Land Value Mapping
Mason Gaffney: Nonpoint Pollution:
Tractable Solutions to Intractable Problems
The Special Challenge to Economic
Thinking
The Search for Surrogates
Sources of Nonpoint Pollution
What Problems are Created?
What Problems are Unsolved by Excise Taxes on
Surrogates?
The Case of Forestry
The Case of Urban Settlement
The Case of Agriculture
The Common Theme from Forest, City and
Farm
Solutions
But the profile of land values is like a volcanic
island. To raise the top and the slopes and the
shores we must also raise the shallows above sea level,
where they shed the waters and come into
use.
Rising population is one factor pushing up the
profile of values, but not the strongest one.
Increased demand per capita is the main factor.
These demands include all the spurious demands described
above, like the demand of government for land to "bank"
and hold idle, and the demand of speculators "with a view
to getting a little something for
nothing." ... Read the whole
article
Fred E. Foldvary — The Ultimate Tax Reform: Public
Revenue from Land Rent
Land value taxation taps the geo-rent. Like
today’s real property tax, a land value tax would
have some tax rate that would tap some percentage of the
land value or rent. I suggest 80 percent of the geo-rent
be used for public revenue. The landowner would pay it
from the rental he collects from the tenant, or if
owner-occupied, from the implicit rental value he obtains
from the site. The 80 percent rate would leave some of
the land rent with the landowner to have a margin for
assessment error and also to maintain a positive price
for the land to facilitate its sale.
There are several methods of assessing land value or
rent. One way is to calculate the replacement value of
the existing improvements (unless they are historic), and
then subtract the depreciation of the buildings. Then
subtract the building value from the total property
value. What is left is land value. For commercial
property, one also can take the net income and subtract
the return on the improvements (using some interest
rate), the remainder being land rent. In some places
there is vacant or bare land that has a market price, and
sometimes there are separate owners for the land and the
improvements, for which data can be derived from leases
and sales. The assessors then smooth out the
neighborhood land values, using computerized maps. It is
not necessary to individually assess the values of most
of the buildings in a neighborhood, since most lots in a
locality will have a similar value per lot.
Assessors enter this data into computers,
which generate neighborhood maps. The assessors
interpolate or smooth out the prices of lots between
those for which they have recent sales or rental data,
since land values tend to be similar in a neighborhood
unless there is some special feature such as corner lots
or odd-sized lots. ... read the whole
document
Louis Post: Outlines
of Louis F. Post's Lectures, with Illustrative Notes and
Charts (1894)
d. Effect of Confiscating Rent to Private
Use.
By giving Rent to individuals society ignores this
most just law, 99 thereby creating social disorder and
inviting social disease. Upon society alone, therefore,
and not upon divine Providence which has provided
bountifully, nor upon the disinherited poor, rests the
responsibility for poverty and fear of poverty.
99. "Whatever dispute arouses the
passions of men, the conflict is sure to rage, not so
much as to the question 'Is it wise?' as to the
question 'Is it right?'
"This tendency of popular discussions to
take an ethical form has a cause. It springs from a law
of the human mind; it rests upon a vague and
instinctive recognition of what is probably the deepest
truth we can grasp. That alone is wise which is just;
that alone is enduring which is right. In the narrow
scale of individual actions and individual life this
truth may be often obscured, but in the wider field of
national life it everywhere stands out.
"I bow to this arbitrament, and accept
this test." — Progress and Poverty, book vii, ch.
i.
The reader who has been deceived into
believing that Mr. George's proposition is in any
respect unjust, will find profit in a perusal of the
entire chapter from which the foregoing extract is
taken.
Let us try to trace the connection by means of a
chart, beginning with the white spaces on page 68. As
before, the first-comers take possession of the best
land. But instead of leaving for others what they do not
themselves need for use, as in the previous
illustrations, they appropriate the whole space, using
only part, but claiming ownership of the rest. We may
distinguish the used part with red color, and that which
is appropriated without use with blue. Thus: [chart]
But what motive is there for appropriating more of the
space than is used? Simply that the appropriators may
secure the pecuniary benefit of future social growth.
What will enable them to secure that? Our system of
confiscating Rent from the community that earns it, and
giving it to land-owners who, as such, earn
nothing.100
100. It is reported from Iowa that a few
years ago a workman in that State saw a meteorite fall,
and. securing possession of it after much digging, he
was offered $105 by a college for his "find." But the
owner of the land on which the meteorite fell claimed
the money, and the two went to law about it. After an
appeal to the highest court of the State, it was
finally decided that neither by right of discovery, nor
by right of labor, could the workman have the money,
because the title to the meteorite was in the man who
owned the land upon which it fell.
Observe the effect now upon Rent and Wages. When other
men come, instead of finding half of the best land still
common and free, as in the corresponding chart on page
68, they find all of it owned, and are obliged either to
go upon poorer land or to buy or rent from owners of the
best. How much will they pay for the best? Not more than
1, if they want it for use and not to hold for a higher
price in the future, for that represents the full
difference between its productiveness and the
productiveness of the next best. But if the first-comers,
reasoning that the next best land will soon be scarce and
theirs will then rise in value, refuse to sell or to rent
at that valuation, the newcomers must resort to land of
the second grade, though the best be as yet only partly
used. Consequently land of the first grade commands Rent
before it otherwise would.
