Transition
Once you're familiar with the ideas of Henry George,
an obvious question is "how do we get from here to
there, and who is affected in the process?" This reform
is both a local one (reforming the property tax and
getting rid of local and state taxes on buildings,
sales and wages) and a national one (starting to
collect an increasing share of the economic value of
natural resources, reasonable user fees, broadcast
spectrum, etc. — see "land includes" and "sources of rent" for more
about this aspect).
And then the question becomes how many years it is
reasonable to ask people to wait for such a reform to
be complete, once it is begun. (See also: slavery.)
It is an axiom of statesmanship, which the
successful founders of tyranny have understood and
acted upon that great changes can best be brought about
under old forms. We, who would free men, should heed
the same truth. It is the natural method. When nature
would make a higher type, she takes a lower one and
develops it. This, also, is the law of social growth.
Let us work by it. With the current we may glide fast
and far. Against it, it is hard pulling and slow
progress.
By making use of this existing machinery, we may,
without jar or shock, assert the common right to land
by appropriating rent by taxation. We already take some
rent in taxation. We have only to make some changes in
our modes of taxation to take it all.*
*Rent in the economic sense is not, as
those unfamiliar with economic terminology may
assume, the whole amount paid for the use of real
estate. It is only that part of such amount which is
paid for the use of the bare land or site employed,
exclusive of the payment for the use of any buildings
or other improvements on it. H. G. B.
In form, the ownership of land would remain just as
now. No owner of land need be dispossessed, and no
restriction need be placed upon the amount of land any
one could hold. For, rent being taken by the State in
taxes, land, no matter in whose name it stood, or in
what parcels it was held, would be really common
property, and every member of the community would
participate in the advantages of its ownership.
Now, insomuch as the taxation of rent, or land
values, must necessarily be increased just as we
abolish other taxes, we may put the proposition into
practical form by proposing --
to abolish all taxation save
that upon land values.
As we have seen, the value of land is at the
beginning of society nothing, but as society develops
by the increase of population and the advance of the
arts, it becomes greater and greater. In every
civilized country, even the newest, the value of the
land taken as a whole is sufficient to bear the entire
expenses of government. In the better developed
countries it is much more than sufficient. Hence it
will not be enough merely to place all taxes upon the
value of land. It will be necessary, where rent exceeds
the present governmental revenues, commensurately to
increase the amount demanded in taxation, and to
continue this increase as society progresses and rent
advances. But this is so natural and easy a matter,
that it may be considered as involved, or at least
understood, in the proposition to put all taxes on the
value of land. That is the first step upon which the
practical struggle must be made. When the hare is once
caught and killed, cooking him will follow as a matter
of course. When the common right to land is so far
appreciated that all taxes are abolished save those
which fall upon rent, there is no danger of much more
than is necessary to induce them to collect the public
revenues being left to individual landholders.
Wherever the idea of concentrating all taxation upon
land values finds lodgment sufficient to induce
consideration, it invariably makes way, but there are
few of the classes most to be benefited by it, who at
first, or even for a long time afterward, see its full
significance and power.
- It is difficult for workingmen to get over the
idea that there is a real antagonism between capital
and labor.
- It is difficult for small farmers and homestead
owners to get over the idea that to put all taxes on
the value of land would be unduly to tax them.
- It is difficult for both classes to get over the
idea that to exempt capital from taxation would be to
make the rich richer, and the poor poorer.
These ideas spring from confused thought. But behind
ignorance and prejudice there is a powerful interest,
which has hitherto dominated literature, education, and
opinion. A great wrong always dies hard, and the great
wrong which in every civilized country condemns the
masses of men to poverty and want, will not die without
a bitter struggle. ... read the
whole chapter
Bill Batt: Painless
Taxation
Abstract Real tax reform could
do away with those taxes that are resented by the large
proportion of our population. We could replace all taxes
on wages and on interest by instead taxing economic rent.
Rent is windfall income; it is income that arises not
from the efforts of any person or corporation; it comes
about as a surplus gain from common social enterprise.
