2. THE TWO KINDS OF DIRECT
TAXATION
Direct taxes fall into two general classes: (1) Taxes
that are levied upon men in proportion to their
ability to pay, and (2) taxes that are levied in
proportion to the benefits received by the
tax-payer from the public. Income taxes are the principal
ones of the first class, though probate and inheritance
taxes would rank high. The single tax is the only
important one of the second class.
There should be no difficulty in choosing between the
two. To tax in proportion to ability to pay, regardless
of benefits received, is in accord with no principle of
just government; it is a device of piracy. The single
tax, therefore, as the only important tax in proportion
to benefits, is the ideal tax.
But here we encounter two plausible objections. One
arises from the mistaken but common notion that men are
not taxed in proportion to benefits unless they pay taxes
upon every kind of property they own that comes under the
protection of government; the other is founded in the
assumption that it is impossible to measure the value of
the public benefits that each individual enjoys. Though
the first of these objections ostensibly accepts the
doctrine of taxation according to benefits,12 yet, as it
leads to attempts at taxation in proportion to wealth,
it, like the other, is really a plea for the piratical
doctrine of taxation according to ability to pay. The two
objections stand or fall together.
12. It is often said, for instance, by
its advocates, that house owners should in justice
contribute to the support of the fire departments that
protect them and it is even gravely argued that houses
are more appropriate subjects of taxation than land;
because they need protection, whereas land needs none.
Read note 8.
Let it once be perceived that the value of the service
which government renders to each individual would be
justly measured by the single tax, and neither objection
would any longer have weight. We should then no more
think of taxing people in proportion to their wealth or
ability to pay, regardless of the benefits they receive
from government than an honest merchant would think of
charging his customers in proportion to their wealth or
ability to pay, regardless of the value of the goods they
bought of him." 13
13. Following is an interesting
computation of the cost and loss to the city of Boston
of the present mixed system of taxation as compared
with the single tax; The computation was made by James
R. Carret, Esq., the leading conveyancer of Boston:
Valuation of Boston, May 1,
1892
Land... ... . .. ...
.. ... .. $399,170,175
Buildings ... ... ... ... ..$281,109,700
Total assessed value of real estate
$680,279,875
Assessed
value of personal estate $213,695,829
.... .... ... ... ... ... ...
... .... .... .... ... .... ...
$893,975,704
Rate of
taxation, $12.90 per $1000
Total tax levy, May 1, 1892 $11,805,036
Amount of taxes levied in respect of the
different subjects of taxation and percentages of the
same:
Land .... .... .... .... $5,149,295 43.62%
Buildings .... .... .. $3,626,295 30.72%
Personal estate .. $2,756,676 23.35%
Polls ... .... ... .... .... ...272,750
2.31%
But to ascertain the total cost to the
people of Boston of the present system of taxation for
the taxable year, beginning May 1, 1892, there should
be added to the taxes assessed upon them what it cost
them to pay the owners of the land of Boston for the
use of the land, being the net ground rent, which I
estimate at four per cent on the land value.
Total tax levy, May 1, 1892 ... ...
... ... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... .... ....
.... .... .... ..$11,805,036
Net ground rent, four percent, on the land value
($399,170,175)..... ... ... ...$15,966,807
Total cost of the present system to
the people of Boston for that year ...
$27,771,843
To contrast this with what the single tax
system would have cost the people of Boston for that
year, take the gross ground rent, found by adding to
the net ground rent the taxation on land values for
that year, being $12.90 per $1000, or 1.29 per cent
added to 4 per cent = 5.29 per cent.
Total cost of present system as
above .. .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
....$27,771,843
Single
tax, or gross ground rent, 5.29 per cent on
$399,170,175 ... ..$21,116,102
Excess cost of present system, which
is the sum of
taxes in
respect of buildings, personal property, and polls ....
...... .. $6,655,741
But the present system not only costs the
people more than the single tax would, but produces
less revenue:
Proceeds of single tax ... ... ...
... ..... .... .... ..... .... .... .... ..... .....
.... $21,116,102
Present
tax levy ... ... ... ... ... .... .... .... ..... ....
.... .... .... .... .... ....
....$11,805,036
Loss to
public treasury by present system ... .... .... ....
.... .. ..... ..$9,311,066
This, however, is not a complete contrast
between the present system and the single tax, for
large amounts of real estate are exempt from taxation,
being held by the United States, the Commonwealth, by
the city itself, by religious societies and
corporations, and by charitable, literary, and
scientific institutions. The total amount of the value
of land so held as returned by the assessors for the
year 1892 is $60,626,171.