As the sellers' price, under these circumstances, is
arbitrary it cannot be stated in the chart; but the
buyers' price is limited by the superiority of the best
land over that which can be had for nothing, and the
chart may be made to show it: [chart]
And now, owing to the success of the appropriators of
the best land in securing more than their fellows for the
same expenditure of labor force, a rush is made for
unappropriated land. It is not to use it that it is
wanted, but to enable its appropriators to put Rent into
their own pockets as soon as growing demand for land
makes it valuable.101 We may, for illustration, suppose
that all the remainder of the second space and the whole
of the third are thus appropriated, and note the effect:
[chart]
At this point Rent does not increase nor Wages fall,
because there is no increased demand for land for use.
The holding of inferior land for higher prices, when
demand for use is at a standstill, is like owning lots in
the moon — entertaining, perhaps, but not
profitable. But let more land be needed for use, and
matters promptly assume a different appearance. The new
labor must either go to the space that yields but 1, or
buy or rent from owners of better grades, or hire out.
The effect would be the same in any case. Nobody for the
given expenditure of labor force would get more than 1;
the surplus of products would go to landowners as Rent,
either directly in rent payments, or indirectly through
lower Wages. Thus: [chart]
101. The text speaks of Rent only as a
periodical or continuous payment — what would be
called "ground rent." But actual or potential Rent may
always be, and frequently is, capitalized for the
purpose of selling the right to enjoy it, and it is to
selling value that we usually refer when dealing in
land.
Land which has the power of yielding
Rent to its owner will have a selling value, whether it
be used or not, and whether Rent is actually derived
from it or not. This selling value will be the
capitalization of its present or prospective power of
producing Rent. In fact, much the larger proportion of
laud that has a selling value is wholly or partly
unused, producing no Rent at all, or less than it would
if fully used. This condition is expressed in the chart
by the blue color.
"The capitalized value of land is the
actuarial 'discounted' value of all the net incomes
which it is likely to afford, allowance being made on
the one hand for all incidental expenses, including
those of collecting the rents, and on the other for its
mineral wealth, its capabilities of development for any
kind of business, and its advantages, material, social,
and aesthetic, for the purposes of residence." —
Marshall's Prin., book vi, ch. ix, sec. 9.
"The value of land is commonly expressed
as a certain number of times the current money rental,
or in other words, a certain 'number of years'
purchase' of that rental; and other things being equal,
it will be the higher the more important these direct
gratifications are, as well as the greater the chance
that they and the money income afforded by the land
will rise." — Id., note.
"Value . . . means not utility, not any
quality inhering in the thing itself, but a quality
which gives to the possession of a thing the power of
obtaining other things, in return for it or for its
use. . . Value in this sense — the usual sense
— is purely relative. It exists from and is
measured by the power of obtaining things for things by
exchanging them. . . Utility is necessary to value, for
nothing can be valuable unless it has the quality of
gratifying some physical or mental desire of man,
though it be but a fancy or whim. But utility of itself
does not give value. . . If we ask ourselves the reason
of . . . variations in . . . value . . . we see that
things having some form of utility or desirability, are
valuable or not valuable, as they are hard or easy to
get. And if we ask further, we may see that with most
of the things that have value this difficulty or ease
of getting them, which determines value, depends on the
amount of labor which must be expended in producing
them ; i.e., bringing them into the place, form and
condition in which they are desired. . . Value is
simply an expression of the labor required for the
production of such a thing. But there are some things
as to which this is not so clear. Land is not produced
by labor, yet land, irrespective of any improvements
that labor has made on it, often has value. . . Yet a
little examination will show that such facts are but
exemplifications of the general principle, just as the
rise of a balloon and the fall of a stone both
exemplify the universal law of gravitation. . . The
value of everything produced by labor, from a pound of
chalk or a paper of pins to the elaborate structure and
appurtenances of a first-class ocean steamer, is
resolvable on analysis into an equivalent of the labor
required to produce such a thing in form and place;
while the value of things not produced by labor, but
nevertheless susceptible of ownership, is in the same
way resolvable into an equivalent of the labor which
the ownership of such a thing enables the owner to
obtain or save." —
Perplexed Philosopher, ch. v.
The figure 1 in parenthesis, as an item of Rent,
indicates potential Rent. Labor would give that much for
the privilege of using the space, but the owners hold out
for better terms; therefore neither Rent nor Wages is
actually produced, though but for this both might be.
In this chart, notwithstanding that but little space
is used, indicated with red, Wages are reduced to the
same low point by the mere appropriation of space,
indicated with blue, that they would reach if all the
space above the poorest were fully used. It thereby
appears that under a system which confiscates Rent to
private uses, the demand for land for speculative
purposes becomes so great that Wages fall to a minimum
long before they would if land were appropriated only for
use.
In illustrating the effect of confiscating Rent to
private use we have as yet ignored the element of social
growth. Let us now assume as before (page 73), that
social growth increases the productive power of the given
expenditure of labor force to 100 when applied to the
best land, 50 when applied to the next best, 10 to the
next, 3 to the next, and 1 to the poorest. Labor would
not be benefited now, as it appeared to be when on page
73 we illustrated the appropriation of land for use only,
although much less land is actually used. The prizes
which expectation of future social growth dangles before
men as the rewards of owning land, would raise demand so
as to make it more than ever difficult to get land. All
of the fourth grade would be taken up in expectation of
future demand; and "surplus labor" would be crowded out
to the open space that originally yielded nothing, but
which in consequence of increased labor power now yields
as much as the poorest closed space originally yielded,
namely, 1 to the given expenditure of labor force.102
Wages would then be reduced to the present productiveness
of the open space. Thus: [chart]
102. The paradise to which the youth of
our country have so long been directed in the advice,
"Go West, young man, go West," is truthfully described
in "Progress and Poverty," book iv, ch. iv, as follows
:
"The man who sets out from the eastern
seaboard in search of the margin of cultivation,
where he may obtain land without paying rent, must,
like the man who swam the river to get a drink, pass
for long distances through half-titled farms, and
traverse vast areas of virgin soil, before he reaches
the point where land can be had free of rent —
i.e., by homestead entry or preemption."