There is ample moral warrant for society to lay claim to
that which it has created, as well as to that which no
individual or party has earned. Analysis increasingly
makes clear that economic rent in all its forms is far
larger than official government figures indicate; in fact
it is likely sufficient to supplant all current taxes on
labor and capital (wages and interest) which are
acknowledged to have so many negative effects. Recovering
economic rent in all its manifestations by taxing its
various bases actually can foster economic performance
and yield other benefits that make it the natural source
of revenue for governments. Such a tax is essentially
painless. ... read
the whole article
Louis Post: Outlines
of Louis F. Post's Lectures, with Illustrative Notes and
Charts (1894) — Appendix: FAQ
Q27. Would working people, whose savings are in
savings banks or insurance companies which own land or
have mortgages upon land, lose by the shrinkage in land
values?
A. Not if the companies were managed intelligently. Well
managed companies would shift their investments as they
observed the persistent decline of land values. They
would do it even as soon as conditions appeared which
would naturally cause land values to shrink. But working
people could well afford to give all their savings for
the permanent employment and high wages that the single
tax would bring about. It is not working people but idle
people who would lose anything by the single tax.
wealthandwant editorial comment: Post may be
confusing land prices and land value.
Land value will continue to rise; land
price will fall, as the land tax is capitalized
into the price. ... read the book
Charles B. Fillebrown: A Catechism of Natural
Taxation, from Principles of Natural Taxation
(1917)
Q62. Would it be wise to take gradually in
taxation, say, 1/4, one half, or 3/4 of the future
increase in economic rent?
A. One hundred and one professors of political economy
have answered "Yes." Twenty-nine have answered
"No."
Q63. How could the single tax be put into
operation?
A. By gradually transferring to land all taxes not
already on it.
Q64. How might such a plan be worked
out?
A. If fifty cents per thousand should be deducted yearly
for 30 years from the rate on all property other than
land, the reduction would finally amount to $15 per
thousand, and it would then be practically exempt from
all taxation.
Q65. But how could it be worked out in case of the
land?
A. Recognizing that a right thing may be done in a wrong
way, it is insisted that a right way ought to be found to
do a thing that ought to be done. The following is
presented as a natural and convenient unit of calculation: To be exact,
an average of about 20 percent of the
gross ground rent of land is now taken in taxation, for
instance, in Boston, as well as for the whole state of
Massachusetts. If an additional one percent should be
taken each year for 30 years, it would amount at the end
of that period to 30 percent, which, added to 20 percent,
would make 50 percent, or one half, which is about the
average proportion that present taxes levied on all
property bear to gross ground rent. Meantime few
landowners would feel the change, much less be prejudiced
by it.
The following variable illustrations, A, B, and C, make
clear.
A "Modus
Operandi"
A Increase of Present Tax
For instance, applied to the assessment of a specific
lot of land for which the user pays a gross ground rent
of say ...... $68.00
Of which amount there is taken in taxation, 1915 .....
$18.00
Leaving a net income to the owner of ....
$50.00
The selling value (presumably also the assessed
valuation) would be at 5 per cent ... $1,000.00
Proceeding to take yearly from now on 1 per cent
additional of the gross ground rent of $68 for a period
of thirty years would amount in all to 30 per cent of
$68, equal to .... $20.40
Which, added to the tax already taken .... $18.00
Would give at the end of thirty years, from the $1,000
worth of land alone, everything else being exempted, a
total tax of .... $38.40.
Which is not much more than one half of the gross ground
rent of ... $68.00
The opening exhibit in detail would stand as
follows:
In 1915 the tax on this $1,000 worth of land was
$18.00
In 1916 the tax would be $18 plus 68 cents (1 per cent of
the gross ground rent, $68); equal to .... $18.68
Reducing the owner's net rent from $50 to $49.32
In 1917 the tax would be $18 plus $1.36 (2 per cent of
the $68), totaling .... $19.36
Reducing the owner's net rent from $50 to $48.64,
In 1918 the tax would be $18 plus $2.04 (3 per cent of
the $68) or $20.45
Reducing the owner's net rent from $50 to $47.96
In 1945 the tax on the land would be $18 plus $20.40 (30
per cent of the $68) or ... $38.40
With all improvements exempted.