Reasons can be given why all lands within
the city should be assessed for taxation to secure a
just distribution of the public burdens, which I cannot
take the space to enter into here. There is good reason
to believe also that lands in the city of Boston are
assessed to quite an appreciable extent below their
fair market value. As an indication of this see an
editorial in the Boston Daily Advertiser for
October 3, 1893, under the title, "Their Own
Figures."
The vacant lands, marsh lands, and flats
in Boston were valued by the assessors in 1892 (page 3
of their annual report) at $52,712,600. I believe that
this represents not more than fifty per cent of their
true market value.
Taking this and the undervaluation of
improved property and the exemptions above mentioned
into consideration, I think $500,000,000 to be a fair
estimate of the land values of Boston. Making this the
basis of contrast, we have:
Proceeds of single tax 5.29 per
cent on $500,000,000 ... .... .... ....
$26,450,000
Present tax
levy ... .... ... .... .... .... .... .... ..... ....
.... .... .... ..... .... ....
..$11,805,036
Loss to
public treasury by present system ... ... ... ... ....
.... .... ....$14,644,974
3. THE SINGLE TAX FALLS IN PROPORTION TO
BENEFITS
To perceive that the single tax would justly measure the
value of government service we have only to realize that
the mass of individuals everywhere and now, in paying for
the land they use, actually pay for government service in
proportion to what they receive. He who would enjoy the
benefits of a government must use land within its
jurisdiction. He cannot carry land from where government
is poor to where it is good; neither can he carry it from
where the benefits of good government are few or enjoyed
with difficulty to where they are many and fully enjoyed.
He must rent or buy land where the benefits of government
are available, or forego them. And unless he buys or
rents where they are greatest and most available he must
forego them in degree. Consequently, if he would work or
live where the benefits of government are available, and
does not already own land there, he will be compelled to
rent or buy at a valuation which, other things being
equal, will depend upon the value of the government
service that the site he selects enables him to enjoy. 14
Thus does he pay for the service of government in
proportion to its value to him. But he does not pay the
public which provides the service; he is required to pay
land-owners.
14. Land values are lower in all
countries of poor government than in any country of
better government, other things being equal. They are
lower in cities of poor government, other things being
equal, than in cities of better government. Land values
are lower, for example, in Juarez, on the Mexican side
of the Rio Grande, where government is bad, than in El
Paso, the neighboring city on the American side, where
government is better. They are lower in the same city
under bad government than under improved government.
When Seth Low, after a reform campaign, was elected
mayor of Brooklyn, N.Y., rents advanced before he took
the oath of office, upon the bare expectation that he
would eradicate municipal abuses. Let the city
authorities anywhere pave a street, put water through
it and sewer it, or do any of these things, and lots in
the neighborhood rise in value. Everywhere that the
"good roads" agitation of wheel men has borne fruit in
better highways, the value of adjacent land has
increased. Instances of this effect as results of
public improvements might be collected in abundance.
Every man must be able to recall some within his own
experience.
And it is perfectly reasonable that it
should be so. Land and not other property must rise in
value with desired improvements in government, because,
while any tendency on the part of other kinds of
property to rise in value is checked by greater
production, land can not be reproduced.
Imagine an utterly lawless place, where
life and property are constantly threatened by
desperadoes. He must be either a very bold man or a
very avaricious one who will build a store in such a
community and stock it with goods; but suppose such a
man should appear. His store costs him more than the
same building would cost in a civilized community;
mechanics are not plentiful in such a place, and
materials are hard to get. The building is finally
erected, however, and stocked. And now what about this
merchant's prices for goods? Competition is weak,
because there are few men who will take the chances he
has taken, and he charges all that his customers will
pay. A hundred per cent, five hundred per cent, perhaps
one or two thousand per cent profit rewards him for his
pains and risk. His goods are dear, enormously dear
— dear enough to satisfy the most contemptuous
enemy of cheapness; and if any one should wish to buy
his store that would be dear too, for the difficulties
in the way of building continue. But land is
cheap! This is the type of community in which may
be found that land, so often mentioned and so seldom
seen, which "the owners actually can't give away, you
know!"
But suppose that government improves. An
efficient administration of justice rids the place of
desperadoes, and life and property are safe. What about
prices then? It would no longer require a bold or
desperately avaricious man to engage in selling goods
in that community, and competition would set in. High
profits would soon come down. Goods would be cheap
— as cheap as anywhere in the world, the cost of
transportation considered. Builders and building
materials could be had without difficulty, and stores
would be cheap, too. But land would be dear!
