Rent Control
Mason Gaffney: How to
Revive a Dying City
Sharing the Surplus
Because urban rents are a
social surplus, not a payment for anyone's making or
supplying land, parties other than the landowner have a
claim. A good deal of American politics deals with how to
assert that claim and share in the surplus.
Dividing a big pie seems a pleasant enough task, but
Confucius knew better: "It is easier to face a common
enemy than to share a surplus." The common ways of
sharing surplus are clumsy, divisive, and destructive;
they bear some responsibility for dead cities. With too
much quarreling over spoils, there are no spoils to
dispute. Consider how spoils are shared, and how we might
do better.
Rent Control
Rent control, which shares surplus with tenants, is a
tempting route that several cities follow. Renters feel
abused and neglected by tough managers and anonymous
landlords. Supply is inelastic, at least in the short
run, so owners can't cut and run. Poetic justice is
served. But there are several spots on this policy:
- Limited number of beneficiaries.
The original tenants carve out an equity in the
landlord's estate, but benefits spread no wider.
Tenants may sublet to others, becoming landlords
themselves. Rent control is at best a zero-sum game
among the few, not a social reform.
- Lower incentive to maintain
supply. It becomes unattractive to build new rental
units, which are allowed higher initial rents but are
vulnerable to future caps. So rent control is worse
than a zero-sum game, it becomes negative-sum. Rent
control confiscates land income and building income
alike; buildings do not receive needed maintenance if
there is no return. Too, land can be reallocated to
uncontrolled uses, such as condominium-ization. A new
wrinkle in Santa Monica is to buy a cheap
rent-controlled apartment building and convert it to a
single-family residence for the new owner.
- Wasted space. Tenants lose
incentives to economize on space that is underpriced to
them. In the extreme, tenants move away, but retain
their apartments to use a few weeks of the year.
- New class society. Old renters
become a privileged class. A lower new supply, and
wasted space, force uncontrolled rent on new buildings
above the market level.
- Owner-tenant clashes. An owner's
main goal under rent control is to evict and repossess.
Nastiness and intimidation have become routine, and the
war stories legendary. In Tokyo, outright extortion and
violence are frequent.
- Aborted incentive to maintain and
improve. Landlords, and tenants retaining
precarious tenures, lose all economic motivation to
maintain or improve property.
- Dogged obstructionism. Sitting
tenants, who cannot gain by site renewal, fight it
every way they can. Obstructionists have a vested
interest in the status quo, however obsolescent,
however decayed, however inappropriate to the
site.
- Undertaxation. Equity that
tenants carve out of landlords' estates has no market
value, because it is inalienable (at least legally).
Assessed values and tax yields drop. The privileged
class pays low rent and avoids supporting public
services. Higher tax burdens are dumped on others, and
worsened public services are suffered by all. By way of
analogy, I am a small farmer with canal company shares
that allow me to buy water below the market price, but
no right to sell my water. So I and my fellow
shareholders waste water and create a chronic,
artificial southern California water shortage.
The rationale is that housing or water is too
important to leave to the market, and must be
price-controlled. The result is regulation much worse
than anything a market could accomplish. Around 1973
there were shortages of coffee, raisins, and even toilet
paper. These were too unimportant to regulate, so their
prices rose, demand fell, supply rose, and the crises
quickly disappeared. Rent control
ensures that we will not overcome the housing crisis so
simply, if at all. ...
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