If we assume that 1 for the given expenditure of labor
force is the least that labor can take while exerting the
same force, the downward movement of Wages will be here
held in equilibrium. They cannot fall below 1; but
neither can they rise above it, no matter how much
productive power may increase, so long as it pays to hold
land for higher values. Some laborers would continually
be pushed back to land which increased productive power
would have brought up in productiveness from 0 to 1, and
by perpetual competition for work would so regulate the
labor market that the given expenditure of labor force,
however much it produced, could nowhere secure more than
1 in Wages.103 And this tendency would persist until some
labor was forced upon land which, despite increase in
productive power, would not yield the accustomed living
without increase of labor force. Competition for work
would then compel all laborers to increase their
expenditure of labor force, and to do it over and over
again as progress went on and lower and lower grades of
land were monopolized, until human endurance could go no
further.104 Either that, or they would be obliged to
adapt themselves to a lower scale of living.105
103. Henry Fawcett, in his work on
"Political Economy," book ii, ch. iii, observes with
reference to improvements in agricultural implements
which diminish the expense of cultivation, that they do
not increase the profits of the farmer or the wages of
his laborers, but that "the landlord will receive in
addition to the rent already paid to him, all that is
saved in the expense of cultivation." This is true not
alone of improvements in agriculture, but also of
improvements in all other branches of industry.
104. "The cause which limits speculation
in commodities, the tendency of increasing price to
draw forth additional supplies, cannot limit the
speculative advance in land values, as land is a fixed
quantity, which human agency can neither increase nor
diminish; but there is nevertheless a limit to the
price of land, in the minimum required by labor and
capital as the condition of engaging in production. If
it were possible to continuously reduce wages until
zero were reached, it would be possible to continuously
increase rent until it swallowed up the whole produce.
But as wages cannot be permanently reduced below the
point at which laborers will consent to work and
reproduce, nor interest below the point at which
capital will be devoted to production, there is a limit
which restrains the speculative advance of rent. Hence,
speculation cannot have the same scope to advance rent
in countries where wages and interest are already near
the minimum, as in countries where they are
considerably above it. Yet that there is in all
progressive countries a constant tendency in the
speculative advance of rent to overpass the limit where
production would cease, is, I think, shown by recurring
seasons of industrial paralysis." — Progress and
Poverty, book iv, ch. iv.
105. As Puck once put it, "the man who
makes two blades of grass to grow where but one grew
before, must not be surprised when ordered to 'keep off
the grass.' "
They in fact do both, and the incidental disturbances
of general readjustment are what we call "hard times."
106 These culminate in forcing unused land into the
market, thereby reducing Rent and reviving industry. Thus
increase of labor force, a lowering of the scale of
living, and depression of Rent, co-operate to bring on
what we call "good times." But no sooner do "good times"
return than renewed demands for land set in, Rent rises
again, Wages fall again, and "hard times" duly reappear.
The end of every period of "hard times" finds Rent higher
and Wages lower than at the end of the previous
period.107
106. "That a speculative advance in rent
or land values invariably precedes each of these
seasons of industrial depression is everywhere clear.
That they bear to each other the relation of cause and
effect, is obvious to whoever considers the necessary
relation between land and labor." — Progress and
Poverty, book v, ch. i.
107. What are called "good times" reach
a point at which an upward land market sets in. From
that point there is a downward tendency of wages (or a
rise in the cost of living, which is the same thing) in
all departments of labor and with all grades of
laborers. This tendency continues until the fictitious
values of land give way. So long as the tendency is
felt only by that class which is hired for wages, it is
poverty merely; when the same tendency is felt by the
class of labor that is distinguished as "the business
interests of the country," it is "hard times." And
"hard times" are periodical because land values, by
falling, allow "good times" to set it, and by rising
with "good times" bring "hard times" on again. The
effect of "hard times" may be overcome, without much,
if any, fall in land values, by sufficient increase in
productive power to overtake the fictitious value of
land.
The dishonest and disorderly system under which
society confiscates Rent from common to individual uses,
produces this result. That maladjustment is the
fundamental cause of poverty. And progress, so long as
the maladjustment continues, instead of tending to remove
poverty as naturally it should, actually generates and
intensifies it. Poverty persists with increase of
productive power because land values, when Rent is
privately appropriated, tend to even greater increase.
There can be but one outcome if this continues: for
individuals suffering and degradation, and for society
destruction.
... read the
book
Michael Hudson: The
Lies of the Land: How and why land gets undervalued
Turning land-value gains into
capital gains
Hiding the free lunch
Two appraisal methods
How land gets a negative value!
Where did all the land value go?
A curious asymmetry
Site values as the economy's "credit sink"
Immortally aging buildings
Real estate industry's priorities
THE FREE LUNCH Its cost to citizens
Its cost to the economy
Two appraisal methods
PROPERTY IS APPRAISED in two ways.
Both start by estimating its market value.