Improvement in government increases the value of that,
and of that alone.
Now, the economic principle pursuant to which
land-owners are thus able to charge their fellow-citizens
for the common benefits of their common government points
to the true method of taxation. With the exception of
such other monopoly property as is analogous to land
titles, and which in the purview of the single tax is
included with land for purposes of taxation, 15 land is
the only kind of property that is increased in value by
government; and the increase of value is in proportion,
other influences aside, to the public service which its
possession secures to the occupant. Therefore, by taxing
land in proportion to its value, and exempting all other
property, kindred monopolies excepted — that is to
say, by adopting the single tax — we should be
levying taxes according to benefits.16
15. Railroad franchises, for example, are
not usually thought of as land titles, but that is what
they are. By an act of sovereign authority they confer
rights of control for transportation purposes over
narrow strips of land between terminals and along
trading points. The value of this right of way is a
land value.
16. Each occupant would pay to his
landlord the value of the public benefits in the way of
highways, schools, courts, police and fire protection,
etc., that his site enabled him to enjoy. The landlord
would pay a tax proportioned to the pecuniary benefits
conferred upon him by the public in raising and
maintaining the value of his holding. And if occupant
and owner were the same, he would pay directly
according to the value of his land for all the public
benefits he enjoyed, both intangible and pecuniary.
And in no sense would this be class taxation. Indeed,
the cry of class taxation is a rather impudent one for
owners of valuable land to raise against the single tax,
when it is considered that under existing systems of
taxation they are exempt. 17 Even the poorest and the
most degraded classes in the community, besides paying
land-owners for such public benefits as come their way,
are compelled by indirect taxation to contribute to the
support of government. But landowners as a class go free.
They enjoy the protection of the courts, and of police
and fire departments, and they have the use of schools
and the benefit of highways and other public
improvements, all in common with the most favored, and
upon the same specific terms; yet, though they go through
the form of paying taxes, and if their holdings are of
considerable value pose as "the tax-payers" on
all important occasions, they, in effect and considered
as a class, pay no taxes, because government, by
increasing the value of their land, enables them to
recover back in higher rents and higher prices more than
their taxes amount to. Enjoying the same tangible
benefits of government that others do, many of them as
individuals and all of them as a class receive in
addition a tangible pecuniary benefit which government
confers upon no other property-owners. The value of their
property is enhanced in proportion to the benefits of
government which its occupants enjoy. To tax them alone,
therefore, is not to discriminate against them; it is to
charge them for what they get.18
17. While the landholders of the City of
Washington were paying something less than two per cent
annually in taxes, a Congressional Committee
(Report of the Select Committee to Investigate Tax
Assessments in the District of Columbia, composed of
Messrs. Johnson, of Ohio, Chairman, Wadsworth, of New
York, and Washington, of Tennessee. Made to the House
of Representatives, May 24, 1892. Report No.
1469), brought out the fact that the value of
their land had been increasing at a minimum rate of ten
per cent per annum. The Washington land-owners as a
class thus appear to have received back in higher land
values, actually and potentially, about ten dollars for
every two dollars that as land-owners they paid in
taxes. If any one supposes that this condition is
peculiar to Washington let him make similar estimates
for any progressive locality, and see if the
land-owners there are not favored in like manner.
But the point is not dependent upon
increase in the capitalized value of land. If the land
yields or will yield to its owner an income in the
nature of actual or potential ground rent, then to the
extent that this actual or possible income is dependent
upon government the landlord is in effect exempt from
taxation. No matter what tax he pays on account of his
ownership of land, the public gives it back to him to
that extent.
18. Take for illustration two towns, one
of excellent government and the other of inefficient
government, but in all other respects alike. Suppose
you are hunting for a place of residence and find a
suitable site in the town of good government. For
simplicity of illustration let us suppose that the land
there is not sold outright but is let upon ground rent.
You meet the owner of the lot you have selected and ask
him his terms. He replies:
"Two hundred and fifty dollars a
year."
"Two hundred and fifty dollars a year! "
you exclaim. "Why, I can get just as good a site in
that other town for a hundred dollars a year."