Reducing the owner's net rent from $50 to $29.60.
B
For a Future Increment
Tax
The taking in taxation of any desired proportion of
the future increment could be accomplished simply by
continuing the present valuation and present rate as
constant factors, and making a separate individual
assessment of the increment tax after the following or
similar formula, according to the proportion to be
taken. For instance, to take in taxation 50 per
cent of the future increase:
Year
|
Valuation
|
Increment
|
Rate Per M.
|
Tax for Each Year
|
1915 |
$1,000 |
|
|
|
1916 |
$1,040 |
$40 |
$25 |
Tax for year 1916, $1 |
|
1915 |
$1,000 |
|
|
|
1917 |
$1,080 |
$80 |
25 |
Tax for year 1917, $2 |
|
1915 |
$1,000 |
|
|
|
1918 |
$1,120 |
$120 |
25 |
Tax for year 1918, $3 |
|
1915 |
$1,000 |
|
|
|
1919 |
$1,160 |
$160 |
25 |
Tax for year 1919, $4 |
|
1915 |
$1,000 |
|
|
|
1920 |
$1,200 |
$200 |
25 |
Tax for year 1920, $5 |
In applying this formula it would be necessary after the
first few years at least to increase the rate to
correspond to the decrease in assessed valuation due to
this new tax. For computations upon this and
related points, see the Report of the
New York City Commission on New Sources of City
Revenue (1913), p. 7 and Appendices X to XV.
C
The Assessment of Rent
It should be reiterated that inasmuchas gross
ground rent, actual or potential, is the initial factor
in getting at the value of land, it cannot be
unprofitable to become familiar with a more correct
formula as expressed in terms of rent.
Starting with the present unit of annual value for use to
take in taxation in 25 years 50 per cent of the future
increase in ground rent:
Year
|
Net Ground Rent
|
Increment
|
Percentage of Rent
|
Tax for Each Year
|
1915 |
$50 |
|
|
|
1916
|
$52 |
2 |
50 |
Tax for year 1916, $1 |
|
1915 |
$50 |
|
|
|
1917 |
54 |
4 |
50 |
Tax for year 1917, $2 |
|
1915 |
$50 |
|
|
|
1918 |
56 |
6 |
50 |
Tax for year 1918, $3 |
|
1915 |
$50 |
|
|
|
1919 |
58 |
8 |
50 |
Tax for year 1919, $4 |
|
1915 |
$50 |
|
|
|
1920
|
60
|
10
|
50
|
Tax for year 1920, $5 |
|
1915 |
$50 |
|
|
|
1940 |
100 |
50 |
50 |
Tax for year 1940, $25 |
... read
the whole article
Fred E. Foldvary — The Ultimate Tax Reform: Public
Revenue from Land Rent
How to make the transition
The switch to land value taxation will affect most
significantly those who own land at the time of the
transition. These are the persons who have been
subsidized, receiving site rental and land value from
civic works paid for mostly by taxes on wages when earned
or spent. But even many landowners would not see their
total tax burden rise. Their wages, profits, interest,
and consumption would all become untaxed, and taxes on
their buildings and other improvements would be
eliminated.
As shown by the equations earlier in this report, the
land value tax is not even any burden on future owners of
the land, since the tax on the land reduces its purchase
price. What the owner pays in a tax on his geo-rent, he
saves in not having to pay that amount as mortgage
interest. There are two ways of addressing any net burden
that might fall on current landowners during a shift to
land value taxes.
First, landowners could be compensated.
Second, the shift could be implemented gradually,
allowing land values to fall to accommodate the expected
and gradually implemented tax shift.
As a concrete example, the transition to land value
taxation can be accomplished in these steps:
1. Each county expands its register of all real
estate and the title holders to include all lands owned
by governments and previously non-registered
entities.
2. Local real estate taxes are split into two taxes,
one on land value and one on improvements.
3. The county real estate assessment function is
transferred to land value assessment boards, comprised
of representatives from the federal, state, county, and
municipal governments as well as real estate
professionals and scholars. These boards appoint
assessors and establish an appeals process, similar to
current real estate tax appeals.
