lines
that make money, but the whole system hardly breaks
even, because lesser lines serve remote areas. The
worst costs $12 for every dollar of revenue.
- British Columbia Hydro. This
socialized power system charges uniform rates
throughout the Province. Users living in high-density
Vancouver are cheap to serve. A few live on the Yukon
border, where (I surmise) it costs hundreds of dollars
to earn a dollar of revenue.
- Water and sewer service in Milwaukee
County, Wisconsin. City investments have been
captured, controlled, and milked by suburban land
development interests, helped by state
legislators.
- State university campuses. The
legislative ethic demands a prize, such as a university
campus, in every electoral district. Most of the eight
UC campuses have excess land; some have excess floor
space. Sacramento solves rising enrollment not with
more intensive use of existing campuses, but with the
costly creation of new ones, each to enrich influential
land speculators.
- Water supply in California. The
high real cost of serving new settlements is passed on
to older settled areas through an accounting device
called "melding," stirring all
the accounts in the same pot. Melding passes through
several levels: a state wholesaler serves the
metropolitan district, which serves local districts,
which serve cities. At the end of the line, in
Riverside, it costs society $1800 to serve the marginal
acre-foot (a unit of water) selling for $20. This
subsidy is worth fortunes to developers; the cost is
spread so others won't notice.
Problems with French Equity
There are two problems with these subsidies as an
approach to equity: they are not equitable, and they are
wasteful.
- Equity achieved by regional
cross-subsidy is not interpersonal, but interregional.
It is like U.S. "foreign aid" programs, which tax the
poor in rich countries to aid the rich in poor
countries. Some who hold speculative land and
enjoy subsidies are among the world's richest people
and cor-porations. Equity is not served by milking
middle-class neighborhoods to further enrich wealthy
owners. "Public works for private gain" is bad enough,
but worse when profiteers are already rich.
- How about waste? Subsidy creates
waste in the amount of the subsidy, almost by
definition. The New York Regional Plan
Association estimates the social cost of creating a new
lot on the urban fringe at four times the lot's price
(probably an underestimate). Why develop a lot worth
only one quarter of its cost? Because other people pay
the other three quarters. This process transfers ground
rent from areas of overcharge to areas of undercharge,
but it destroys much of the ground rent. To spread the
surplus, we lose much of it.
Has French Equity any merit? It passed for a way to
create jobs when Keynes actually urged waste as a route
to full employment. Those ideas are now dormant, but we
still do not understand the problem. If we had to fire
teachers or policemen each time a city extended utilities
to a campaign donor's raw acres, we would better sense
the true cost of public works for private profit.
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