"Certainly you can," he will say. "But if
you build a house there and it catches fire it will
burn down; they have no fire department. If you go out
after dark you will be 'held up' and robbed; they have
no police force. If you ride out in the spring, your
carriage will stick in the mud up to the hubs, and if
you walk you may break your legs and will be lucky if
you don t break your neck; they have no street
pavements and their sidewalks are dangerously out of
repair. When the moon doesn't shine the streets are in
darkness, for they have no street lights. The water you
need for your house you must get from a well; there is
no water supply there. Now in our town it is different.
We have a splendid fire department, and the best police
force in the world. Our streets are macadamized, and
lighted with electricity; our sidewalks are always in
first class repair; we have a water system that equals
that of New York; and in every way the public benefits
in this town are unsurpassed. It is the best governed
town in all this region. Isn't it worth a hundred and
fifty dollars a year more for a building site here than
over in that poorly governed town?"
You recognize the advantages and agree to
the terms. But when your house is built and the
assessor visits you officially, what would be the
conversation if your sense of the fitness of things
were not warped by familiarity with false systems of
taxation? Would it not be something like what
follows?
"How much do you regard this house as
worth? " asks the assessor.
"What is that to you?" you inquire.
"I am the town assessor and am about to
appraise your property for taxation."
"Am I to be taxed by this town? What
for?"
"What for?" echoes the assessor in
surprise. "What for? Is not your house protected from
fire by our magnificent fire department? Are not you
protected from robbery by the best police force in the
world? Do not you have the use of macadamized
pavements, and good sidewalks, and electric street
lights, and a first class water supply? Don't you
suppose these things cost something? And don't you
think you ought to pay your share?"
"Yes," you answer, with more or less
calmness; "I do have the benefit of these things, and I
do think that I ought to pay my share toward supporting
them. But I have already paid my share for this year. I
have paid it to the owner of this lot. He charges me
two hundred and fifty dollars a year -- one hundred and
fifty dollars more than I should pay or he could get
but for those very benefits. He has collected
my share of this year's expense of maintaining town
improvements; you go and collect from him. If you do
not, but insist upon collecting from me, I shall be
paying twice for these things, once to him and once to
you; and he won't be paying at all, but will be making
money out of them, although he derives the same
benefits from them in all other respects that I
do."
4. CONFORMITY TO GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
TAXATION
The single tax conforms most closely to the essential
principles of Adam Smith's four classical maxims, which
are stated best by Henry George 19 as follows:
The best tax by which public revenues can be raised is
evidently that which will closest conform to the
following conditions:
- That it bear as lightly as possible upon production
— so as least to check the increase of the
general fund from which taxes must be paid and the
community maintained. 20
- That it be easily and cheaply collected, and fall
as directly as may be upon the ultimate payers —
so as to take from the people as little as possible in
addition to what it yields the government. 21
- That it be certain — so as to give the least
opportunity for tyranny or corruption on the part of
officials, and the least temptation to law-breaking and
evasion on the part of the tax-payers. 22
- That it bear equally — so as to give no
citizen an advantage or put any at a disadvantage, as
compared with others. 23
19. "Progress and Poverty," book viii.
ch.iii.
20. This is the second part of Adam
Smith's fourth maxim. He states it as follows: "Every
tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to
keep out of the pockets of the people as little as
possible over and above what it brings into the public
treasury of the state. A tax may either take out or
keep out of the pockets of the people a great deal more
than it brings into the public treasury in the four
following ways: . . . Secondly, it may obstruct the
industry of the people, and discourage them from
applying to certain branches of business which might
give maintenance and employment to great multitudes.
While it obliges the people to pay, it may thus
diminish or perhaps destroy some of the funds which
might enable them more easily to do so."
21. This is the first part of Adam
Smith's fourth maxim, in which he condemns a tax that
takes out of the pockets of the people more than it
brings into the public treasury.
22. This is Adam Smith's second maxim. He
states it as follows: "The tax which each individual is
bound to pay ought to be certain and not arbitrary. The
time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to
be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the
contributor and to every other person. Where it is
otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put more
or less in the power of the tax gatherer."
23. This is Adam Smith's first maxim. He
states it as follows: "The subjects of every state
ought to contribute towards the support of the
government as nearly as possible in proportion to their
respective abilities, that is to say, in proportion to
the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the
protection of the state. The expense of government to
the individuals of a great nation is like the expense
of management to the joint tenants of a great estate,
who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to
their respective interests in the estate. In the
observation or neglect of this maxim consists what is
called the equality or inequality of taxation."
In changing this Mr. George says
("Progress and Poverty," book viii, ch. iii, subd.