4. All land is assessed at its current market
value.
5. Over a period of years, depending on how much
land values already have fallen in anticipation of the
tax shift, the tax on improvements is reduced, while
the tax on land values is increased. (An immediate tax
shift to geo-rent, with other taxes reduced or
abolished, could be compensated, for those with net
losses, with special bonds whose face-value interest
payments would decrease over time; this would have an
effect similar to the gradual increase in the geo-rent
tax rate.)
6. Sales taxes, tariffs, and excise taxes are
reduced and eventually eliminated.
7. The personal exemption in federal income taxes is
raised each year, until it eventually includes all
income, at which time all state and federal personal
income taxes are abolished. The taxation of corporate
profits is also phased out.
8. The value of material land (minerals, oil, water,
etc.), the electromagnetic spectrum, naturally growing
forests, and other natural resources is taxed at
gradually increasing rates up to a substantial amount,
if not all, of the unimproved rental value.
9. An amendment to the Constitution is enacted
prohibiting any taxation of wages, sales, profits,
value-added, or produced wealth and establishing the
taxation of the value of land and other natural
resources, along with voluntary user fees and charges
for pollution and congestion, as the only sources of
public revenues. The amendment also establishes a land
value tax commission with representatives from the
federal, state, local, territorial, and Indian-nation
governments to divide the taxes raised. Generally,
taxes raised from off-shore oil and water, atmospheric
pollution, airline routes, and other continental uses
would be allocated to the federal government, and the
rest would be allocated to the state (or provincial, in
Canada), local, territorial, and Indian-nation
governments. If the national government needs
additional revenue, it is obtained from the state or
territorial governments in proportion to their land
value, as was specified in the Articles of
Confederation that preceded the U.S. Constitution.
10. Top-down revenue sharing from federal to state
and from state to local government stops. Many
services, functions, and agencies are transferred from
the central government to the state/provincial and
local governments. ... read the whole
document
Fred Foldvary: Geo-Rent: A Plea to Public
Economists
GRADUAL REFORM: 20 YEARS TO 75 PERCENT
A shift to public finance from geo-rent would be
politically difficult, which may help explain why it has
not been done. The political difficulty, however, exists
despite the fact that most homeowners, being also wage
earners, would have a net gain if other taxes, including
the property tax on improvements, were simultaneously
abolished. But some current landowners, especially of
urban commercial real estate, would have a net loss,
unless we build in some kind of
“compensation.” Economists are accustomed to
saying that a tough transition — plant-closings,
declining industries, retooling and
retraining—should not deter the long-term good. The
same should apply here.
I suggest the following transition to geo-rent
taxation, if only to serve as a conceptual
model:
Time 0: The new regime is
enacted into law.
Years 1 through 10: The landowner
continues to pay the roughly 25 percent of the geo-rent
now implicit in his current property taxes. (If the
property tax is 2 percent of land value and the
capitalization rate (real interest rate) is 6 percent,
that works out to about 25 percent of geo-rent, which is
an annualized dimension.)
Year 11: He pays 30
percent.
Year 12: He pays 35
percent.
Year 13: He pays 40
percent.
Year 14: He pays 45
percent.
Year 15: He pays 50
percent.
Year 16: He pays 55
percent.
Year 17: He pays 60
percent.
Year 18: He pays 65
percent.
Year 19: He pays 70
percent.
Year 20: He pays 75
percent.
Thereafter: He pays 75
percent.
Here are a number of points the help to flesh out
the scheme:
- The scheme applies also to government-owned
land. The associated government agency, such as the
Bureau of Land Management or the United States Postal
Service, would pay geo-rent for the land it owns. This
will improve government cost accounting and policy
decisions.
- To which level of government are geo-rent
taxes paid? This is an important question, but I wish to
sidestep it here. For present purposes, one may imagine a
system in which, like property taxes today, geo-rent
taxes would be collected at the level of county
government. When such taxes are sufficiently large, they
would flow both down to the city governments and up to
the state and national governments.
- The other side of the scheme, not detailed
here, is the untaxing of buildings, sales, income, etc.