- The land-residual approach subtracts
the value of buildings from this overall value,
designating the remainder as the value of land. Building
values may be estimated in terms of their replacement
cost (which usually produces a very high estimate,
leaving little land value) or their depreciated value
(which gives an unrealistically low building estimate,
inasmuch as maintenance and repairs save most buildings
from deteriorating through wear and tear). Using the
depreciated value method leaves a higher residual land
value. The Federal Reserve Board recently has
experimented with a hybrid intermediate method that
values buildings on the basis of their "historical
costs".
- The building-residual approach starts
by valuing the land, and treats the difference as
representing the building's value. The
first step in this approach is to construct a land-value
map for the district or city. This displays fairly
smooth contours for land values. Overlays would show
zoning variations. Most of the variations in property
prices around this normalized map will be for structures,
along with a sizable component of "errors and omissions."
This approach rarely is used, and most assessed land
values vary drastically from one parcel to the next. The
problem is especially apparent in the case of parking
lots or one-story "taxpayers," that is, inexpensive
buildings in neighbourhoods that are heavily built up.
Their purpose is simply to be rented out at enough to
carry the property's tax bill, not to maximise the site's
current economic value.
Note that the Fed's land-residual
appraisal methods do not acknowledge the possibility that
the land itself may be rising in price. Site values appear
as the passive derivative, not as the driving force. Yet
low-rise or vacant land sites tend to appreciate as much as
(or in many cases, even more than) the improved properties
around them. Hence this price appreciation cannot be
attributed to rising construction costs. If every property
in the country were built last year, the problem would be
simple enough. The land acquisition prices and construction
costs would be recorded, adding up to the property's value.
But many structures were erected as long ago as the 19th
century. How do we decide how much their value has changed
in comparison to the property's overall value?
The Federal Reserve multiplies the
building's original cost by the rise in the construction
price index since its completion. The implication is that
when a property is sold at a higher price (which usually
happens), it is because the building itself has risen in
value, not the land site. However, if the property must be
sold at a lower price, falling land prices are
blamed.
If it is agreed that any explanation
of land/building relations should be symmetrical through
boom and bust periods alike, then the same appraisal
methodology should be able to explain the decline of
property values as well as their rise. The methodology
should be as uniform and homogeneous as
possible. By that, I mean that similar land should be
valued at a homogeneous price, and buildings of equivalent
worth should be valued accordingly.
If these two criteria are accepted,
then I believe that economists would treat buildings as the
residual, not the land. Yet just the opposite usually is
done. ...
One clear sign of land-price inflation is that one
category of land rises or falls much more rapidly than
others. A widening disparity usually reflects a financial
inflation. In Japan, for instance, high rates of saving
were recycled to a remarkable extent into construction
and real estate acquisition. Japanese authorities
produced detailed land-value statistics for each category
of land, showing property values during the Bubble years
1985-90 rising at an accelerating pace until 1991, and
then turning downward. The A-shaped rise and fall was
steepest for the most expensive land surrounding the
Tokyo palace, while land for single-story wooden
residential housing rose and fell least steeply.
A land-value map placing the highest
values at the center and the lowest values in the
outlying areas would tend to reflect a land-price bubble
when price ratios steepened. On the other hand, a
fairly level set of land values between the central city
and its outskirts would indicate relatively less rent of
location, and hence less land-value disparities. Using
this analogy to examine New York City's midtown area, the
steep land-value curve has been fed by credit as affluent
buyers sought the most prestigious locations. Land sites
have become the receptacle of the economy's surplus
savings. ... Read the whole
article
Jeff Smith and Kris Nelson: Giving Life to the Property Tax
Shift (PTS)
John Muir is right. "Tug on any one thing and find
it connected to everything else in the universe." Tug on
the property tax and find it connected to urban slums,
farmland loss, political favoritism, and unearned equity
with disrupted neighborhood tenure. Echoing Thoreau, the
more familiar reforms have failed to address this
many-headed hydra at its root. To think that the root
could be chopped by a mere shift in the property tax base
-- from buildings to land -- must seem like the epitome
of unfounded faith. Yet the evidence shows that state and
local tax activists do have a powerful, if subtle, tool
at their disposal. The "stick" spurring efficient use of
land is a higher tax rate upon land, up to even the
site's full annual value. The "carrot" rewarding
efficient use of land is a lower or zero tax rate upon
improvements. ...
The failed policy that the PTS would replace
is the present property tax. This is actually two taxes
in one, one on land and another on improvements. The tax
on improvements penalizes owners for improving. This
negative incentive does its greatest damage at the
margin, where profit is slim. There, rather than pay a
higher tax, owners let buildings dilapidate into slums.
The lack of much tax on land keeps overhead on
speculators affordable. This negative incentive lets
owners under-utilize prime sites, even withhold them from
use entirely. Kept from prime sites, development sprawls
outward.
Sprawl inflates the values of suburban and rural land.
Leap-frog development raises a few
spikes in a land value map that soon pull up values
everywhere, increasing the property tax burden of owners
of previously developed sites, unless the tax is
capped. The resultant sprawl also raises
enormously the cost of extending infrastructure and makes
auto-dependency a given.
The PTS reverses all these negative
consequences.
- Rather than burden
construction, taxing only land spares
it.
- Rather than spread development
(hooking us on cars), taxing land concentrates it
(providing a market for mass
transit).
- Rather than inflate land price,
a land tax squashes it.
- Rather than enrich the owners
of prime sites or itself, a land-taxing government
could rebate some collected site rent as a dividend,
perhaps in the form of a Housing Voucher, making home
ownership inflation-proof.