4): "Adam Smith speaks of incomes as enjoyed
'under the protection of the state'; and this is the
ground upon which the equal taxation of all species of
property is commonly insisted upon — that it is
equally protected by the state. The basis of this idea
is evidently that the enjoyment of property is made
possible by the state — that there is a value
created and maintained by the community; which is
justly called upon to meet community expenses. Now, of
what values is this true? Only of the value of land.
This is a value that does not arise until a community
is formed, and that, unlike other values, grows with
the growth of the community. It only exists as the
community exists. Scatter again the largest community,
and land, now so valuable, would have no value at all.
With every increase of population the value of land
rises; with every decrease it falls. This is true of
nothing else save of things which, like the ownership
of land, are in their nature monopolies."
Adam Smith's third maxim refers only to
conveniency of payment, and gives countenance to
indirect taxation, which is in conflict with the
principle of his fourth maxim. Mr. George properly
excludes it.
a. Interference with Production
Indirect taxes tend to check production and cause
scarcity, by obstructing the processes of production.
They fall upon men as they work, as
they do business, as they invest capital
productively. 24 But the single tax, which must be paid
and be the same in amount regardless of whether the payer
works or plays, of whether he invests his capital
productively or wastes it, of whether he uses his land
for the most productive purposes 25 or in lesser degree
or not at all, removes fiscal penalties from industry and
thrift, and tends to leave production free. It therefore
conforms more closely than indirect taxation to the first
maxim quoted above.
24. "Taxation which falls upon the
processes of production interposes an artificial
obstacle to the creation of wealth. Taxation which
falls upon labor as it is exerted, wealth as it is used
as capital, land as it is cultivated, will manifestly
tend to discourage production much more powerfully than
taxation to the same amount levied upon laborers
whether they work or play, upon wealth whether used
productively or unproductively, or upon land whether
cultivated or left waste" — Progress and
Poverty, book viii, ch. iii, subd. I.
25. It is common, besides taxing
improvements, as fast as they are made, to levy higher
taxes upon land when put to its best use than when put
to partial use or to no use at all. This is upon the
theory that when his land is used the owner gets full
income from it and can afford to pay high taxes; but
that he gets little or no income when the land is out
of use, and so cannot afford to pay much. It is an
absurd but perfectly legitimate illustration of the
pretentious doctrine of taxation according to ability
to pay.
Examples are numerous. Improved building
lots, and even those that are only plotted for
improvement, are usually taxed more than contiguous
unused and unplotted land which is equally in demand
for building purposes and equally valuable. So coal
land, iron land, oil land, and sugar land are as a rule
taxed less as land when opened up for appropriate use
than when lying idle or put to inferior uses, though
the land value be the same. Any serious proposal to put
land to its appropriate use is commonly regarded as a
signal for increasing the tax upon it.
b. Cheapness of Collection
Indirect taxes are passed along from first payers to
final consumers through many exchanges, accumulating
compound profits as they go, until they take enormous
sums from the people in addition to what the government
receives.26 But the single tax takes nothing from the
people in excess of the tax. It therefore conforms more
closely than indirect taxation to the second maxim quoted
above.
26. "All taxes upon things of unfixed
quantity increase prices, and in the course of exchange
are shifted from seller to buyer, increasing as they
go. If we impose a tax on money loaned, as has been
often attempted, the lender will charge the tax to the
borrower, and the borrower must pay it or not obtain
the loan. If the borrower uses it in his business, he
in his turn must get back the tax from his customers,
or his business becomes unprofitable. If we impose a
tax upon buildings, the users of buildings must finally
pay it, for the erection of buildings will cease until
building rents become high enough to pay the regular
profit and the tax besides. If we impose a tax upon
manufactures or imported goods, the manufacturer or
importer will charge it in a higher price to the
jobber, the jobber to the retailer. and the retailer to
the consumer. Now, the consumer, on whom the tax thus
ultimately falls, must not only pay the amount of the
tax, but also a profit on this amount to everyone who
has thus advanced it — for profit on the capital
he has advanced in paying taxes is as much required by
each dealer as profit on the capital he has advanced in
paying for goods." — Progress and Poverty,
book viii, ch. iii, subd. 2.