Thus, the scheme involves an enormous confiscation of
land-wealth and an enormous de-confiscation of other
kinds of wealth.
A reform like that suggested here would, of
course, require a movement and public debate taking
years, if not decades. Once enacted, during the first 10
years, the landowners pay no more in geo-rent than they
are accustomed to paying. All this lead-up time will give
people time to figure out what geo-rent taxation means,
and to work out in markets the present values of land, in
anticipation of the coming increases in levies.
...
The financial burden is only on the owners who are
current at the time the geo-rent tax is increased. What
is not so well recognized in public finance is that,
after the transition to geo-rent
taxation, there is no burden on any new site owner. The price of land is
capitalized down in proportion to the tax rate, so the
payment of the tax is offset by the lower price of land.
However, if we may neglect the consequences on the
dependents and heirs of the current landowners, after the
transitional generation, no one suffers a
burden.
The impact on the current landowners raises issues
of “compensation.” While advocates of tapping
geo-rent for public revenue argue that it is equitable,
because it pays back geo-rent generated by
government’s civic works, critics argue that the
transition would not be equitable, because the financial
burden would be concentrated on landowners. Robert Solow
(1998, 278) states that while taxing geo-rent would be
good for a new country, “Expropriating land values
today would have no semblance of fairness.” He
adds, however, that if the transition is gradual or if
there is compensation, then “the complaint of
iniquity may lose validity.”
An immediate tax shift to geo-rent, with other
taxes reduced or abolished, could be compensated with
special bonds whose face-value interest payments would
decrease over time, with an effect similar to the gradual
increase in the geo-rent tax rate suggested above. But
compensation is a side issue. I say we try to sell the
reform to the current landowners on its merits, just as
we would argue for a reduction in trade barriers, as a
worthy sacrifice, and offer our gratitude for their
political cooperation. (I say this as the owner of a
prime plot in Berkeley, California!) Read the entire
article
Nic Tideman: The Case
for Site Value Rating
The Social Justice of Site Value
Rating
The Efficiency of Site Value Rating
How Valuations would be Made
Both for reasons of social justice
and for reasons of economic efficiency, site value rating
deserves a continued place in the programme of the Liberal
Party.
The case for site value rating in
terms of social justice is founded on two understandings:
first, that the value of land in the absence of economic
development is the common heritage of humanity, and second,
that increases in the rental value of land arising from
economic development and government expenditures should be
collected by governments to finance those activities. What
is meant by "land" is the unimproved value of sites and the
value of extractable natural resources such as North Sea
oil.
While there may someday be
institutions capable of implementing a recognition of land
as the heritage of all humanity on a worldwide basis, in
the absence of such institutions each nation should
implement a recognition that land within its boundaries is
the common heritage of its citizens. This is accomplished
not by making the nation a gigantic Common or by
instituting government management of all land, but rather
by requiring all persons and corporations that are granted
the use of land to pay a fee or tax equal to what the
rental value of the land they control would be if it were
in an unimproved condition.
The case for site value rating in
terms of economic efficiency is founded on the fact that a
tax on resources that are not produced by human effort is
one of the few sources of government revenue that does not
reduce incentives for people to be productive. Two other
revenue sources that have this virtue are taxes on other
government-granted privileges such as exclusive use of
radio frequencies and taxes on activities with harmful
consequences, such as polluting the air. An economy will be
more efficient if revenue sources that do not diminish
productivity are employed to the greatest possible extent
before any use is made of taxes that impede
productivity.
What makes a tax efficient is that
the amount of tax that is due cannot be reduced by reducing
productive activities. When incomes are taxed, people can
reduce the amount of taxes owed by working less. They do
so, and the productivity of the economy falls. When houses
are taxed, people can reduce the amount of taxes owed by
building fewer house and smaller houses. They do so, and
the housing shortage worsens. But when the unimproved value
of land is taxed, there is no resulting diminution in the
quantity of land. Thus taxes can be levied on land without
diminishing the productivity of an economy. And shifting
taxes from other, destructive bases to land will improve
the productivity of an economy.
