I have listened to some of this, more today than any other day as I had some driving to do and NPR is my co-pilot.
I had a hard time driving some of the time due to some excess saline eyewash: the sincerity and abject remorse of some of the speakers was hard to listen to. It’s important to remember the difference between elected officials and civil/public servants: the civil servants may and often do their jobs as electeds come and go. So they offer the continuity and institutional memory of the government: they know how things work and what doesn’t work.
So listening to them talking about how they tried to learn more about the threats, how they tried to raise the awareness of the chatter they were hearing, and learning how what they saw as important, even critical, was ignored by the electeds is both infuriating and heartbreaking. [T]hough [former acting FBI Director Thomas Pickard] initially briefed the attorney general regarding these threats, after two such briefings the attorney general told him he did not want to hear this information anymore.
Thinking more about the Presidential Daily Briefing of August 6, 2001, does it seem the president and his inner circle are just not curious, not engaged enough to want to know more about these potential threats? As I mentioned in these comments, what possible scenarios came to mind as the people preparing this briefing and the person for whom it was written read the thing? I get the impression nothing was going to happen unless there were clear choices spelled out.
Possible action items [check all that apply]:
* warn airlines and FAA of possible hijacking threat
* alert airbases near congested flight paths to be on alert
* monitor all communications with Sheik Rahman
* pay special attention to mentions of him by name or any known or suspected code words
* assemble/update and disseminate visa watch lists of Al Queda operatives to all border checkpoints and airlines
* have on my desk in 24 hours a detailed and concise action plan for a possible hijacking to free Sheik Rahman: what is our proposed response and more importantly, what pre-emptive steps can we take to foil any such plans
* have on my desk in 24 hours a history of Al Queda, its sources of financing, its motives, leaders and their history, and two actions plans, one short-term plan to disrupt their network, and one long-term to undermine their motives, diplomatically, militarily. Explore all options.
* have on my desk by COB today likely targets and times for attacks, based on what intelligence we have from CIA/FBI/State and our allies. This is to be updated daily until further notice.
* Arrange a call with the DCI, NSA, VP, Sec’y of State to discuss a war posture against a non-state enemy who has declared war on the United States. Followups to be arranged with the Joint Chiefs and select cabinet members.
An aggressive and wide-ranging list, but we’re talking about the president of the United States: none of this should be impossible but making the call. And I’m afraid that’s what we have: a team that isn’t capable of understanding their responsibilities and how to exercise their authority. Hard as it may be to believe, the US government is even more powerful and has more resources than Halliburton.