A big problem needs a big
solution which in turn needs a matching shift of our
prevailing paradigm. Geonomics -- advocating that we
share the social value of sites and natural resources and
untax earnings -- does just that.
Read the whole
article
Tony Vickers: From Zee to Vee: using
property tax assessments to monitor the economic
landscape
The ‘real world’ in which human
society exists is not confined to natural, physical
phenomena. From earliest times, human beings have
interacted socially and economically. As they do so, they
have specialised and traded in goods and services which
are the products of combinations of labour, capital,
enterprise and the fourth – often forgotten but
distinct – factor of all production: land.
Land comprises all natural resources,
not just ‘terra
firma.’ It is the universe minus man’s
products. Even the simplest of human activities, sleep,
requires each of us to occupy exclusively a space, a
location, preferably a bed in a home of our own. But that
word ‘own’ conjures emotions and political
postures.
As everyone who deals in real estate
knows, there are three most important things about their
stock in trade: location, location and location! Because
the market value attached to locations varies over space
and time, our real world conceals a shifting and invisible
‘land-value-scape’. We can see the roof-tops
and admire (or deplore) the physical view. We can measure
the bricks and timber in three dimensions. We cannot see
the fourth dimension, the fourth factor that comprises 20%
to 60% of the market value of our homes: ‘v’ or value of land per unit area.
But we know it is there.
Just as every point on the surface of
planet Earth has a ‘z’ that defines its place
in the landscape, so every location has a value in the
global economy. This value is a function of three
things:
- content (soil, air or water quality; metallic
composition of rock);
- accessibility (position in relation to human
society); and
- the wealth of that particular
community.
Unlike other, natural, phenomena in the real
world, the landvaluescape changes over time and space at
a fairly rapid and often unpredictable rate. Value only
has meaning where there is both human knowledge of the
existence of a place and its natural wealth potential
and the possibility of converting that potential
into products that others will wish to buy. Knowledge of
places and utility of resources vary with time, as do the
workings of markets: physical means of exchange of
goods.
For example, the discovery of a new
continent immediately gives value to the place in the minds
of the crew of the ship that discovers it – as does
the discovery of the mysteries of the genetic code in a
plant species or the broadcast spectrum. Unless the
ship’s captain charts the discovery and brings the
chart safely back to port – with the plants of the
continent – or transmits the information about it
through the air-waves, ‘discovery’ has no value
in any market place. Whether we talk about value in
exchange or value in use, the measure of ‘v’
given to a location depends on social context.
The most important difference between
measuring ‘v’ and measuring ‘z’ is
that there is no single objective value of any location,
other than at those somewhat rare points in time when real
estate is traded, when market price is the surrogate for
market value. Even then, transactions that are to form the
basis of market valuations need, in theory, to be made in
certain idealised conditions, such as open competition
between buyers and sellers. All potential parties to the
transaction should have perfect information about other
similar contemporaneous transactions – and be in an
‘arms length’ relationship. Contracting parties
are assumed to be of sound mind! No two transactions in
real estate are ever identical in every respect and the
number of factors than can affect price or value is
enormous.
Valuation of real estate is tricky.
Separation of the value of land/location from the value of
land-and-buildings combined is even more tricky. So is it
worth the effort involved in replacing ‘z’ with
‘v’ in a three-dimensional model of
landvaluescape, in order to visualise what is going on in
economies in the geo-spatial sense? Are value maps
valuable?
The unavoidable subjectivity in
assigning value to land or locations is what many
geographers, more used to mapping physical features, find
discomforting about value mapping (Dale, 2002). Mapping
things of less importance that can be measured more
precisely and objectively, is preferred to mapping property
values (accounting for at least twenty percent of the
global economy) that cannot objectively be measured at
all.
Yet value maps have been attempted
for various reasons for about one hundred years and are
becoming a fairly common feature of the property industry
in some advanced countries. The last known comprehensive
survey of global practice in value mapping was over twenty
years ago, before the widespread use of the personal
computer (PC), computer aided mass assessment (CAMA) of
property values and geographic information systems (GIS).
The author concluded:-
“Value maps will increasingly play a
major part in research into the causes and effects of
changes in land and property values.” (Howes,
1980)
Read the whole
article
Bill Batt: The Nexus of
Transportation, Economic Rent, and Land Use
What is Land
Rent?
John Houseman, an actor perhaps most widely known
as Professor Kingsfield in the long-running TV series,
The Paper Chase, later became the pitchman for Smith
Barney. In that advertisement, his tag line was "We make
money the old-fashioned way -- we earn it."
That we should earn our money rather than live off
the efforts of others seems a simple enough moral tenet.
But it seems to have lost its cogency in contemporary
economic thought. More than a century ago John Stuart
Mill noted that
Landlords grow richer in their
sleep without working, risking or economizing. The
increase in the value of land, arising as it does from
the efforts of an entire community, should belong to the
community and not to the individual who might hold
title.(1)
Today, on the other hand, the
unearned surplus which classical economists called
rent attaches to monopoly titles -- largely the
scarce goods and services of nature like locational
sites, and has totally disappeared from economic
calculus. Yet this is the primary vehicle by which wealth
is captured by economic elites. If government recaptured
the socially-created economic rent from land sites that
comes from the investment of the collective community, we
could eliminate other taxes that are both more onerous
and create a drag on the economy that makes us all
poorer. There are many websites that explain how this can
be done, ways that not only beget greater economic
efficiency but also bring about economic
justice.(2) The
surplus economic rent that derives from community effort
is its rightful entitlement.
