Will Rogers said it best.
The New York Times > National > Correcting the Record on Sept. 11, in Great Detail:
“Correcting the Record on Sept. 11, in Great Detail”
This makes for some frustrating reading. The 9/11 attacks were made simpler by a lack of attention to detail at all levels, it appears. From border guards and immigration officers who didn’t catch altered documents or pursue visa violators to intelligence analysts who misunderstood the nature and capabilities of the threats to executives who, even given flawed but alarming information, didn’t react, it seems like there was a collective tune-out. Given that increasing intensity and boldness of the attacks — the 1993 attack on the WTC, the Khobar Towers attack, the US embassy attacks in east Africa, the crippling of the USS Cole, a briefing with the title Bin Laden Determined to Attack in U.S. should have aroused some interest. While I don’t claim the president should have leapt into action at this revelation, I’ve wondered about the culture of an executive branch that would take such a passive approach to such alarming news.
As noted here, why didn’t the people submitting the briefing volunteer any possible actions that could be taken?
I came up with this list in about 10 minutes back in April when I originally wrote about this:
Possible action items [check all that apply]:
• warn airlines and FAA of possible hijacking threat
• alert airbases near congested flight paths to be on alert
• monitor all communications with Sheik Rahman
• pay special attention to mentions of him by name or any known or suspected code words
• assemble/update and disseminate visa watch lists of Al Queda operatives to all border checkpoints and airlines
• have on my desk in 24 hours a detailed and concise action plan for a possible hijacking to free Sheik Rahman: what is our proposed response and more importantly, what pre-emptive steps can we take to foil any such plans
• have on my desk in 24 hours a history of Al Queda, its sources of financing, its motives, leaders and their history, and two actions plans, one short-term plan to disrupt their network, and one long-term to undermine their motives, diplomatically, militarily. Explore all options.
• have on my desk by COB today likely targets and times for attacks, based on what intelligence we have from CIA/FBI/State and our allies. This is to be updated daily until further notice.
• Arrange a call with the DCI, NSA, VP, Sec’y of State to discuss a war posture against a non-state enemy who has declared war on the United States. Followups to be arranged with the Joint Chiefs and select cabinet members.
But then we know that the new administration’s attention was drawn elsewhere. Is it unpatriotic to wonder why we would need fund a fleet of new sub-hunting aircraft or a missile defense system when we are one of the only nations to effectively use subs and missiles? Our enemies aren’t using those weapons and as noted above, the previous attacks should have made that obvious.
I think the culture of the executive branch had a lot to do with the success of the attacks: the amen chorus of will say it’s all Clinton’s fault, since the earlier attacks took place on his watch but those attacks took place outside America. An attack of this magnitude against the homeland is a different thing. If one really wanted to get to the bottom of it, one could consider how much the Ken Starr inquisition distracted the prior administration from dealing with the Al Queda threat comprehensively. The notion of opportunity cost comes to mind.