Subsequent sections explain in more
detail these social justice and efficiency arguments for
site value rating, describe procedures for implementing
such a tax system, and explain why a variety of potential
objections are without merit.
...
... if the full rental value of
land is collected through site value rating, then the
sale value of unimproved land will fall to approximately
zero. The sale value of houses will fall to the value of
the houses themselves. Do the owners of land deserve
compensation for these reductions in the market value of
their wealth?
First, it should be pointed out that
the average taxpayer will pay the same tax as before, but
in a different form. Site value rating will be substituted
for some combination of income taxes, excise taxes,
community charges, property value rates, and other taxes. A
person should not complain about a change in the form of
the taxes he pays if the total is the same. The above
argument would be sufficient if every individual paid the
same total tax after the change, but of course this will
not occur. To some extent, increases in the sale value of
capital will offset decreases in the sale value of land.
This occurs because, by a removal of taxes from capital,
site value rating will greatly increase the private returns
to capital. This will generate a massive flow of capital
toward any nation or region that reduces its taxes on
capital. But such flows cannot occur instantaneously, and
before they are completed the reductions in taxes on
capital will raise the value of capital. In general, young
persons will benefit more than older persons from a move to
site value rating, because they tend to own less expensive
plots of land if they own land at all, and they have many
years ahead of them to benefit from reduction in other
taxes. Those who are yet unborn will benefit most of all,
because their birthrights to equal shares of the provenance
of nature, as well as to the product of their labour, will
be recognized. Net financial losses will tend to be
greatest for older persons. Their houses will fall in sale
value. They will be required to pay annually the rental
value of the land on which their houses sit, without as
much in reductions of their income taxes, and with fewer
years ahead of them to reap tax savings. On the other hand,
they will have less concern about providing for their
children, because houses will be much easier for their
children to acquire. Further offsetting any claim to
compensation would be any past unearned profits that
potential claimants had made on ownership of
land.
In some circumstances, a claim for
compensation would have merit. If a person had purchased a
title to land from the government just before the
introduction of site value rating, that person could
reasonably claim compensation from government action that
eliminated the value of his purchase. Even if a substantial
amount of time has passed, it can be argued that a
government should not be permitted to eliminate by
legislation the value of an asset that it has sold. On this
basis, anyone who owned land that was at one time purchased
from the government would have a reasonable claim on a
return of the (inflation adjusted) price for which the land
was purchased from the government. A claim for interest on
the purchase price could not be sustained, however. The use
of the land since the time of purchase offsets the interest
that could otherwise be claimed.
What of land that was at one time
granted by the crown without payment for the title, and
land that has risen substantially in value since it was
purchased from the government? The government is not
obliged to provide compensation for these losses from
general tax revenues, because the source of these losses is
the mistaken belief that private appropriation of the rent
of land can be just. It cannot. The present generation of
taxpayers should not be required to pay for this mistaken
belief on the part of their forbearers. On the other hand,
every person who has sold land in the past has fostered, to
his profit, the mistaken belief that the rent of land can
justly be privately appropriated. On this basis, all past
profits from the sale of land, and all inheritances based
on such profits, with accumulated interest, can be
appropriated to provide compensation for those whose land
falls in value to less than they paid for it, upon
introduction of site value rating.
It is possible that the
administrative cost of such an undertaking would be so
great as to make it infeasible, while at the same time its
moral justice was recognized. On this basis one can justify
a "capital levy," a one-time charge on all capital in the
nation, to provide compensation for those who lose from the
introduction of site value rating. The justification of the
capital levy would be that the amount of capital that a
person owned was the best readily available indicator of
past gains that a person had made from the sale of land....
Read the whole article
Jeff Smith and Kris Nelson: Giving Life to the Property Tax
Shift (PTS)
John Muir is right. "Tug on any one thing and find
it connected to everything else in the universe." Tug on
the property tax and find it connected to urban slums,
farmland loss, political favoritism, and unearned equity
with disrupted neighborhood tenure. Echoing Thoreau, the
more familiar reforms have failed to address this
many-headed hydra at its root. To think that the root
could be chopped by a mere shift in the property tax base
-- from buildings to land -- must seem like the epitome
of unfounded faith. Yet the evidence shows that state and
local tax activists do have a powerful, if subtle, tool
at their disposal. The "stick" spurring efficient use of
land is a higher tax rate upon land, up to even the
site's full annual value. The "carrot" rewarding
efficient use of land is a lower or zero tax rate upon
improvements. ...