c. Certainty
No other tax, direct or indirect, conforms so closely
to the third maxim. "Land lies out of doors." It cannot
be hidden; it cannot be "accidentally" overlooked. Nor
can its value be seriously misstated. Neither
under-appraisement nor over-appraisement to any important
degree is possible without the connivance of the whole
community. 27 The land values of a neighborhood are
matters of common knowledge. Any intelligent resident can
justly appraise them, and every other intelligent
resident can fairly test the appraisement. Therefore, the
tyranny, corruption, fraud, favoritism, and evasions that
are so common in connection with the taxation of imports,
manufactures, incomes, personal property, and buildings
— the values of which, even when the object itself
cannot be hidden, are so distinctly matters of minute
special knowledge that only experts can fairly appraise
them — would be out of the question if the single
tax were substituted for existing fiscal methods. 28
27. The under-appraisements so common at
present, and alluded to in note 25, are possible
because the community, ignorant of the just principles
of taxation, does connive at them. Under-appraisements
are not secret crimes on the part of assessors; they
are distinctly recognized, but thoughtlessly
disregarded when not actually insisted upon, by the
people themselves. And this is due to the dishonest
ideas of taxation that are taught. Let the vicious
doctrine that people ought to pay taxes according to
their ability give way to the honest principle that
they should pay in proportion to the benefits they
receive, which benefits, as we have already seen, are
measured by the land values they own, and
underappraisement of land would cease. No assessor can
befool the community in respect of the value of the
land within his jurisdiction.
And, with the cessation of general
under-appraisement, favoritism in individual
appraisements also would cease. General
under-appraisement fosters unfair individual
appraisements. If land were generally appraised at its
full value, a particular unfair appraisement would
stand out in such relief that the crime of the assessor
would be exposed. But now if a man's land is appraised
at a higher valuation than his neighbor's equally
valuable land, and he complains of the unfairness, he
is promptly and effectually silenced with a warning
that his land is worth much more than it is appraised
at, anyhow, and if he makes a fuss his appraisement
will be increased. To complain further of the deficient
taxation of his neighbor is to invite the imposition of
a higher tax upon himself.
28. If you wish to test the merits in
point of certainty of the single tax as compared with
other taxes, go to a real estate agent in your
community, and, showing him a building lot upon the
map, ask him its value. If he inquires about the
improvements, instruct him to ignore them. He will be
able at once to tell you what the lot is worth. And if
you go to twenty other agents their estimates will not
materially vary from his. Yet none of the agents will
have left his office. Each will have inferred the value
from the size and location of the lot.
But suppose when you show the map to the
first agent you ask him the value of the land and its
improvements. He will tell you that he cannot give an
estimate until he examines the improvements. And if it
is the highly improved property of a rich man he will
engage building experts to assist him. Should you ask
him to include the value of the contents of the
buildings, he would need a corps of selected experts,
including artists and liverymen, dealers in furniture
and bric-a-brac, librarians and jewelers. Should you
propose that he also include the value of the
occupant's income, the agent would throw up his hands
in despair.
If without the aid of an army of experts
the agent should make an estimate of these
miscellaneous values, and twenty others should do the
same, their several estimates would be as wide apart as
ignorant guesses usually are. And the richer the owner
of the property the lower as a proportion would the
guesses probably be.
Now turn the real estate agent into an
assessor, and is it not plain that he would appraise
the land values with much greater certainty and
cheapness than he could appraise the values of all
kinds of property? With a plot map before him he might
fairly make every appraisement without leaving his desk
at the town hall.
And there would be no material difference
if the property in question were a farm instead of a
building lot. A competent farmer or business man in a
farming community can, without leaving his own
door-yard, appraise the value of the land of any farm
there; whereas it would be impossible for him to value
the improvements, stock, produce, etc., without at
least inspecting them.
d. Equality
In respect of the fourth maxim the single tax bears
more equally— that is to say, more justly —
than any other tax. It is the only tax that falls upon
the taxpayer in proportion to the pecuniary benefits he
receives from the public; 29 and its tendency,
accelerating with the increase of the tax, is to leave
every one the full fruit of his own productive enterprise
and effort. 30
29 The benefits of government are
not the only public benefits whose value attaches
exclusively to land. Communal development from whatever
cause produces the same effect. But as it is under the
protection of government that land-owners are able to
maintain ownership of land and through that to enjoy
the pecuniary benefits of advancing social conditions,
government confers upon them as a class not only the
pecuniary benefits of good government but also the
pecuniary benefits of progress in general.
30. "Here are two men of equal incomes
— that of the one derived from the exertion of
his labor, that of the other from the rent of land. Is
it just that they should equally contribute to the
expenses of the state? Evidently not. The income of the
one represents wealth he creates and adds to the
general wealth of the state; the income of the other
represents merely wealth that he takes from the general
stock, returning nothing." — Progress and
Poverty, book viii, ch. iii, subd. 4.
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