Where does economic rent most tend to lodge? In
the center of cities where people are. And also proximate
to heavy social investments -- such as railroad and metro
stations, public and office buildings, hotels and
conference centers, and anywhere there is high traffic in
personal or market exchanges. The land value in New York
City is higher than all the rest of the New York state
combined, even though it is only a minute fraction of the
area. One 9-acre site south of the United Nations
Building was recently sold to a developer intent on
building luxury condominiums facing the East River. That
site sold for $680 million, and would have been higher
had the existing structure, an obsolete power plant, not
have to be razed.(3) Land values in
any given area tend to rise and fall together, and tend
also to form a contour somewhat comparable to a
topographical survey map. In a city's center are the
highest value locations, analogous to a mountain peak.
Once one departs from that center, land values fall in
direct proportion to the value of their use, made more or
less attractive by whatever social attributes are
provided in the proximate areas. Two illustrations
from small and medium sized cities in the United States
illustrate the point.
Case 1: Ithaca, New
York: Tompkins County, where the city of Ithaca sits
at the center, has land values many times those within a
short walk. Dividing the county land parcels into
quintiles, the highest fifth have values of $56,000 per
acre and above. The lowest fifth have a value of less than
$3,000 per acre. The high value area collectively
constitutes only a minute proportion of the total number of
square miles because most of it is farm or forest land.
[see map]
Case 2: Des Moines, Iowa:
Polk County, where Des Moines sits near the center, has
land values even more disparate between urban and rural
locations. The highest quartile there are those $97,400
per acre and above, the single highest parcel of all
worth an astonishing $31.4 million per acre. Yet, the
lowest quartile, a roughly equal number of far larger
parcels, all have a value of less than $30,000 per acre.
[see map]
... The failure to collect site rent
leads to a distortion in land use configurations. If
patterns unfolded along the lines of both social preference
and economic efficiency, high value landsites would tend to
have high value buildings, and low value landsites would
tend to be vacant or have very modest buildings. Consistent
with this, urban centers sites would tend to have office
and commercial use, surrounded by lower-value residential
land uses, and still further out would be farms and
forests. The ratio of building to land value, land to total
value (or for that matter any other ratio between
buildings, land, and total values) would be relatively
constant throughout a region. Instead, the ratio of land
value to total value consistently tends to reveal a
patchwork of random development. This inefficient
settlement of land sites is what we know as sprawl. ...
read the whole article
Land Rent
From the standpoint of an economic geographer and for
some land economists, land rent is simply capitalized
transportation cost. Land rent is the surplus generated
by social activity on or in the vicinity of locational
sites that accrues to titleholders of those parcels.
Whether or not it is recaptured by public policy, rent is
a natural factor deriving from the intensive use of
natural capital. One must return to nineteenth-century
classical economics to appreciate the importance of
economic rent or land rent; neoclassical economic
frameworks have largely discarded it.[13] More
intensive use of high-value land sites leads to site
configurations that are less dependent on transportation
services. Land rent is highest where the greatest traffic
and market exchanges occur, that being at the center of
large conurbations. Comparing land values of urban
property parcels, the highest land rent in the urban
cores and traffic junctures are analogous to the contours
of land elevations. Mountain peaks gradually slope down
to valleys and flatland regions and continue outward
until at distant points — perhaps at the poles of
the earth — land sites have no market value at
all.
The differentials in land values are profound, even
more than most people realize. In 1995, in the small city
of Ithaca, New York, the highest quintile of land had a
value of over $56,000 per acre in the downtown center,
whereas the lowest quintile only a mile away falls to
less than $3,000.[14] Large city
centers have far higher site prices. Even in Polk County,
Iowa (which includes Des Moines), in the middle of
cornfields where I did a study two years ago, the highest
urban value land site was $31.3 million per acre, which
quickly declined to about $20,000 per acre only about a
mile away. In the spring of 1998, one land parcel (the
building was to be razed) of less than an acre in New
York City's Times Square and split in two pieces by
Broadway was sold by Prudential Life to Disney for
roughly $240 million.[15] To take
another instance, a nine-acre tract on the East River in
New York City occupied by an obsolete power plant was
purchased by Mort Zuckerman to build high-rise
condominiums two years ago. The sale price was in the
neighborhood of $680 million and would have been higher
were it not for some enormous costs associated with the
demolition of the old structures.[16] It should be
noted that the overwhelming proportion of land value is
in cities; relatively speaking, the site values of
peripheral lands, typically used for agriculture and
timber growth, are negligible. Land values are high in
urban areas because, over time, rent accrues to a site.
Each improvement in proximity to a property parcel
enhances the value of all other parcels. This makes even
unimproved sites attractive objects for speculation,
particularly when land sites surrounding it are to be
improved by adding either transportation service or new
structures. One nine-mile stretch of interstate highway
in Albany, New York, costing $125 million to construct,
has yielded $3.8 billion in increased land values
(constant dollars) within just two miles of its corridor
in the forty years of its existence.[17] This is a
thirty-fold return in a time span typically used for bond
repayment! The Washington Metro created increments in
land value along much of the 101-mile system completed by
1980 that easily exceeded $3.5 billion, compared with the
$2.7 billion of federal funds invested in Metro up until
that time.[18] Any major
building construction project, private or public, will
have a similar effect on adjacent land sites.
