I. Taxing Land as Ethics and
Efficiency
II. What is Land?
III. The simple efficiency argument for
taxing land
IV. Taxing Land is Better Than
Neutral
V. Measuring the Economic Gains from
Shifting Taxes to Land
VI. The Ethical Case for Taxing Land
VII. Answer to Arguments against Taxing
Land
An additional ethical reason for recognizing equal
rights to natural opportunities is that it may be
necessary to secure world peace. Nations have
arisen through violence. While the world condemns
violence among nations, it has persistently acquiesced to
regimes established by violence. The greater the
natural resources of a nation, the greater is the
attraction to potential tyrants of the possibility of
taking over the nation. If the world is able to
establish an understanding, backed up by the threat of
economic boycotts, that nations have an obligation to
share the value of natural opportunities in proportion to
population, and that people are free to leave nations
that they find unacceptable, then the return to violent
appropriation of power will be removed. As long as
we accept the continued exercise of disproportionate
power over natural opportunities by those who acquired
that power through violence, we will have difficulty
persuading potential usurpers of power that we will not
accept their conquests. Read the whole
article
Nic Tideman: The Shape
of a World Inspired by Henry George
How would the world look if its political
institutions were shaped by the conception of social
justice advanced by Henry George?
Mason Gaffney: Rent Seeking and Global
Conflict
Mason Gaffney: Rent, Taxation,
Dissipation and Federalism
I. The issue II. Sources of
rent III. Dissipation of rent before
the fisc takes it: what and how?
A. Dissipation means waste and destruction or
suppression.
B. How rent is dissipated.
C. Open access followed by tenure: rent-seeking
institutions.
IV. Dissipating rent via public
spending
A. Taxes and lease provisions need not twist
incentives.
B. Public spending of tax proceeds may dissipate
rent.
C. History of recognition of this spending effect
D. Successful compromises with the
principle.
1. Barriers to immigration or sharing.
2. Selling voters on the benefits of
immigration
E. Less successful compromises with the
principle
1. Public works.
2. Subsidized public works in tandem with
exclusionary zoning
3. Hocking the revenues
V. Solutions
A. Socialize rent at the national level.
B. Limit benefits to citizens per se (not to landowners
per se).
C. A social dividend to citizens is the obvious
route.
D. Return rents to local school districts in inverse
proportion to local tax base per capita (the Colin
Clark principle).
E. Promote James Madison and Neville Chamberlain to
elder statesmen emeritus.
Offset rights to pollute are
doubly effective in dissipating rent.
By generating a nuisance and lowering
the value of surrounding land, a polluter is rewarded
by receiving a valuable vested right to continue the
nuisance in perpetuity, or sell it.
Internationally, rent-seeking via warfare, or
big-stick policies threatening warfare, may be seen to
dissipate rent when we deduct the public cost from the
private gain.
Read
the whole
article
Nic Tideman:
Applications of Land Value Taxation to Problems of
Environmental Protection, Congestion, Efficient Resource
Use, Population, and Economic Growth
John Locke did not advocate land value taxation.
Writing in about 1690, he said that there was so much
unclaimed land in America that no one could properly
complain about the private appropriation of land in
Europe.3 Writing nearly 200 year
later, when it was becoming impossible for people to
appropriate good unclaimed land in America, Henry George
said:
If we are all here by the equal permission of the
creator, we are all here with an equal title to the
enjoyment of his bounty -- with an equal right to the
use of all that nature so impartially offers. This is a
right which is natural and inalienable; it is a right
which vests in every human being as he enters the
world, and which during his continuance in the world
can be limited only by the equal rights of others.
There is in nature no such thing as a fee simple in
land. There is on earth no power which can rightfully
make a grant of exclusive ownership in land. If all
existing men were to unite to grant away their equal
rights, they could not grant away the right of those
who follow them.4
George preceded this argument with a psychological and
linguistic one. He said that our conception of property,
of a right of exclusive possession, is based on the idea
that each person has a right to his or her productive
powers, and therefore to what he or she produces. Since
no one produced land, no one can properly claim to own
it.5
This psychological and linguistic argument is not
entirely convincing. It seems clear that humans, like
other species, have an impulse toward the appropriation
and defense of territory. Natural selection has worked in
favor of those who are skilled in appropriating natural
opportunities and deterring others from encroaching on
them. It seems possible that, as a way of limiting
violence, humans have merged an idea of ownership based
on production with an idea of ownership based on the
ability to appropriate territory and deter
encroachment.
If this is the social and biological reality, then
there is a different argument for treating natural
opportunities as everyone's common heritage. Realizing
that we are participants in a game of territorial
appropriation and its extension into the politics of
special interest legislation and other manifestation of
privilege, we should also realize that substantial gains
are possible from ending the game of encroachment and
appropriation. We might aspire to end the waste of effort
on all forms of rent-seeking and on defense against
rent-seeking. But our efforts to end the game have been
based primarily on enshrining the status quo:
The last successful appropriator gets to
keep what has been appropriated. This deference to power
might be considered simply realistic. However, it has a
high cost. The practice of legitimating successful
past appropriations -- as when the world declines to
challenge Indonesia's 1976 annexation of East Timor, or
when any number of dictators become recognized as the
rightful heads of nations -- induces selfish egoists to
calculate that if they can grab something and hang on to
it long enough for the expected furor to subside, then it
will be regarded as just as legitimately theirs as North
America is regarded as the legitimate property of the
descendants of European settlers rather than the
previously occupying natives. (And of course, in many
cases those previously occupying natives had forcibly
displaced earlier occupants.) A statement of the form,
"No appropriation before year X will be questioned, but
all aggressive appropriations after year X will be
overturned," is not credible. Year X keeps getting moved,
and successful aggression pays.
Much more credible is a statement of the form, "We
will share equally the value of natural opportunities
that might be appropriated." This is the potential of
land value taxation: to provide a framework in which the
value of natural opportunities will be shared equally,
both as an expression of the idea that all persons have
equal rights to natural opportunities, and as a formula
whose potential to remove the motive for future
aggression is greater than that of enshrining the status
quo of any particular year. And in addition, land value
taxation is one way of achieving allocative efficiency
with respect to a wide variety of public issues.
Land value taxation is usually thought of as a
possible source of revenue for local governments.
But the ethical principle that supports
it is most coherent when the principal is applied on a
global basis: All persons in the world have equal rights
to natural opportunities. This does not mean that all
persons in the world have equal rights to all land rent.
To the extent that the rent of land arises as a result of
the provision of infrastructure, that rent is the natural
income of the polity that provided the infrastructure,
and the logical source for financing it. What all persons
in the world have equal rights to is the
"pre-development" rental value of land, the rental value
that land would have to the potential developer of a new
community if there were no community and no
infrastructure. To motivate the application of
land value taxation to other areas of economic life, I
will assume that there is a global agreement that,
because all persons have equal rights to natural
opportunities, there will be transfers among nations to
equalize per capita pre-development rent. The principle
behind this agreement is then extended to other issues.
...
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