Q22. What is privilege?
A. Strictly defined, privilege is, according to the
Century Dictionary, "a special and exclusive power
conferred by law on particular persons or classes of
persons and ordinarily in derogation of the common
right."
Q23. What is today the popular conception of
privilege?
A. That it is the law-given power of one man to profit at
another man's expense.
Q24. What are the principal forms of
privilege?
A. The appropriation by individuals, or by public service
corporations, of the net rent of land created by the
growth and activity of the community without payment for
the same. Also, the less important privileges connected
with patents, tariff, and the currency.
Q25. Where in does privilege differ from
capital?
A. Capital is a material thing, a product of labor,
stored-up wages; an instrument of production paid for in
human labor, and destined to wear out. Capital is the
natural ally of labor, and is harmless except as allied
to privilege. Privilege is none of these, but is
an intangible statutory power, an unpaid-for and
perpetual lien upon the future labor of this and
succeeding generations. Capital is paid for and
ephemeral. Privilege is unpaid for and
eternal. A man accumulated in his profession
$5,000 capital, which he invested in land in Canada. Ten
years later he sold the same land for $200,000. Here is
an instance of $5,000 capital allied with $195,000
privilege. This illustrates that privilege and not
capital is the real enemy of labor.
Q26. How may franchises be treated?
A. Franchise privileges may be abated, or gradually
abolished by lower rates, or by taxation, or by both, in
the interest of the community.
Q27. Why should privilege be especially
taxed?
A. Because such payment is fairly due from grantee to the
grantor of privilege and also because a tax upon
privilege can never be a burden upon industry or
commerce, nor can it ever operate to reduce the wages of
labor or increase prices to the consumer.
Q28. How are landlords privileged?
A. Because, in so far as their land tax is an "old" tax,
it is a burdenless tax, and because their buildings' tax
is shifted upon their tenants; most landlords who let
land and also the tenement houses and business blocks
thereon avoid all share in the tax burden.
Q29. How does privilege affect the distribution of
wealth?
A. Wealth as produced is now distributed substantially in
but two channels, privilege and wages. The abolition of
privilege would leave but the one proper channel, viz.,
wages of capital, hand, and brain. ... read the whole
article
Thus far I’ve argued that Capitalism 2.0 —
or surplus capitalism — has three tragic flaws: it
devours nature, widens inequality, and fails to make us
happier in the end. It behaves this way because
it’s programmed to do so. It must
make thneeds, reward property owners disproportionately,
and distract us from truer paths to happiness because its
algorithms direct it to do so. Neither enlightened
managers nor the occasional zealous regulator can make it
behave much differently.
In this part of the book I advance a solution. The
essence of it is to fix capitalism’s operating
system by adding a commons sector to balance the
corporate sector. The new sector would supply virtuous
feedback loops and proxies for unrepresented
stakeholders: future generations, pollutees, and nonhuman
species. And would offset the corporate sector’s
negative externalities with positive
externalities of comparable magnitude. If the corporate
sector devours nature, the commons sector would protect
it. If the corporate sector widens inequality, the
commons sector would reduce it. If the corporate sector
turns us into self-obsessed consumers, the commons sector
would reconnect us to nature, community, and culture. All
this would happen automatically once the commons sector
is set up. The result would be a balanced economy that
gives us the best of both sectors and the worst of
neither. ...
Organizing Principles of the Commons
Sector
Property rights, especially the common kind, require
competent institutions to manage them. What we need
today, then, along with more common property, is a set of
institutions, distinct from corporations and government,
whose unique and explicit mission is to manage common
property.
I say set of institutions because there will and
should be variety. The commons sector should not be a
monoculture like the corporate sector. Each institution
should be appropriate to its particular asset and
locale.
Some of the variety will depend on whether the
underlying asset is limited or inexhaustible. Typically,
gifts of nature have limited capacities; the air can
safely absorb only so much carbon dioxide, the oceans
only so many drift nets. Institutions that manage natural
assets must therefore be capable of limiting use. By
contrast, ideas and cultural creations have endless
potential for elaboration and reuse. In these commons,
managing institutions should maximize public access and
minimize private tollbooths.
Despite their variations, commons sector institutions
would share a set of organizing principles. Here are the
main ones.
LEAVE ENOUGH AND AS GOOD IN
COMMON
As Locke argued, it’s okay to privatize parts of
the commons as long as “enough and as good”
is left for everyone forever. Enough in the case of an
ecosystem means enough to keep it alive and healthy. That
much, or more, should be part of the commons, even if
parts of the ecosystem are private. In the case of
culture and science, enough means enough to assure a
vibrant public domain. Exclusive licenses, such as
patents and copyrights, should be kept to a minimum.
PUT FUTURE GENERATIONS
FIRST
Corporations put the interests of stockholders first,
while government puts the interests of campaign donors
and living voters first. No one at the moment puts future
generations first. That’s Job Number One for the
commons sector.
In practice, this means trustees of common property
should be legally accountable to future generations.
(We’ll see how this might work in chapter 6.) They
should also be bound by the precautionary principle: when
in doubt, err on the side of safety. And when faced with
a conflict between short-term gain and long-term
preservation, they should be required to choose the
latter.
THE MORE THE MERRIER
Whereas private property is inherently exclusive,
common property strives to be inclusive. It always wants
more co-owners or participants, consistent with
preservation of the asset.
This organizing principle applies most clearly to
commons like culture and the Internet, where physical
limits are absent and increasing use unleashes synergies
galore. It also applies to social compacts like Social
Security and Medicare, which require universal
participation. In these compacts, financial mechanisms
express our solidarity with other members of our national
community. They’re efficient and fair because they
include everybody. Were they to operate under
profit-maximizing principles, they’d inevitably
exclude the poor (who couldn’t afford to
participate) and anyone deemed by private insurers to be
too risky.
ONE PERSON, ONE
SHARE
Modern democratic government is grounded on the
principle of one person, one vote. In the same way, the
modern commons sector would be grounded on the principle
of one person, one share. In the case of scarce natural
assets, it will be necessary to distinguish between usage
rights and income rights. It’s impossible for
everyone to use a limited commons equally, but everyone
should receive equal shares of the income derived from
selling limited usage rights.
INCLUDE SOME
LIQUIDITY
Currently, private property owners enjoy a near-monopoly
on the privilege of receiving property income. But as the
Alaska Permanent Fund shows, it’s possible for
common property co-owners to receive income too.
Income sharing would end private property’s
monopoly not only on liquidity, but also on attention.
People would notice common property if they got income
from it. They’d care about it, think about it, and
talk about it. Concern for invisible commons would
soar.
Common property liquidity has to be designed
carefully, though. Since common property rights are
birthrights, they shouldn’t be tradeable the way
corporate shares are. This means commons owners
wouldn’t reap capital gains. Instead, they’d
retain their shared income stakes throughout their lives,
and through such stakes, share in rent, royalties,
interest, and dividends.
...
read the whole chapter