Differentials in land value can have a profound effect on
decisions made by titleholders, either positively by
inducing appropriate development in urban cores or
negatively by giving monopoly titleholders power to hold
sites out of use for long-term speculative gain. Such
decisions of course determine the character of urban
configurations and society as well. ... read the whole article
Bill Batt: Who Says Cities
are Poor? They Just Don't Know How to Tax Their
Wealth!
This is relatively easy to understand by considering a
vacant expanse of land that has imposed upon it a grid of
roads like a tic-tac-toe board. Suppose each of the
squares were privately owned, and development of those
sites were to ensue, the economic surplus generated by
that market activity would raise the value of each of
those locations. Let's further suppose that every site
were developed except the center square, that titleholder
choosing instead to just hold his title vacant. Which
land site, discounting the building values, would command
the greatest market price after a short time? The center
square, of course — even though that owner made no
effort to earn that increase in price. The center square
would see the greatest accretion of economic rent because
of its strategic access. It would be the passive
beneficiary of the surplus generated by the common
enterprise of all the market exchanges resulting from the
other locations. In just this way rent becomes the social
creation of the community and not the result of any
private individual's enterprise. The more the economic
activity, the more the surplus generated comes to settle
on land in the form of rent. Rent accretes to land sites
and raises their market value, directly reflecting the
varying levels of productive economic surplus generated
over time throughout a community. High economic
productivity yields high surplus rent.
If one plots the land value per unit area, whether by
square foot, acre, hectare, or square mile, as is now
possible to easily do using modern computer programs, the
differential land values are easy to approximate.
Typically the center of a city experiences the peak land
value, with a precipitous decline as one leaves the
center and departs to its outer edge. The highest value
locations are the commercial cores, falling quickly as
one travels out to residential locations, and with
agricultural and forest lands having only a small
fraction of the value commanded at the center. In areas
of New York City, the market price of locations has been
shown to be in the vicinity of $500 million per acre.
Even in smaller cities, there is little realization of
the enormous cost of sites in core areas: in downtown Des
Moines, the price per acre was $31.5 million. Other
illustrations are easily available, particularly in urban
areas on the east and west coasts of the US. Taking
another perspective, the urbanized center of Tompkins
County, New York (Ithaca) is five percent of the land
area but contains ninety-five percent of the land
value.[8] To see where
the land values are highest, it is easiest to look at a
city's skyline.[9] The tallest
buildings sit on the most expensive land parcels.
Typically the aggregate land value of a city is about 40
percent of the combined market value of land and
improvements. The proportion of overall land value to
building value is revealed by that profile, known as a
landvaluescape.[10] Some
buildings will exceed that proportion — a large
investment on a small footprint; other sites may be
vacant or depreciated buildings with a far smaller land
to building ratio. The dynamic at work here is easily
understood: the greater a land site's value the greater
the incentive to take advantage of its location;
following the same logic, the more intensive the
investments in particular neighborhoods the greater
market value of remaining or underused land sites, making
any locations that are underutilized good candidates for
improvement. So it is that downtowns generate land values
many times those of farther reaches; each investment
development fosters others. ... read the whole article
Ted Gwartney: Estimating Land
Values
Bill Batt: Comment on Parts of the
NYS Legislative Tax Study Commission's 1985 study
“Who Pays New York Taxes?”
Little justification exists for taxing buildings, or
improvements of any sort, so this question is easily
disposed of. The practice is explained largely as a
matter of historical inertia. Only in the recent century
or two have buildings represented any significant capital
value; prior to the rise of major cities, the value of
real property lay essentially in land. American cities
today typically record aggregate assessed land values
– at least when the valuations are well-done
– at about 40% to 60% of total taxable value, that
is, of land and buildings taken together.31 Skyscrapers
reflect enormous capital investment, and this expenditure
is warranted because of the enormous value of locational
sites. Each site gets its market price from the fact that
the total neighborhood context creates an attractive
market presence and ambience. By taxing buildings,
however, we impose a penalty on their optimum development
as well as on the incentives for their maintenance.
Moreover, taxes on buildings take away from whatever
burden would otherwise be imposed on sites, with the
result that incentives for their highest and best use is
weakened. Lastly, the technical and administrative
challenges of properly assessing the value of
improvements is daunting, particularly since they must be
depreciated for tax and accounting purposes, evaluated
for potential replacement, and so on. In fact most costs
associated with administration of property taxation and
appeal litigation involve disputes over the valuation of
structures, not land values.
Land value taxation, on the other hand, overcomes all
these obstacles. Locations are the beneficiaries of
community services whether they are improved or not. As
has been forcefully argued by this writer and others
elsewhere,32 a tax on land value conforms to all the
textbook principles of sound tax theory. Some further
considerations are worth reviewing, however, when looking
at ground rent as a flow rather than as a “present
value” stock. The technical ability to trace
changes in the market prices of sites – or as can
also be understood, the variable flow of ground rent to
those sites – by the application of GIS (geographic
information systems) real-time recording of sales
transactions invites wholesale changes in the maintenance
of cadastral data. The transmittal of sales records as
typically received in the offices of local governments
for purposes of title registration over to
Assessors’ offices allows for the possibility of a
running real-time mapping of market values. Given
also that GIS algorithms can now calculate the land value
proportions reasonably accurately, this means that
“landvaluescapes” are easily created in ways
analogous to maps that portray other common geographic
features. These landvaluescapes reflect the flow of
ground rent through local or regional economies, and can
also be used to identify the areas of greatest market
vitality and enterprise. The flow of economic
rent can easily be taxed in ways that overcomes the
mistaken notion that it is a stock. Just as income is
recognized as a flow of money, rent too can (and should)
be understood as such.