Starting in 1914, Pittsburgh and Scranton
introduced "the graded tax." Over a decade they phased in
a higher rate on land until it was twice the rate on
buildings. Doing so gradually allowed residents and
businesses time to adapt, giving the PTS political
acceptability. Tho' this delayed benefits, land
speculators offered little opposition since they did not
face the sudden effects of the full shift. Such an
approach is still prudent today.
On the other hand, the shifting the property tax can be
rapid and orderly. Economies and societies do endure
price shocks, such as the doubling of gas pump prices in
the early 70s. Yet to avoid that resultant acrimony, the
PTS could be phased in gradually. Over five years, tax
rates could change 20% per year.
- Year One, the levy upon sites,
resources, and government granted privileges (e.g.,
utility franchises, medical licenses, taxi medallions)
would increase by 20% of uncollected annual value. All
other taxes would fall by 20%, or policymakers could
exempt the bottom quintile form
taxes.
- Year Two, if all goes well, 40%
of natural value would be collected while other taxes
would fall 40%. Years Three and Four, the process
continues.
- By Year Five, if all goes well,
all natural value is collected while all other taxes
are eliminated. If government projects a shortfall in
revenue, the process could be drawn
out.
Governments can rely on land
rents, not on property, as a stable source of revenue
thruout the business cycle. Such reliable revenue flows
should give governments the confidence to alleviate
hardship with various reductions, eventho' doing so would
reduce revenue. Ways to ease the transition include
monthly or quarterly payments, discounts for early
payments, rebates of income or sales taxes, and a cap on
how fast land dues may rise. Ways to lift the burden from
those unable to pay include
- exemptions for the elderly over
a declining term,
- deferral until sale or bequest
of property,
- deferral for the certified
unemployed,
- partial exemptions for farmers
at a set amount,
- purchase-and-demolition
reimbursement, and
- moving
cost-sharing.
A big problem needs a big
solution which in turn needs a matching shift of our
prevailing paradigm. Geonomics -- advocating that we
share the social value of sites and natural resources and
untax earnings -- does just that.
Read the whole
article
Herbert J. G. Bab: Property Tax -- Cause of
Unemployment
There can be little doubt that the shifting of the
tax burden from improvements to the land is the
appropriate remedy. I shall try to outline a few ground
rules for the procedure which should be followed:
- The shifting of the tax burden should be
achieved gradually over a period of years.
- A predetermined yearly reduction in property
tax rates on improvements should be enacted by each State
and should be imposed on all local governments without
exception. At the same time the tax rate on urban land
should be increased to make up for the loss in
revenues.
- A State agency or State Tax commission should,
be set up to supervise and administer the shifting of the
tax burden with the following functions:
- To break up the property tax into its
constituent parts: taxes on urban improvements, urban
land, farm land and property other than real
estate.
- To enforce the yearly reduction in tax rates
on urban improvements and to see to it that taxes on
urban land are raised to make up for the loss in
revenues.
- To supervise assessment procedures and
practices and enforce the equal assessment of all classes
of property.
- To enforce the pooling of revenue derived from
school taxes and to equalize school standards on a
state-wide basis.
- To examine the merits and effects of the taxes
assessed on tangible and intangible property other than
real estate and to recommend the retention or
discontinuation of these taxes.
