dangerous bluff, continued

If we take the report on Iraq’s weapons capability at face value, what should we make of Saddam’s refusal to yield to a rigorous inspection regime? Why would he bluff at the risk of losing his power and position?

If we take the report on Iraq’s weapons capability at face value, what should we make of Saddam’s refusal to yield to a rigorous inspection regime? Why would he bluff at the risk of losing his power and position?

Take a look at the map: Iraq is the yellow bit in the middle, with Iran in pink to the right and Saudi Arabia to the left in brown. Would you want to admit to the world that you were defenseless, given a recent war with Iran and continued mutual antipathy toward Saudi Arabia?

 Maps Maps 606Map of the Iran-Iraq War:

When two of the world’s leading suppliers of oil go to war, the world has to take sides, but when the war pits a corrupt dictatorship against a fanatic theocracy, it’s hard to know which side to take. As a purely practical matter, however, it’s best to line up with corrupt dictatorships because they’re usually more willing to work a deal. During the Iran-Iraq War, the world as a whole tossed in with Iraq. The two superpowers openly assisted the Iraqis, as did most centrist Moslem states such as Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

And here’s a look at how different governments took sides (the US took both sides: above the table to Iraq by supplying intelligence and under the table to Iran in the Iran/Contra misadventure).

 Mwhite28 Images Ira-N-Q2

Saddam’s options?

* To declare and/or have confirmed that he had no weapons, risking attack by his neighbors.
Would the US or UN defend Iraq? Would we have seen the establishment of a protectorate to safeguard the flow of oil?

* To remain resolute and defiant, and let whomever take responsibility for rebuilding Iraq, at whatever human and financial costs. He loved power more than Iraq, so he held on to that as long as he could.

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