The question still begs to be answered, “why tax
land?” And what happens when we don’t tax
land? Henry George answered this more than a century ago
more forcefully and clearly, perhaps, than anyone has
since. He recognized full well that the economic surplus
not expended by human hands or minds in the production of
capital wealth gravitates to land. Particular land sites
come to reflect the value of their strategic location for
market exchanges by assuming a price for their monopoly
use. Regardless whether those who acquire title to such
sites use them to the full extent of their potential, the
flow of rent to such locations is commensurate with their
full capacity. This is why John Stuart Mill more than a
century ago observed that, “Landlords grow richer
in their sleep without working, risking or economizing.
The increase in the value of land, arising as it does
from the efforts of an entire community, should belong to
the community and not to the individual who might hold
title.”33 Absent its recovery by taxation this rent
becomes a “free lunch” to opportunistically
situated titleholders. When offered for sale, the
projected rental value is capitalized in the present
value for purposes of attaching a market price and sold
as a commodity. Yet simple justice calls for the recovery
in taxes what is the community’s creation.
Moreover, the failure to recover the land rent connected
to sites makes it necessary to tax productive activities
in our economy, and this leads to economic and technical
inefficiency known as “deadweight loss.”34 It
means that the economy performs suboptimally.
Land, and by this Henry George meant any natural
factor of production not created by human hands or minds,
is ours only to use, not to buy or sell as a commodity.
In the equally immortal words of Jefferson a century
earlier, “The earth belongs in usufruct to the
living; . . . [It is] given as a common stock for men to
labor and live on.”35 This passage likely needs a
bit of parsing for the modern reader. The word usufruct,
understood since Roman times, has almost passed from use
today. It means “the right to use the property of
another so long as its value is not diminished.”36
Note also that Jefferson regarded the earth as a
“common stock;” not allotted to individuals
with possessory titles. Only the phrase “to the
living” might be subject to challenge by
forward-looking environmentalists who, taking an idea
from Native American cultures, argue that “we do
not inherit the earth from our ancestors; we borrow it
from our children.” The presumption that real
property titles are acquired legitimately is a claim that
does not withstand scrutiny; rather all such titles owe
their origin ultimately to force or fraud.37
If we own the land sites that we occupy only in
usufruct, and the rent that derives from those sites is
due to community enterprise, it is not a large logical
leap to argue that the community’s recovery of that
rent should be the proper source of taxation. This is the
Georgist argument: that the recapture of land rent is the
proper – indeed the natural – source of
taxation.38 ... read the whole
commentary
Nic Tideman:
Market-Based Systems for Assigning Rental Value to
Land
The system described so far presumes that there are
many identical sites, so that the rents offered for ones
that are relinquished can reveal the value of the ones in
continued use. In fact, every site has unique
characteristics, especially in terms of the distances
from other locations that are economically relevant, and
often in other ways as well. Fortunately, the initial
assumption of identical sites, which was made to explore
the system, is not necessary. It is possible to make good
estimates of the rental value of all land from
information about the rental value of a small percentage
of sites, because the rental value of land tends to be a
smooth function of location. Rents are highest in the
centers of cities, diminishing gradually with distance
from the center. Rents are also higher in places with
characteristics such as proximity to transit facilities
or especially good views, and tend to be lower in places
that are close to the source of a noxious smell or
noise.
To take account of the differences among sites, the
officials in charge of renting land can annually examine
the results of recent auctions and construct a revised
map of land rents. In constructing this map, the rent
assigned to each site that is auctioned should be not the
highest bid, but rather the second-highest bid, which
represents the actual opportunity cost of a site, what it
would be worth to have one more vacant site.
Consider an example to highlight this point. Suppose
that the highest bid for a site is 1,000 rubles per year,
the second-highest bid is 800 rubles per year, and an
adjacent site, with virtually identical characteristics,
is occupied by someone for whom continued use is worth
900 rubles per year. If charged 1,000 rubles, this person
will relinquish the site, and the rent that can then be
obtained for it will presumably be the 800 rubles offered
for the adjacent site. Thus it is counterproductive to
assign rent that is greater than the highest offer that
is refused.
Summary of the System Involving Actual
Delivery of Land
To operate the system for determining annual rents
from bids for sites that are actually delivered for use,
the officials in charge of renting land simply auction
every site that is relinquished by its previous user.
According to the terms of the auction, the bid represents
an offer of rent for the first year's use, with use of
the site going to the highest bidder at a price of the
second highest bid. The highest bidder also receives an
option to continue to use the site into the indefinite
future, upon payment of rent that will be determined,
year by year, by rent maps constructed from bids in
auctions that will be conducted in the same way.
The user of any site is permitted to terminate use at
any time, provided that the site is restored to a
condition of bare land. To protect against the
abandonment of sites in a condition in which it is
expensive to restore them to an unimproved state, anyone
who wishes to build can be required to post a bond
against the cost of demolition.
Any user of land is permitted to sell both the
improvements on a site and the right to continue renting
the site to anyone else, for any price on which they
mutually agree. However, it can be expected that the
prices that will secure agreement will reflect little if
anything more than the value of the improvements, because
the right to use sites can be obtained at auction just by
offering a small amount more than what others are
offering for the first year's rent.
Each year the land-managing bureaucracy will construct
a new map of land value, based on the second-highest bids
for sites that have been auctioned recently. Rent bills
for all land will then be sent out, based on this map.
...
read the whole article
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