- To consider the merits of granting immediate
tax relief on the first $3,000 of all newly constructed
housing in order to stimulate the improvements and
modernization of homes. Read the
whole
article
Robert V. Andelson Henry George and the
Reconstruction of Capitalism
Nobody, to my knowledge, advocates that it be
instituted whole-hog overnight. But it could be phased in
in easy stages so as to obviate the risk of shock and
dislocation. And it is my considered opinion that, by
the time the system were in full effect, the revenues
produced by collecting land values alone would suffice to
meet all legitimate public needs. This may not have
been true during the Cold War, with its staggering burden
of nuclear defense. But with that burden lifted, and with
the need for welfare of all kinds evaporated because of
the full employment and other social benefits that the
system would naturally engender, and for other reasons,
which time precludes my specifying here, I really think
that we could dispense with taxes on incomes,
improvements, sales, imports, and all the rest. If I am
unduly optimistic in this belief, and the public
appropriation of land-values were insufficient, this
would be no argument against using it as far as it could
go. Read the whole article
Winston Churchill: The
People's Land
The system to be attacked, not
individuals. I hope you will understand that when
I speak of the land monopolist I am dealing more with the
process than with the individual landowner. I have no
wish to hold any class up to public disapprobation. I do
not think that the man who makes money by unearned
increment in land is morally a worse man than anyone else
who gathers his profit where he finds it in this hard
world under the law and according to common usage. It is
not the individual I attack, it is the system.
It is not the man who is bad, it is the
law which is bad. It is not the man who is
blameworthy for doing what the law allows and what other
men do; it is the State which would be blameworthy were
it not to endeavour to reform the law and correct the
practice. We do not want to punish the
landlord. We want to alter the law.
We do not go back on the
past. Look at our actual proposal. We do not
go back on the past. We accept as our basis the value as
it stands today. The tax on the increment of land begins
by recognizing and franking the past increment. We look
only to the future, and for the future we say only this,
that the community shall be the partner in any further
increment above the present value after all the owner's
improvements have been deducted. We say that the State
and the municipality should jointly levy a toll upon the
future unearned increment of the land. The toll of what?
Of the whole? No. Of a half? No. Of a quarter! No. Of
a fifth -- that is the proposal
of the Budget, and that is robbery, that is Plunder, that
is communism and spoliation, that is the social
revolution at last, that is the overturn of civilized
society, that is the end of the world foretold in the
Apocalypse! Such is the increment tax about which so much
chatter and outcry are raised at the present time, and
upon which I will say that no more fair, considerate, or
salutary proposal for taxation has ever been made in the
House of Commons. ... Read the
whole piece
Nic Tideman:
Being Just While Conceptions of Justice are Changing: 7
Cases
A conception of justice is a framework for resolving
questions of what liberties people ought to have. The
smooth functioning of society requires substantial
consensus about conceptions of justice, because without
such consensus, people will take actions and make claims
on resources that others regard as intrusions upon what
is properly theirs. This can be expected to lead, at a
minimum, to disharmony and possibly to violent conflict.
On the other hand, when people agree on a conception of
justice and who is competent to interpret it, conflicts
will be less likely to arise, and those that do arise can
be settled more easily. Thus there is strong impetus
toward stability in any society's conception of justice:
Any doubts about a shared conception of justice may be
suppressed or hidden to preserve the advantages of
consensus.
Moral evolution, however, can require conceptions of
justice to change, as when the world came to recognize
that slavery could not be just, or that women must be
accorded the same civil rights as men. When, as with the
abolition of slavery, a new conception of justice entails
the elimination of the sale value of what had previously
been assets, there will be calls for compensation, on the
ground that, as provided in the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the U.S. Constitution, governments should
not take property without compensation.
Advocates of the new understanding, on the other hand,
will argue against compensation on the ground that
citizens who knew better should not be obliged to bail
out those who had sought to enrich themselves through the
perpetuation of old injustices. When slavery was ended in
the U.S., not only was there no compensation for the
previous "owners" of slaves, but the thirteenth amendment
to the U.S. Constitution explicitly forbade any state
from paying compensation. Why should the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution require
compensation in general while the thirteenth amendment
forbids it for losses sustained from the end of slavery?
Ackerman (1984) points out the importance of the
distinction between ordinary legislation, where it must
be accepted that self-interest will be rife, and
constitutional law-making, where something much closer to
consensus is achieved. It was not inconsistent for the
thirteenth amendment to depart from the general principle
that compensation must be provided, because the
constitutional process attenuated the self-interested
forces that the requirement of compensation was designed
to check. ...
read the whole article
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